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A GOAL-ORIENTED MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE FOR WISCONSIN
By Cyril D. Robinson*
I. Introduction
In June 1966, the Wisconsin legislature approved
AN ACT to increase the appropriation
to the judicial council for the purpose of
conducting a study of criminal procedure
laws.
The appropriation in section 20.490-
(1)(a) of the statutes, as effected by the
laws of 1965, is increased by $18,980 for
the fiscal year 1966-67 for the purpose of
conducting a detailed research study of
criminal procedure in this state and re-
writing all relevant criminal procedure
*tatutes.1
Pursuant to this act the judicial council appointed a committee to oversee
the revision of the Wisconsin code of criminal procedure and contracted
with Marquette University Law School to furnish one of its faculty mem-
bers as reporter to the committee. For the purpose of conducting neces-
sary research and drafting as reporter to the committee, the author was
appointed in July 1966 to the law faculty of Marquette University. The
revision project was scheduled to last two years. Before the end of the
first year, however, the council in April 1967 voted not to renew its con-
tract with Marquette University. The council refused to accept the more
systematic approach to revision which utilizes definitive principles and
goals to which the code must conform. The alternate method of revision
has been called a "patch-work" approach, seeking to plug with legislative
thumbs the various breaches in the dike of criminal justice caused by the
passage of time and the recurrent decisions of the United States Supreme
Court. The reasoning which led the judicial council in Wisconsin to ter-
minate its effort rather than attempt a rebuilding of the code reaches far
beyond criminal procedure and the State of Wisconsin. The decision re-
*Assistant Professor of Political Science, Rosary College. LL.B. 1952, Northwestern
University.
Reprints of the statute proposed and discussed by Mr. Robinon infra are available
from Prospectus.
I Wis. SEss. LAws 1965, Chap. 609, eff. July 20, 1966.
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flects much of the problem attending a significant revision of any code law.
While the story of its demise is worthy of careful attention, the Wis-
consin experience forms only a history out of which this suggested model
code of pre-arraignment procedure has developed.
In this article we analyze the arrest chapter of the proposed code as it
was substantially completed at the time the project was terminated, al-
though it has been updated to accommodate relevant recent case law. We
examine the need for guiding principles in drafting a code, the proper aims
and organization of the code, the proposed provisions of the arrest chapter,
and the law and practice which recommend both the principles and the
provisions. 2
A. What is a revision?
The judicial council has never formally set out its conception of the
code revision called for by the legislature. However, minutes from one of
the meetings which preceded the termination of the project summarize the
discussion as follows:
The Committee [supervising the revi-
sion of the code] is getting into things
over and above those requiring amend-
ment or change. [The reporter] should
start with ch. 954 matters [the present ar-
rest chapter] and amend or correct them
to comply with new constitutional provi-
sions . . . existing statutes should be
amended, omissions supplied, etc. 3
This approach is not unique to Wisconsin. Although in recent years codes
have become more common in preference to individual legislative acts,
2 Code provisions discussed remain substantially as they were presented to the re-
vision committee unless otherwise indicated. The provisions and the commentary
thereon are to be attributed solely to the writer who writes not as reporter for
the committee but in his individual capacity.
3 Digest of Proceedings of Meeting of Judicial Council, March 17, 1967, Report of
the Criminal Rules Committee 4. In a letter to the writer dated June 9, 1967,
William A. Platz, assistant attorney general, and one of the members of the
supervisory committee for the code revision, wrote:
My understanding of why the judicial council
initiated the Criminal Procedure Code revision
was because of defects, omissions, conflicts,
etc. in the existing Code caused in part by
amendments hastily made in connection with
the court organization bills of 1961, and by
such things as the Wisconsin Supreme Court
recognition of motions for leave to withdraw
pleas of guilty which are not referred to in
the Code.
[Vol. 2:1
Pre-Arraignment Procedure
there are those experienced in comparative law who believe that no penal
code or criminal procedure code worthy of the name yet exists in this
country. 4 Typically state codes drafted to date have avoided carefully
every important and controversial policy decision. This is especially true
for pre-arraignment. One finds nothing on standards of arrest and non-
arrest, on field interrogation, on in-custody interrogation, or on action to
be taken where the police fail to conform to such legislative and judicial
standards as do exist. 5
There is not even agreement on the terms to be used to describe the
various approaches to "revision". Professor Remington delineates three
methods:
"piecemeal amendment" which
involves the repeal of certain sections,
the amendment of others, perhaps the
enactment of a few new ones. Emphasis
is upon the most obvious defects with
the least possible disturbance to other
criminal statutes. It is the traditional
method of revision in the criminal law;
"mechanical redrafting of all existing crim-
inal statutes",
the redrafting of the statutes to elimi-
nate inconsistent use of terminology,
verbosity, needless distinction, and du-
plication between sections, and perhaps
to reorganize the statutes according to
a more sensible classification. The ob-
jective is to modernize, simplify, and
clarify the language of existing statutes.
Change, whether it be the enacting of
new statutes, the repeal of old ones, or
4 Mueller and Kamisar, Has the Court Left the Attorney General Behind? -The
Bazelon-Katzenbach Letters on Poverty, Equality and the Administration of
Criminal Justice, 54 Ky. L. REV. 515, 517 (1966); Cohen, Criminal Law Legis-
lation and Legal Scholarship, 16 J. LEGAL ED. 253, 255-59 (1964).
. REMINGTON, REFORM IN STATE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 27-28, Edward Douglass
White Lecture, Georgetown University Law Center, Nov. 13, 1963; Weisberg,
Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, 52 J.CRIM. L. C.
& P.S. 21, 22 (1961). This conclusion is likewise accurate for penal codes. See
Molnar, The Proposed Criminal Code of Georgia, 3 GEO. ST. BAR J. 145,
152-55 (1966), where the revision committee considered abortion, consensual
sexual offenses, capital punishment and the defense of insanity but were unable
to agree and therefore "the final solution, if there will ever be a final solution,
was left to future legislators." See also Platz, The 1949 Revision of the Wis-
consin Code of Criminal Procedure, 1950 Wis. L. REV. 28, 41. Some reasons
for legislative inaction are analyzed in LaFave, Improving Police Performance
through the Exclusionary Rule-Part II: Defining the Norms and Training the
Police, 30 Mo. L. REV. 566, 568-579 (1965).
December 1968]
Prospectus
the codification of existing case law in
areas untouched by existing statutes, is
to be avoided;
"codification"
is the attempt to state enough of the
substantive law in statutory form to
give a reasonably adequate picture of
its scope and the details of its provi-
sions without extended reference to
case law.6
An "over-all revision" is sometimes referred to as "reform". 7 The term
"systematization" has also been employed.8 But whatever the name of the
game, this seems to be the time for revision. A recent survey shows that
twenty states are in the process of revising their penal code or procedural
code, or both; four others are about to begin revision and thirteen have re-
cently revised one code or the other.9 In addition, a National Commission
6 Remington, Criminal Law Revision, Codification v. Piecemeal Amendment, 33
NEB. L. REV. 396, 402-04 (1954). Although the article concerns problems of
substantive law revision, the classifications apply equally to procedural revision.
Compare Platz, supra note 5 at 29, with Platz, The Criminal Code, 1956 Wis.
L. REV. 350, 356 for a comparison of the objectives of the two codes.
7 Remington, supra note 5 at 1, n. 1; Senator McClellan, in a report submitted in
connection with the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws,
stated:
The administration bill (H.R. 13548) would
have created a Criminal Law Revision Com-
mission. H.R. 15766 contemplates a Criminal
Law Reform Commission, which would not be
limited to recodification or revision, merely
restating existing laws and limiting disparities,
but would itself determine where its attention
will best be focused after having had an op-
portunity to review the entire spectrum of the
criminal laws, including also the possible codi-
fication of case law where needed to modernize
the system.
S. REP. No. 1862, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1966).
SCohen, supra note 4 at 255, 267, 270; ALl MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
PROCEDURE xviii-ix, [hereafter cited as MODEL PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE (1966).]
9 According to a countrywide survey made by the writer, as of April 20, 1967, eleven
states were revising both their penal code and code of criminal procedure: Colorado,
Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Ohio, South Caro-
lina and Washington; six states were revising their penal code: California, Delaware,
Maine, Montana, Pennsylvania and Texas; three states were revising their code of
criminal procedure: Missouri, New York and Wisconsin; four states were propos-
ing revision: Indiana, Kentucky and Oregon of the penal code and Hawaii of both
codes; thirteen states have revised one or the other code within the last five years:
Alaska, Florida, Louisiana, Maine, Montana, Nevada and Texas, the code of crimi-
nal procedure; Illinois, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Mexico and New York,
the penal code; and West Virginia, both codes. See Robinson, Revisionists of the
States Unite, 5 AMER. CRIM. L.Q. 178, 180 (1967). At the end of 1967, "22 states
were engaged in either overall or limited constitutional revision activity." N.Y.
Times, Jan. 31, 1968, §1 at 18, col. 7. Professor Frank B. Baldwin 111, of the
[Vol. 2:1
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for the Reform of Federal Criminal Laws has been formed1 0 and there
is some interest in another look at the Uniform Code of Military Justice.l
Moving forces for such a surge of revision must certainly include the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code and Model Code of Pre-
Arraignment Procedure, the American Bar Association subcommittees on
minimum standards for criminal justice, and the Report of the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. Another
such force must be seen in the ever-increasing number of United States
Supreme Court and state court opinions discovering, recognizing or ex-
panding the rights of a defendant, and thereby deciding many of the policy
questions with which the legislatures have so far failed to grapple. The
increasing incidence of crime and particularly the publicity given court de-
cisions as a relevant factor in the control of crime have also played a
part. In addition, many of the codes under revision have passed their hun-
dredth birthday not having been substantially revised since the state en-
tered the Union. Until the adoption of the criminal code of Louisiana
twenty-five years ago, there had been almost no "over-all reform of the
substantive criminal law" and until the adoption of the Illinois code of
criminal procedure in 1963, there was no completely revised procedural
code. 12
This movement toward revision has paralleled the accumulation of em-
pirical data about the criminal justice system. Notable in this service are
the various studies by the American Bar Foundation and the studies being
University of California School of Law at Davis, is making a more extensive
survey for the American Law Institute.
10 See note 7 supra; See also 3 CR. L. 2414 (1968).
11 N.Y. Times, May 18, 1967, §1 at 3, col. 1.
12 Remington, supra note 5 at 3.
A traditional legislative response to difficult
issues has been either to deal with them by an
overly generalized statute as is the case with
respect to gambling, or not to deal with the
issue at all, which has been the case, until
recently at least, with respect to stopping and
questioning suspects.
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice.
Task Force Report: The Police 18 (1967), [hereafter cited as Police Task Force
Report]. This has been true especially of pre-arraignment procedures. What
was said over 30 years ago is still true:
[C]ourt procedure deals with a relatively small
number of the total criminal cases. The Crim-
inal Justice surveys made in several states dis-
closed that the chief failure of our machinery
of criminal justice occurs at the very beginning.
• . . It is rather the matter of administration
that needs attention; the personnel, equipment
and methods of the police, the prosecuting
attorneys and court officials. These matters have
largely hitherto escaped attention.
Lindsey, Legislation on Crime in Twenty-five Years, 24 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S.
109, 116-17 (1933).
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fostered by a growing awareness of mutuality of interest between be-
havioral scientists in the making and operation of legal controls and law
reformers in the behavioral science.13
Though the time is ripe for long strides toward law reform and though
there is now a wealth of legal and behavioral material never before avail-
able to law revisors, evidently the pattern has changed little from the
"horse and buggy" operations of a bar association committee or part-time
law teacher responsible for the codes now in existence.1 4 Even where it
is recognized that "changes in our code have been made without reference
to general principles or to the problem of maintaining a consistent and
rational system" 15 and where a formal decision is made "to identify and
consider fundamental policy issues and resolve them by changing existing
law,"1 6 the limited perspective of those usually controlling policy consid-
erations frequently makes realization of such objectives illusory.17
IMSee the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, A Report, Appendix B,
313-25 (1967), [hereafter cited as President's Commission Report], for the
number of social scientists of various disciplines employed in the project. Some
of the most interesting work will be found in the field reports filed by social
scientists.
14 From the information gathered by the survey, supra note 9, it appears that nine
states have appointed a law professor to draft the code, usually as reporter to
a committee of lawyers and judges; in seven instances it is the legislative or
judicial council which is directly charged with the task; in four cases it is the
bar association and in three a special commission created by the legislature.
New York probably has the most elaborate set-up, having appointed a temporary
commission with the right to hold public hearings, an annual budget of over
$150,000, a staff of two full-time lawyers, a lawyer employed part-time for
special research and drafting, and three secretaries. A typical effort includes a
round table of judges, lawyers (defense and prosecution), perhaps law enforce-
ment officials and occasionally in a far-out effort, a consulting sociologist. The
composition of the committee usually represents an attempt to make it politically
palatable, by sprinkling it with a few pro-defense and pro-prosecution people. Al-
though this makes for a good political compromise at the beginning, it makes
unlikely a systematic reform at the end. For such a tale with a relatively happy
ending, see Platz, supra note 6 at 352, 355. For the composition of committees,
see Platz, supra note 5 at 28 n. 1, Keeton and Reid, Proposed Revision of the
Texas Penal Code, 45 TEXAs L. REv. 399, 408-411 (1967). Compare with
Conway, Making Research Effective in Legislation, 1967 Wis. L. Rev. 252, 259.
15 Keeton and Reid, supra note 14 at 402.
16ld. at 406.
17 Preparatory to revising the Texas Penal Code, the staff of the State Bar Committee
solicited recommendations from interested lawyers, judges and district attorneys.
With few exceptions the recommendations fall
into the following categories: 1) Consolidation
of certain offenses (theft being the most com-
mon); 2) relaxation of certain rules of evidence
(e.g., corroboration); 3) imposition of longer
terms of imprisonment and measures to assure
longer terms actually spent in prison; and 4)
the raising of certain offenses from misde-
meanors to felonies.
[Vol. 2:1
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The need for such formalized delineation of principles has been disputed
seriously. One may argue that the American legal heritage is one of on-
going supplementation, case by case, brick by brick, giving a dynamic elas-
ticity to our law.lS Yet to the extent this is so, it does not always result
from deliberate legislative choice but rather from legislative inability to
agree on such principles, or reluctance even to consider the need for them.
Traditionally it has been left to the police to evolve a system of operative
criminal justice and to the courts to define the limits of permissible activ-
ity. The increasingly legislative role of the United States Supreme Court
is attributable largely to the failure of the police, the state courts and par-
ticularly the legislature to control their own destiny and that of their
state.1 9
So long as revision remains unstructured and limited to amendments to
existing law in a perpetual attempt to "keep-up" with the Supreme Court,
this situation will persist. Such a legal marathon not only is costly and
wasteful of legal talent but also prolongs the unfortunate reversal of roles in
which the Court makes the political decisions and the legislature tidies up
afterward. While it is the function of a court to evolve the individual
Cohen, Reflections on the Revision of the Texas Penal Code, 45 TEXAS L. REV.
413, 415 (1967). See also Wright, Procedural Reform: Its Limitations and Its
Future, 1 GA. L. REV. 563, 574-77 (1967). For comparison, see SUTTON, THE
ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION: A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF LAW REFORM, 1009,
1014-15, 1022-27 (1967), and R. POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 22-23
(1930).
IS See Remington, supra note 6 at 406.
19 The Court, of course, is cognizant of this role. Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in
Terry v. Ohio, 36 U.S.L.W. 4578 (June 10, 1968), observed that "what is said by
this Court today will serve as initial guidelines for law enforcement authorities
and courts throughout the land...." For the structure this has taken, see
Robinson, Police and Prosecutor Practices and Attitudes Relating to Interrogation
As Revealed by Pre and Post-Miranda Questionnaires: A Construct of Police
Capacity to Comply, 1968 DUKE L.J. 425, 452-474, 471-473 and 493-499.
Perhaps the most succinct statement of this Supreme Court-legislative jux-
taposition is found in Packer, Policing the Police, Nine Men are not Enough,
The New Republic, Sept. 4, 1965, 17, 18-19. The proper place of the
legislature has been assigned recently by the Wisconsin legislature itself in its
structure of the Executive Branch. The "Declaration of Policy" stated:
The "republican form of government" guar-
anteed by the U.S. constitution contemplates
the separation of powers within state govern-
ment among the legislative, the executive and
the judicial branches of the government. The
legislative branch has the broad objective of
determining policies and programs and review
of program performance for programs previ-
ously authorized, the executive branch carries
out the programs and policies and the judicial
branch has the responsibility for adjudicating
any conflicts which might arise from the inter-
pretation or application of the laws.
WIs. STAT. §15.001(1) (1967).
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pieces of the legal puzzle, it is for the legislature to bring them together
into a coherent whole, to discard the pieces that do not fit, and to construct
new pieces where necessary. The most eloquent proof that a modest effort
may be more costly than a full-scale revision is found in Wisconsin's lim-
ited revision of the criminal procedure code, representing four years of
labor but now again in need of revision.20
The kind of changes least likely to
work are the kind most likely to be sug-
gested by the socially conscious, nonradi-
cal observer - middle range changes, so
to speak, designed to achieve special and
isolated ends, suggested without recogniz-
ing the interrelationships of the various
levels of the criminal justice system. Such
efforts at isolated change will almost cer-
tainly be neutralized, for the system will
compensate in such a way as to approxi-
mate the quality of justice to which soci-
ety has become accustomed. 2 1
B. Principles Underlying Revision
Allowing that there may be advantages to a code which adheres to pre-
determined guiding principles in order to attain consistency and rationality,
the skeptic may fairly ask not only that those principles be defined but also
that the expected benefits from their application in a state such as Wiscon-
son be specified. 22 This article is an effort to supply answers to these
questions.
The guiding principles of the proposed code (hereafter referred to as
20 See Platz, supra note 5 at 29 for the original objectives of the Code.
2 1 OAKS AND LEHMAN, A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE INDIGENT 10 (1968);
SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 244 (1966); Breitel, The Quandary in
Litigation, 25 Mo. L. REV. 225, 237 (1960).
22 Remington, supra note 6 at 397-98; Remington, A Proposed Code for Wisconsin,
20 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 221 (1952). The argument for police guidelines is
strengthened by the conclusion that judges are thought to require them. Code
of Judicial Ethics, 36 Wis.2d 252, 153 N.W.2d 873 (1967). Judge Edwin M.
Wilkie, state court administrator, said of the newly enacted code that it
represented
an important milestone in the administration of
justice in Wisconsin. . . . The Code sets forth
rules and standards which are helpful to the
court administration in reviewing the judicial
performance of all of our judges. . . . Without
specific rules and standards, it would be difficult
for judges to conform their conduct to proper
custom and practice.
Milwaukee Journal, Nov. 26, 1967, Accent section at 1, col. 3.
[Vol. 2:1
Pre-Arraignment Procedure
the Code) concern both its organization and its substance. 23 The reader is
23 Two preliminary problems were considered by the revision committee: should
the Code be drafted in the form of rules of court to be promulgated by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court or should it be drafted in statutory form to be
submitted to the legislature? Secondly, to what extent, if at all, should a code
of criminal procedure be concerned with ordinance violation?
Rules of court may be adopted by and modified by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court while statutes must pass through the more politicized legislative process.
The chance of a code thus retaining its integrity as a whole is much more likely
in the former circumstance than in the latter. The alternative of court rules
was rejected for several reasons, however. The enabling authorization for re-
vision issued from the legislature; it was natural to return the product to the
legislature for promulgation. It is also questionable whether the state Supreme
Court would have authority to regulate direct non-court procedures, such as
arrest without a warrant and police custody of the suspect.
Moreover, there is little precedent for such activity on the part of the Wis-
consin Supreme Court. Pursuant to Sec. 3, Art. VII of the Wisconsin con-
stitution, a statute, Wis. STAT. §251.18 (1967), authorizes the Supreme Court
to modify or suspend, by rule, all statutes relating to "pleading, practice and
procedure in judicial proceedings in all courts, for the purpose of simplifying
the same and of promoting the speedy determination of litigation upon its
merits." In re Constitutionality of Statute Empowering Supreme Court to
Promulgate Rules Regulating Pleading, Practice, and Procedure in Judicial Pro-
ceedings, 204 Wis. 501, 510, 236 N.W. 717, 720-721 (1931) upholds the
statute against the constitutional attack that it was an unlawful delegation by
the legislature of its legislative function. To date, in only five instances has
the court used its power to promulgate rules relating to criminal procedure:
212 Wis. xi (now WIs. STAT. §957.16); 214 Wis. vii (now WIS. STAT. §955.07);
236 Wis. vi (now Wis. STAT. §957.14); 25 Wis.2d ix (now Wis. STAT.
§956.03(3)); most recently, 34 Wis.2d v. (now Wis. STAT. §256.55), a rule
that, "with certain exceptions, all testimony in all courts of record in every
action . . . shall be reported" beginning January 1, 1968. Another considera-
tion in connection with court rules is the delicate position of a court called
upon to defend from constitutional attack rules it has promulgated. In an
instance where this occurred, the court was undeterred by false modesty in
declaring that the language of the statute, §955.07, "is plain and unambiguous."
State v. Selbach, 268 Wis. 538, 540, 68 N.W.2d 37, 38 (1955). [Research aid:
Marquette University law student, now attorney, Tod 0. Daniel.] A system
that would take advantage of both legislative and judicial attributes would
involve formulation by the legislature of generalized rules of the type suggested
by the proposed Code, which could be detailed and modified by the court in
response to changing and local conditions. Chief Judge Lumbard of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, at a conference of chief justices in August 1967,
suggested that state supreme courts be empowered "to draft and promulgate
rules of criminal procedure as the Congress has empowered the Supreme Court
to do." 1 CR.L. 2257 (1967). See Sutton, supra note 17 at 1019-20.
If we solve the second preliminary problem of ordinance violations by
including them in a code of criminal procedure, there is perhaps some semantic
inconsistency. However, it became obvious that their exclusion would leave
many questions unanswered, particularly in instances of arrest and custody
where the police officer is presented with a factual situation which does not
resolve itself easily into facile legal classifications. Ordinance violations involve
a lesser culpability, a more moderate penalty and little stigma. It was decided
December 19681
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invited to scan the present Arrest and Examination chapter of the Wis-
consin code of criminal procedure (chapter 954). Try to determine from
this reading the law governing the actions of the police, the district attorney
and the judge on the one hand and the rights of the suspect and his attor-
ney on the other. Attempt to reconstruct the path followed by the accused
from his entrance into the criminal process until his initial appearance
before a judge.2 4
The following were accepted as criteria for drafting a table of organiza-
tion for the Code:
1. Procedures should be set forth logically
and rationally so that a procedure is
found in the place and order one would
expect to find it. Procedures should,
as far as consistent with the other
listed attributes, follow the course of
the criminal process.
2. Extraneous details not directly con-
cerned with the day to day operation of
criminal justice administration should
be removed from the main part of the
to bring these violations within the code, treating them procedurally as mis-
demeanors.
Comments by John P. Howard, Chief of Police, city of Wauwatosa, Wisconsin,
were especially helpful and illustrate the importance of the participation of law
enforcement officials in code revision. He urged that the code include ordinance
violations as they are presently included in §954.03. He added:
I believe the time- has come to abandon the
legal fiction that Ordinance cases are "civil."...
The same requirements in pre-trial procedures
should apply to Ordinance violations as to statu-
tory crimes. A defendant convicted of theft in
Municipal Justice Court faces 30 days in the
House of Correction on default of payment of
$100 fine. . . . If one of the objectives of
your proposed draft is to insure due process
of law to all persons accused of crimes (in
the real meaning, as distinguished from a
legalistic definition of "crimes")- then the uses
of Municipal Courts and Ordinances will have
to be taken into account.
Letter'from Chief Howard to the writer, February 1, 1967. Prior to 1949,
ordinance violations were not covered by the code. In that year, §954.03 was
amended to include them. See note 53 infra. THE HIGHWAY SAFETY ACT
includes a uniform traffic citation and complaint but no separate arrest pro-
visions. Wis. STAT. §345.11 (1967) and the MODEL PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE,
supra note 8 at 1, recognize that "Many jurisdictions have special provisions
governing arrest, summons and court appearances, in cases involving parking
and minor traffic violations," and provide an exclusion clause.
24 See the court's attempt to do this in Pillsbury v. State, 31 Wis.2d 87, 92-93, 142
N.W.2d 187, 190-91 (1966).
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code. The aim should be a smooth
flow, almost descriptive in nature.
3. Matters should be grouped functionally
so that, for example, an attorney may
be sure that in checking the sections on
pleadings he will find all procedures
relating to pleading.
4. The obligations and duties of each le-
gal actor at the various stages of the
criminal process should be apparent.
These general objectives may be translated into several more specific
organizational adjustments to be made in the existing code:
a. All matters properly within a code of
criminal procedure should be found in
one place. Therefore matters in statutes
outside the Code, but appropriate to
criminal procedure, should be brought
within the confines of the Code.
b. Matters within the present code which
are not properly matters of criminal
procedure should be deleted.
c. Sections describing special or rarely
used procedures should be separated
from the main body of the code; for
example, provisions concerning forfei-
ture of bail, Wis. Stat. 954.30-954.33,
are to be placed in proposed chapter
974, Special Proceedings. 2 5
d. Areas of the law which are not now
statutory should be made statutory
where this is appropriate; for example,
felony arrest, or discovery procedures
making prosecution evidence available
to defendant's attorney.
e. Areas of the law which are partly stat-
utory, such as post-conviction reme-
dies, should be made entirely statutory.
25 The Wisconsin Code of Criminal Procedure presently occupies chapters 954
through 966 of the- Wisconsin Statutes. Although the Code was to occupy chap-
ters 967 to 975, and has been so enumerated in the- table of organization, most
of the discussion to follow will deal with chapter 969, the arrest chapter.. In
citing the sections of the present and proposed Code in the text, the section
number itself will be cited without further elaboration.
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f. Statutes which appear ambiguous or
incomplete should be amplified and de-
tailed; for example, the arrest to mag-
istrate cycle.
g. New procedures securing constitutional
rights should be detailed; for example,
provision of counsel to the indigent
before trial, or in-custody protections
for the suspect.
h. Uniformity of civil and criminal court-
room procedure should be sought
where this is feasible. 26
The result should be a smooth, chronological movement providing the
suspect's attorney, district attorneys, judges and other code "consumers"
with a useful tool in their day to day labor.27 Surprisingly little has been
written on criteria for the organization or attributes of a code, perhaps be-
cause such commentary is usually prepared afterwards and subordinated
to explanation of the reasons for the code provisions themselves. But at
the very least one may say that the code's first function is to instruct these
actors on how to proceed. 28 The following Table of Organization with
detailed provisions relating to custody is presented to suggest the useful-
ness of this approach:
TITLE XLVI
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 967 GENERAL PROVISIONS
967.01 Rules of Construction.
967.10 Application of the Code.
967.20 Terms and Jurisdiction of Court.
967.30 Definitions.
CHAPTER 968 PRE-CUSTODY PROCEDURES
968.01 Investigation of Crime.
968.10 Process.
(a) Warrant.
(b) Summons.
20 See Orfield, The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 10 ST. Louis L. REV.
445 (1966).
27Among these other "consumers" may be counted law enforcement officers, "jail-
house" lawyers, law students, and an occasional civilian who may have heard
that ignorance of the law is no excuse.
28 Regardless of the ultimate ends of organization listed above, initially the objective
of a table of organization is to provide a means for organizing the work of
writing the Code and the reader may judge it accordingly.
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CHAPTER 969 CUSTODY AND DISPOSITION OF THE PERSON
IN CUSTODY
969.01 Authority to Take a Person into Custody.
( 1 ) Authority to Take into Custody Without a Warrant-Felony.
(2) Authority to Take into Custody without a Warrant-Mis-
demeanor or Ordinance Violation.
(3) Notice to Appear after Taking into Custody.
(4) Release of Person.
969.03 Authority to Take into Custody a Person Unable to Care for
Himself.
(1) Conditions under which Custody is Permitted.
(2) Disposition of Incapacitated Persons.
969.05 Notice to Appear in Lieu of or in Connection with Taking into
Custody without a Warrant.
(1 ) Notice to Appear without Taking into Custody.
(2) Procedure for Issuing Notice to Appear.
(3) Notice to Appear in Place other than Court.
(4) Regulations to Encourage Notices to Appear.
969.07 Circumstances Implying Custody.
(I) Implied Restriction on Liberty.
(2) Requests to Appear at Police Station.
969.10 Place of Taking into Custody: Private Premises.
969.15 Procedures on Taking into Custody: Use of Force.
969.20 Procedures on Ordering a Person to Stop: Warning.
969.22 Procedures on Taking a Person into Custody: Warning.
969.24 Prompt Taking to Police Station.
969.30 Preliminary Disposition of Persons in Custody: Warning.
(1) Appearance before Station Officer.
(2) Warning.
(3) Printed Form to be Given.
(4) Incapacity to Understand Warning.
(5) Telephoning Rights.
(6) Information Concerning Location of Persons in Custody.
(7) Information Concerning Custody Decisions.
969.32 Disposition of Persons Taken into Custody.
(I) Alternative Dispositions.
(2) Order for Screening in Certain Cases.
(3) Duration of Period of Screening.
(4) Disposition at end of Period of Screening.
(5) Refusal of Complaint.
969.40 Stationhouse Bail.
969.50 Disposition of Person in Custody-Prompt Production Before
a Judicial Officer.
969.55 Perpetuation of Interrogation by Written Records and Sound
Recording.
(I ) Obligation to Make Records Relating to Periods of Custody.(2) Written Records.
(3) Sound or Written Recording of Interrogation.
(4) Access to Records.
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969.60 Conditions of Investigation of a Person in Custody.
(1) Warning at the Outset of Interrogation.
(2) Deception as to Cooperation.
(3) Deception as to Facts or Conditions.
969.70 Access to Counsel and Consultation Rights.
( 1 ) Access to Counsel - Indigents.
(2) Access to Counsel - Non-Indigents.
(3) Access of Counsel to Client.
969.75 Records to be Maintained by Station Officer.
969.80 Duty of District Attorney and Attorney General to Issue
Regulations.(1) District Attorney to Prepare Regulations Implementing
Code.
(2) Attorney General to Aid District Attorneys.
(3) Public Documents.
969.90 Violations of the Code: Exclusion of Evidence.
CHAPTER 970 PROCEEDINGS BEFORE TRIAL
970.01 Initial Appearance before Judicial Officer of Performance in
Custody.
(1) Filing of Reason for Charging with Court.
(2) Advising the Person in Custody.
(3) Printed Form to be Given.
(4) Further Proceedings to Await Appointment of Counsel.(5) Summary Trial of Some Cases.(6) Judicial Officer to Decide Release Question Promptly.
(7) District Attorneys to Promote Release of Persons in Custody.
970.10 Complaint.
970.15 Issuance and Filing of Complaints.
970.20 Initial Appearance before Judicial Officer of Persons not in
Custody.
970.25 Preliminary Examination.
970.30 Information.
970.35 Arraignment.
970.40 Guilty Pleas.
970.45 Defenses.
970.50 Pleadings.
970.55 Motions.
970.60 Discovery.
970.65 Aid to the Indigent Accused.
CHAPTER 971 TRIAL
CHAPTER 972 POST-TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
CHAPTER 973 EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES
CHAPTER 974 SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
CHAPTER 975 FORMS
CHAPTER 976 MISCELLANEOUS
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I. Custody and Disposition29
A. Sketch of Custody and Disposition Chapter
The chapter on custody and disposition was drafted to achieve these
objectives:
1. to isolate, clarify and rationalize points
of decision-making required of the
police;
2. to delimit the exercise of police author-
ity over the individual, maintaining
only that necessary to attain the de-
sired result;
3. to provide legislative answers to the
most crucial policy questions;
4. to provide a flexible framework within
which local authorities may work;
5. to provide just enough local and cen-
tral control to ensure that the Code is
properly implemented.
One of the advantages of drafting a code as compared to drafting a section
this year and another section another year is that a code should and may
have a "rationalizing principle." The "rationalizing principle" which forms
the underpinning of this chapter may be stated as follows:
Curtail the liberty of the individual only
where it is reasonably necessary and hence
rationally related to the accomplishment
of some clearly defined purpose of law
enforcement which could not otherwise
be attained.3 0
29 Subjects not covered by the draft chapter relating to custody include: pre-custody
procedures such as stop and frisk; questions relating to search, warrant, sum-
mons, details of bail procedures; definitions of terms such as "law enforcement
officer"; and sanctions to require code performance. The sections of the Code
set out in the Table of Organization but which are not drafted yet and are
not commented on here include: Chapters 967, 968, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975,
and 976 and also Sections 969.10, 969.15, 969.40, 969.75, 969.90 and 970.60.
30 This is suggestive of the German principle of proportion whereby a person may
not be taken into custody if to do so would be
disproportionate (1) to the significance of the
case, (2) to the punishment to be expected, or
(3) to the measure of prevention and reform
likely to be imposed.
See Robinson, Arrest, Prosecution and Police Power in the Federal Republic of
Germany, 4 DUQUESNE L. REV. 225, 253 (1965). A corresponding concept may
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In reading this article and examining the proposed provisions, the reader
should understand that the draft is preoccupied with the notion that the
American system of criminal justice is almost completely felony-oriented.
This means that procedures are organized around the approximate ten
per cent of criminal charges called felonies and judged most serious by
society. The Code was drafted not only to compensate but also to create
a clear bias in the direction of lessening the burdens of the system for
the lesser offender. 31
Bearing in mind the principle stated above, we should also recognize
two practical prerequisites to successful revision: police adherence to code
provisions and Supreme Court acceptance of such "state experimenta-
tion".32 The following outline offers the best chance of fulfilling the ration-
alizing principle and meeting practical prerequisites:
1. Limitations on arrests of lesser offen-
ders (969.01, 969.03, 969.05);33 pro-
vision of non-criminal procedures for
those physically or mentally unable to
care for themselves who would other-
wise fall within the criminal process
(969.03);
be found in American law with particular reference to the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment of the 8TH AMENDMENT to the UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 371 (1910);
Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1074
(1964); Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive
Criminal Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 635, 640 (1966); Taylor, The Supreme Court,
the Individual and the Criminal Process, I GA. L. REV. 386, 482-85 (1967);
MUELLER AND WISE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 565 (1965); Beccaria
stated it in the following words:
Every punishment, which does not arise from
absolute necessity, says the great Montesquieu,
is tyrannical. It is upon this then, that the
sovereign's right to punish crimes is founded;
that is, upon the necessity of defending the
public liberty, entrusted to his care, from the
ursurpations of individuals; and punishments
are just in proportion, as the liberty preserved
by the sovereign, is sacred and valuable.
BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 7 (1767).
31 Preparation for processing offenders in future riots requires that some considera-
tion be given that problem, as a way to reduce the workload as well as for
legal or humanitarian reasons. In New York City "Plans call for different
procedure for arrests made for different crimes; thus, cases involving serious
crimes, such as arson or sniping, will be handled differently from those involving
minor offenders such as curfew violators." 3 CR.L. 2436 (Aug. 21, 1968).
32Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966); United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 239 (1967).
33 The Draft Sections of the Code are discussed sequentially and set out in full
beginning with §969.01 and §969.05 at 31-34.
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2. Limitation on time that prisoners may
be held before being brought before
some judicial officer (969.24, 969.32,
969.50);
3. Protections during the time in police
custody;
a) detailed records are kept and are
available to suspect and his counsel
(969.75, 969.80(3) );
b) a record is made of all interrogation
(969.55);
c) counsel is available, if desired by
the prisoner (969.70);
d) rights of the prisoner to counsel and
to remain silent are clearly and re-
peatedly made known to him in
such a way that the choice to make
use of these rights is truly his choice
(969.20, 969.22, 969.30(2), 969.-
60(1));
4. More detailed guidelines or regulations
for police will become available as
experience with the system broadens
(969.05(4), 969.80);
5. Information advising the police how to
comply with the statutory rules, and
means to determine if there is compli-
ance (969.80).
The draft chapter on custody represents a measured delimitation of
police power in accordance with the need. It must show through clearly
that the Code is not just a formal, negative and thus passive adherence
to constitutional imperatives but a studied, systematic attempt to resolve
the apparent conflict between individual and law enforcement needs. The
conditions in which a penal code is enforced should receive as much con-
sideration as did the penal code which first designated the conduct as
criminal and thus now subjects the individual to those conditions.
A prime objective of the Code is to identify and release at the earliest
possible stage those persons who need not be taken into or retained in
custody. This approach sifts large numbers of persons from the custody
phase of the criminal process whose detention serves no purpose even
from the police point of view. If a person's liberty is to be restricted
whether for minutes or hours, that restriction must have a rational basis,
and that basis must be found in a situational need.
Under the Code an officer having reasonable grounds to believe a felony
has been committed may take the person into custody or may issue a
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notice to appear (969.01(1), 969.05(1)). If the officer has reasonable
grounds to believe a person has committed a misdemeanor or an ordinance
violation, he must give a notice to appear - unless he reasonably believes
that the person will not be apprehended, will cause injury or property
damage if not taken into custody, or that the person cannot supply suffi-
ciently reliable identification. In these circumstances, the suspect may be
taken into custody (969.01 (2) (b)). Special treatment is accorded persons
unable to care for themselves: intoxicated persons and those mentally or
physically disabled are to be taken home or to another appropriate facility
(969.03).
These procedures should permit a large proportion of misdemeanants
and ordinance violators to be given notices to appear eliminating the neces-
sity of an appearance at the station. Police will be able to deal with in-
toxicated persons without resort to the present revolving court door cycle.
Custody is applied only to those persons who are to be charged with serious
felonies or who cannot qualify as good risks for release without security
because there are grounds to expect that they will not appear in court.
Within two hours of the person's arrival at the police station the station
officer must decide as to his disposition. If the station officer concludes
that the person has committed no crime, he is to be released outright
(969.32(1)(a)). For all ordinance violations and for misdemeanors
where the statutory penalty does not exceed six months' imprisonment, the
station officer must issue a notice to appear or release the person on his
signed promise to appear, unless in the previous three years the person has
defaulted in a court appearance of some consequence (969.32(1) (b)).
For felonies and misdemeanors where the statutory penalty exceeds six
months' imprisonment, the station officer may require bail in addition. The
choice, however, for these more serious offenses is to be exercised under
the direction of the district attorney and pursuant to regulations issued by
him (969.32(1)(c)). The maximum permissible detention may be ex-
tended to three hours on condition that the station officer reasonably be-
lieves that the additional time is necessary to obtain sufficient information
to charge the person with one of a series of named serious crimes.
Warnings are required at the time of arrest (969.24), at the time of
arrival at the station (969.30(2)) and at the time of initial questioning
(969.60(1)). Facilities are to be made available so that the arrested per-
son may communicate with the outside world (969.30(5), 969.70(3))
and he is to be informed how long he may be held in custody
(969.30(2)(a), 969.60(l)(a)).
No criteria are provided for determining when a person has "knowingly
and intelligently" waived constitutional rights of silence and of counsel.
Provision is made, however, for preserving any interrogation about the
crime by means of a sound recording or stenographic transcript (969.55
(3)). The record of such interrogation and all other records required to
be kept by these sections are available to the defendant or to his attor-
ney (969.55(4), 969.75). These sections are aimed at reducing the com-
[Vol. 2:1
Pre-Arraignment Procedure
pulsive atmosphere of the police station in accordance with constitutional
requirements: first, by providing adequate warnings of rights; second, by
recording these steps so that a subsequent determination of compliance
may be made without swearing contests; and third, by opening the police
process to reasonable inspection.
The conditions under which the law enforcement officer may take a
person into custody are general and serve as guidelines rather than restric-
tions; the details for assuring that, after due warnings, any waiver of rights
is the result of intelligent understanding are left open. Many details can-
not and should not be minutely set forth in legislation which may be po-
litically difficult to modify. At the same time it is important that police
have guidance in matters involving more legal interpretation than police
administration. Therefore an obligation is placed on the district attorney
to provide regulations or guidelines to implement Code provisions appli-
cable to the police and to modify them in accordance with changing statu-
tory and case law (969.80(1)). In order to encourage uniformity of pro-
cedure throughout the state the attorney general is to issue guidelines
which may be utilized by the local district attorney (969.80(2)).
The attorney general may suggest that certain statistical information be
collected by local district attorneys and law enforcement officials, which
is then made available to the office of the attorney general for compilation
and distribution. The attorney general is to make recommendations to the
executive and to the legislature for the improvement of criminal justice
(969.80(2)).
Although no provisions have been drafted to sanction violations of the
Code, it is conceived that parties injured by failure of police to conform
to statutory provisions may, among other possibilities, obtain injunctive
relief to require mandatory adherence (969.90).
B. Taking Persons into Custody34
In attempting to define its objectives carefully the Code is perhaps
unique, but there is little in its provisions which may be called "revolution-
ary." The proposed chapter on custody and disposition has borrowed gen-
erously from both the 1966 and 1968 drafts of the American Law Insti-
tute Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure and the American Bar
Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice: Standards
Relating to Pretrial Release and Providing Defense Services. That con-
siderable changes were necessitated by Wisconsin conditions well illustrates
the interplay between model codes and state legislation.3 5 A special
effort was made to follow established Wisconsin law and practice.
34 Space limitations make impossible a full exposition of each Code Section. There-
fore, those Sections have been selected for full discussion which are essential for
an understanding of the integrated nature of the Code. Sections not considered in
the article appear in the Appendix and are followed by brief explanatory notes.
35 See Remington, supra note 5 at 7-10.
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Nonetheless, within the revision committee there was considerable op-
position to these provisions. It was argued that the chapter restricted the
police too much; basically they should be permitted to run their own
affairs. 3 6 The chapter was an attempt, it was said, to write a "police
manual." If there is any single point which caused the project to founder,
it was the Code's proposed approach to custody and disposition.
Contrary to the argument that the detailed nature of the custody pro-
visions would be objectionable to law enforcement officials, there is ample
complaint by police commentators not that the present law of arrest gives
them too much direction, but that it gives too little. 3 7 If police are to con-
form to applicable legal rules, the rules must be precise, clear and realistic.
1. Wisconsin Law and Practice
The Wisconsin law of arrest in case of misdemeanor or ordinance vio-
lation is singular in restricting custody to situations where detention seems
required by circumstances at the scene or by the characteristics of the
person to be taken into custody.3 s According to present Section 954.03,
an "arrest" without a warrant is
36 For a discussion of this point of view, see Robinson, supra note 19, at 499-506.
37 In submitting the Code to several police officials, not only did they not raise the
question of too much detail, but the comment was uniformly favorable. On
the ambiguity of the laws of arrest, see Remington, supra note 5 at 12. The
same is true of British laws of arrest from which ours derive.
Police testified before a Select Commission ...
that "they did not want alteration of the laws
in order to secure increase of power for the
police, but they showed the necessity of alter-
ing laws in order to regulate and define police
powers and to secure them from criticism.
REITH, BRITISH POLICE AND THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL 160 (1943). Ironically,
this policy void is unfilled due "largely to the real doubts possessed by the
police as to the propriety of their assuming a policy-making role that so closely
parallels the legislative function." Goldstein, Police Policy Formulation: A
Proposal for Improving Police Performance, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1123, 1127,
1129, 1133 (1967), citing the Police Task Force Report, supra note 12, Chapter
2. New York Police Commissioner Howard R. Leary recently proposed that
"the State Legislature draw up guidelines on what behavior should be tolerated
in protest demonstrations and what should result in arrests and prosecution on
criminal charges. The Commissioner said that specific definitions would 'help
both citizens and the police' in situations of violence, pilfering and destruction
of property." N.Y. Times, July 31, 1968, at 24, col. 2.
38 In fact the statute has been selected as a model by the "model" codes. See MODEL
PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE, supra note 8 at 107, 224, where the Wisconsin section
is taken almost verbatim, Section 3.01 at 12; and American Bar Association
Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to
Pretrial Release, Section 2.1 at II and Section 3.3 at 13 (1968), [hereafter re-
ferred to as Pretrial Release Standards], and DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CRIME LAW,
P.L. 90-226, Section 397(b). 1 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 818 (1967).
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lawful whenever the officer has reasonable
grounds to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed a misdemeanor or
has violated an ordinance and will not be
apprehended unless immediately arrested
or that personal or property damage may
likely be done unless immediately ar-
rested.3 9
The Section sets forth the conditions under which "arrest" is "lawful",
thereby implying that arrest under other conditions is "unlawful". Yet the
officer is given no indication what procedure he is to follow when he does
or does not take a person into custody. 40 Nor do we know exactly what
the Section seeks to accomplish, although one may infer that the aim is to
reduce the number taken into custody by reference to circumstances such
as danger of escape from prosecution or danger to public security. To clar-
ify this ambiguity it will be helpful to consider the history of arrest briefly
and then the Wisconsin practice in light of that history.
Common law arrests without warrant for misdemeanors were allowed
only where a breach of the peace was committed or was about to be com-
mitted in the presence of an officer or when the offender was attempting
to escape. 41 Requiring that arrest take place when the officer has per-
39 The Section continues:
This subsection is supplemental to §62.09(13)
and shall not in any way limit any powers to
arrest granted by that section.
The sentence was added after Allen v. State, 183 Wis. 323, 197 N.W. 808
(1924) which stated that §62.09(13) merely restated the common law of
arrest without a warrant so that "found . . . violating any law of the state or
ordinance of such city continued to mean that the act, leading to the arrest,
must be committed in the presence of the officer. Thus, to the extent that the
common law power of arrest was greater than that given by the statute, the
officer has this additional power." In most instances the statute permits more
extensive power to arrest than does the common law. Cf. MICH. COMP. LAWS
§780.51 (1948) which combines felonies, misdemeanors, and ordinance viola-
tions for purposes of allowing police to take a suspect into custody without
a warrant. Additionally, it does not include the Wisconsin requirement of likeli-
hood that the suspect will not be apprehended unless immediately arrested or
that property damage will occur.
40 Thus, there is no authorization for the officer to issue a citation. The present code
does not even contain a direction that the suspect arrested without a warrant
be brought before a magistrate. Such direction is found in various other places
in the statutes. See note 139 inIra, §954.47 and Pillsbury v. State, 31 Wis.2d 87,
92-94, 142 N.W.2d 19-91 (1966).
4 1 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND 345 (3rd ed. 1955); Allen v. State, 183 Wis. 323,
332-33, 197 N.W. 808, 811 (1924); Bohlen and Shulman, Arrest With and
Without a Warrant, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 485-90 (1927), Hall, Police and Law in
Democratic Society, 28 IND. L. REV. 133 (1953). Compare §62.09(13)(a),
where the police officer
shall arrest with or without process . . . every
person found in the city in a state of intoxica-
December 19681
Prospectus
sonal knowledge of the offense meant that a person would be taken into
custody only when his guilt was evident. 4 2 Limiting an arrest to situations
where acts are committed in the officer's presence also meant that there
was nothing to "arrest" if all criminal action had ceased by the time of
the officer's arrival.43
Under ancient European law, where a person is caught in flagrante
delicto committing a serious felony or an offense involving violence or
damage to persons or property he could be physically removed. 4 4 This was
done not as a jurisdictional step in a process but as a necessity called for
by the particular circumstances. 45 In the case of misdemeanors the appar-
tion or engaged in any disturbance of the peace
or violating any law of the state or ordinance
of such city ....42 Remington, The Law Relating to "On the Street" Detention, Questioning and
Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest Privileges in General in POLICE
POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 18 (1962). Section 70.30 of the PROPOSED
NEW YORK CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW (1967) makes the notice to appear
mandatory for "petty offenses" where they occur in the officer's "presence."
This is the same as the prior law. See staff comment, Id. at 102. It is there
stated:
The "in the presence" requirement is, however,
retained for petty offenses. It does not seem
advisable to authorize police arrests for very
minor offenses on hearsay, and a summons is
undoubtedly a more appropriate method of re-
quiring the defendant to answer such a charge
when the offense was not committed in the
officer's presence. Even when such an offense
is committed in the officer's presence, it is
hoped that service of an appearance ticket
rather than arrest would be the usual procedure.
[Emphasis supplied]
43 The original meaning of "arrest" is "to stop" the person, "to stay," L. restare-
from re, back, and stare, to stand. SKEAT, A CONCISE ETYMOLOGICAL DIC-
TIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 26 (1965). In other words, it is to hold
him in place in order to obtain the information necessary to make a further
decision of what to do with him. See Robinson, supra note 30 at 229-31, 238.
In Stittgen v. Rundle, 99 Wis. 78, 74. N.W. 536, 537 (1898), a Milwaukee
policeman was informed that plaintiff had committed a breach of the peace. The
Court, in upholding the plaintiff's verdict for false imprisonment, stated:
There is no pretense or claim that respondent,
at the time of his arrest, was doing any act
that would justify his being taken into custody.
The act complained of had been committed
some 20 or 30 minutes previous to the arrest,
and not in the presence of the officer who
made the arrest.
44 Allen v. State, supra note 39. In the statute governing powers and duties of sheriffs,
§59.24, there is mentioned "the apprehending or securing any person for felony
or breach of the peace." Such language is taken directly from the common law.
See also §964.30(5) where the UNIFORM ACT IN CLOSE PURSUIT limits pursuit
by peace officers across state lines to persons suspected of having committed a
felony.
45As the police power to arrest has evolved from the common law right to arrest in
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ent guilt of the offender gave the officer the right to intercede but not the
right to take the person into custody unless there was a specific need for
such action. The right to stop the person and the right to take the person
into custody were separate actions and whether the matter should be pur-
sued criminally was a separate decision left to the prosecutor or magis-
trate. 46 At the scene the officer would obtain sufficient identifying infor-
mation concerning the accused so that he could seek either a warrant or
a summons or report the information to the prosecutor or magistrate for
decision as to prosecution.
This system is still substantially followed on the Continent. 4 7 But in the
United States for the most part such a functional use of custody virtually
disappeared with the trend from arrests by warrant to arrests without war-
rant.48 In Wisconsin, on the contrary, this functional use has been re-
tained in principle. The concept was enunciated in Gunderson v. Strue-
bing,4 9 and followed in Allen v. State:5 0
It is the general rule of the common
law that no arrest can be made without a
warrant except in cases where the ends
of justice would be defeated without it.
For public reasons, therefore, in some
cases, the personal security of the citizen
is subjected to the liability of being ar-
rested without warrant, but the right thus
to arrest must be confined to cases of
strict public necessity. In Stittgen v. Run-
certain limited situations to a statutory right to arrest for any offense, the
function of arrest has been lost. It has been confused with the duty of
the officer to take cognizance of criminal offenses and take some action with
reference to them. Arrest has thus taken on the significance of a jurisdictional
rite in that the officer, in many states, must arrest any person he reasonably
believes has committed a criminal offense. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act,
28 VA. L. REV. 315, 334 (1942); LAFAVE, ARREST, THE DECISION TO TAKE A
SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 78-9 (1965).
46 See LAFAVE, supra note 45 at 5-6. The decision that the officer is called on to make
here is not whether the individual should be prosecuted. His choice is between
custody and issuing the suspect a notice to appear. For a discussion of authority
for the officer to withhold prosecution, see LAFAVE, supra note 45 at 72, 493,
508. For the district attorney's discretion to prosecute, see Id. at 23-26.4 7 Robinson, supra note 30 at 229-40, 251-58.
48See note 45 supra. The vast majority of arrests in the United States are now made
without warrant. WALD AND FREED, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES: 1964, 71 n. 5
(1964); Remington supra note 42 at 13; LAFAVE, supra note 45 at 169. LaFave
comments:
The [statute] which defines when a peace officer
can make an arrest has developed with almost
no concern with whether the taking of imme-
diate custody is necessary.
49125 Wis. 173, 179-80, 104 N.W. 149, 151 (1905).
50 See note 39 supra.
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die, 99 Wis. 78, 80, 74 N.W. 537, this
court said:
An arrest without a warrant has never
been lawful except in those cases where
the public security requires it; and this
has only been recognized in felony, and
in breaches of the peace committed in
the presence of the officer.
The court has declared recently that "as a matter of policy" the authority
of a private person to arrest for a misdemeanor "should be limited to
instances where the public security requires it, that is, to acts which in-
volve, threaten or incite violence."51 This should limit an officer's arrest
authority as well.
The case law was codified in 1943:
An arrest by a peace officer without a
warrant for a misdemeanor is lawful when-
ever the officer has reasonable grounds to
believe that the person to be arrested has
committed a misdemeanor and will not be
apprehended unless immediately arrested
or that further personal and property
damage may likely be done unless imme-
diately arrested. 52
The Section was expanded to its present form in 1948.53 Wisconsin's
statute substantially follows the common law practice of taking a person
into custody only when the specific circumstances of the event call for such
action. In some other jurisdictions it has been observed that even where
the legislature has permitted an alternative of nonarrest, it has not been
utilized.54 The law revisor, therefore, should be interested in learning how
51 See Stittgen v. Ruidle, supra note 43 and Radloff v. National Food Stores, Inc., 20
Wis. 2d 224, 123 N.W. 2d 570, 571 (1963) for the rule of misdemeanor arrest
by a person not a law enforcement officer.
52 WIs. STAT. §361.44 (1943).
53 WIS. STAT. §354.03 (1949). The most important changes involved the authorization
to arrest for ordinance violations and the change in wording from "further
personal and property damage" to "personal or property damage," thus per-
mitting arrest even though no damage had occurred yet and where either
personal or property damage was threatened. [Research aid: Marquette Univer-
sity law student, now attorney, David Werth.]
5This is as true in Wisconsin as in other states. Wts. STAT. §954.02(4) authorizes
the issuance of summons. The comment of the Advisory Committee for the
1949 Code revision states:
This section is based upon the Federal Criminal
Rules Nos. 3 and 4. The use of a summons is
also recommended by the American Law In-
stitute. . . . This practice has been used in a
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law enforcement officials have implemented Section 954.03, perhaps more
particularly because the legislature provided neither a statement of clear
intent nor instruction in operation.
Available resources did not permit a detailed survey of Wisconsin police
procedures. Nevertheless, it was possible to interview a number of Mil-
waukee police officers and to examine the Milwaukee police department
training guide as it treats arrest.5 5 Of course, the extent to which Mil-
waukee practice is representative of other cities or of the state as a whole
is unknown. 56 The purpose, however, is not to determine the exact prac-
tice but to examine police interpretation of present law in order to focus
on problems posed in drafting a rational system which can be applied in
the operative criminal process. The Milwaukee manual recognizes that the
statutory law (Section 954.03) would authorize arrest for misdemeanors
and ordinance violations not committed in the officer's presence, but it
nevertheless recommends that the officer follow the "prevailing common
number of other states, and is recommended
as a desirable alternative to requiring an arrest
to be made in every case.
WIs. STAT. §954.02. But a comprehensive field survey of the Milwaukee County
criminal justice system from February 1, 1956, to the end of April 1956, as
part of the American Bar Foundation's study, The Administration of Criminal
Justice in the United States, Pilot Project Report Vol. V. at 11-5, [hereafter cited
as Pilot Project Report], observes that summons is "used infrequently, if at all,
in Milwaukee County." See also Parnas, The Police Response to the Domestic
Disturbance, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 914, 942-943. But see note 60 infra. Statutory
authorization for use of the notice to appear has been rare. LAFAVE, supra note
45 at 204 n.133 lists such statutes. The failure of legislatures to take a strong
stand in favor of usage has contributed to, if it has not been principally responsible
for, the paucity of the use of the notice to appear. Thus, the D.C. Crime Law,
supra note 38, Title VII, Section 701 (i), is regressive. Although it authorizes
citations in misdemeanors, at the same time it tells the officer to use this discretion
with caution.
No citation may be issued ... unless the person
authorized to issue the citation has reason to
believe that the arrested person will not cause
injury to persons or damage to property and
that he will make an appearance in answer to
the citation.
Professor LaFave forcefully makes this point when he asks, "What
kind of presumption do you start with?" BAIL AND SUMMONS: 1965, 132
(1966). See text infra at 41-42. In California, an officer must give a citation in
some vehicle misdemeanors and can arrest only if there is a refusal to sign the
citation. CAL. VEHICLE CODE, Sections 40303, 40504 (West 1967).
65 As far as it could be determined, this guide represents an accurate description of
Milwaukee police practice.
56 There are substantially fewer arrests in rural areas than in the cities. The American
Bar Foundation study, supra note 54, initially intended a survey of rural arrest
procedure but abandoned the attempt because arrests were found to be so rare.
Of 37,097 "major crimes" committed in 1966, 24,354 were committed in
metropolitan areas where about 50% of the Wisconsin population lives. Mil-
waukee Journal, Feb. 14, 1968, pt. 2, at 1. See also the Presidents' Commission
Report, supra note 13, at 119.
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law view": arrest without a warrant only for a "breach of the peace com-
mitted in his presence."' 5 7 The manual further instructs:
57 The manual nicely illustrates the police definition of arrest powers:
Arrest without Warrant in Misdemeanor Cases
I. As a general rule an officer should not arrest
without a warrant for a misdemeanor viola-
tion unless it constitutes a breach of the
peace.
2. As a general rule, an officer should not
make an arrest for a misdemeanor or viola-
tion not committed in his presence.
3. Breach of the peace violations in the officer's
presence
a. If an affray . . . the officer may arrest
persons who he reasonably believes to
have been participants -even though
they were not so in fact.
b. Violence is not necessary
(1) The use of force -or threat of an
immediate use of force (in a crim-
inal manner)- is a breach of the
peace.
(2) Threats or uncomplimentary names
directed at another may amount to a
breach of the peace.
Other acts which the manual lists as breach of the peace are drunkenness in
public, operating an auto while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, carry-
ing a concealed weapon, prostitution, keeping a disorderly house, disturbing
others as at a religious worship, forcibly tearing down public signs, agreeing
to fight "even where no fight takes place," noises amounting to a disturbance
of the peace.
The next section describes §954.03 as permitting arrest "not in the officer's
presence" for misdemeanor violations. The manual continues:
4(b) Although state statute permits this type
of arrest, the officer should attempt to
follow the prevailing common law view,
which is that an officer can arrest with-
out a warrant only for:
(1) Breach of the peace committed in
his presence
(2) Or, possibly where he has reason-
able belief that a breach of the
peace will be committed in his
presence.
5. Arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor
must be promptly made or the officer there-
after can arrest only by procuring a war-
rant ....
Pilot Project Report, supra note 54 at 1-34 n. 73, observed:
The assumption which the police make in Mil-
waukee is that an arrest for a misdemeanor
committed in the presence of the officer is
valid apart from the consideration whether
reasonable grounds exist to believe that escape
or further damage will be done if arrest is not
made immediately.
Milwaukee police also arrest "when the offender is a non-resident of the area
within the jurisdiction of the officer on the scene," LAFAVE supra note 45 at 22,
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apparently because of the possibility of escape. See Pilot Project Report, supra
note 54 at 11-7. Compare Directive No. 124, issued June 4, 1968, by the
Wauwatosa police department with the Milwaukee police manual:
SUBJECT: USE OF SUMMONS OR NOTICE
TO APPEAR IN CERTAIN NON-TRAF-
FIC CITY ORDINANCE VIOLATION
CASES
1. PERSONS OVER THE AGE OF 18 WHO
ARE TO BE CHARGED WITH ANY NON-
TRAFFIC CITY ORDINANCE VIOLATION
SHOULD BE GIVEN SUMMONS TO AP-
PEAR IN COURT OR TO REPORT TO THE
DETECTIVES IN LIEU OF PHYSICAL
ARREST WHEN THE FOLLOWING CON-
DITIONS EXIST:
A. THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT THE
SUBJECT'S IDENTITY
B. SUBJECT IS A RESIDENT OF OR EM-
PLOYED IN THE METROPOLITAN
AREA SO THAT HE CAN READILY BE
LOCATED IF HE FAILS TO RESPOND
TO SUMMONS
C. SUBJECT INDICATES A WILLINGNESS
TO ANSWER THE SUMMONS OR RE-
QUEST TO APPEAR
D. THERE IS NO LIKELIHOOD THAT THE
SUBJECT WILL INJURE PERSONS OR
PROPERTY IF NOT IMMEDIATELY
TAKEN INTO CUSTODY
E. THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT SUB-
JECT IS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
ALCOHOL OR DRUGS, OR IS MEN-
TALLY DISTURBED
F. ROUTINE CHECK SHOWS SUBJECT IS
NOT WANTED ON OTHER CHARGES
4. IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
DETECTIVE WHO CONDUCTS THE IN-
TERVIEW OF A SUBJECT ORDERED IN
UNDER THIS PROCEDURE TO REVIEW
THE OFFICER'S REPORT, QUESTION THE
SUBJECT AND ANY WITNESSES OR COM-
PLAINANTS WHO COME IN, AND DETER-
MINE IF THE FACTS AND CIRCUM-
STANCES WARRANT AN APPEARANCE
IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT AND
WHETHER ANY DIFFERENT OR ADDI-
TIONAL ORDINANCE CHARGES SHOULD
BE MADE. AFTER CONFERRING WITH
THE ARRESTING OFFICER THE COURT
DATE WILL BE SET OR OTHER DIS-
POSITION AGREED UPON. THE ARREST-
ING OFFICER WILL PREPARE AND
SUBMIT A SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT
SUMMARIZING THE RESULTS OF THE
INTERVIEW AND THE DISPOSITION UP
TO THAT TIME.
7. THIS PROCEDURE IS NOT TO BE USED
AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR POLICE WORK
ON THE STREET. ITS PURPOSE IS TO
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6. When the officer feels that an arrest
without a warrant is not justified, he
should advise the complainant to go to
the office of the District Attorney or
City Attorney and apply for a war-
rant ....
7. When the violation does not involve a
breach of the peace, the officer should
not make a summary (immediate) ar-
rest.
a. Obtain information from the viola-
tor- name and address, etc.
b. Instruct (order) him, the complain-
ant, and necessary witnesses, to ap-
pear at your district or bureau for
review by Commanding Officer.
c. Following review, officer and per-
sons involved go to city or district
attorney and issuing magistrate if
so ordered by Commanding Offi-
cer .... 5 8
MINIMIZE THE TIME SPENT BY PATROL
OFFICERS ON THEIR REGULAR SHIFTS
FOR QUESTIONING AND PROCESSING
ORDINANCE VIOLATORS AT THE STA-
TION DURING OUR BUSIEST HOURS.
SINCE NO FINGERPRINTING OR "MUG
SHOT" IS PRACTICABLE UNDER THIS
PROCEDURE, IT SHOULD NOT BE USED
IN CASES WHERE SUBJECT IS BELIEVED
TO BE INVOLVED IN FELONIES AND
FINGERPRINTS AND/OR PHOTOGRAPHS
COULD CONNECT HIM THEREWITH.
58 In practice, the "order in" apparently works at some variance with the scheme
in the manual. A letter dated July 8, 1968, from Victor Manian, First Assistant
District Attorney, Milwaukee County, stated:
"Order in" slips are used most often in mis-
demeanor cases which the officer did not witness
. . . battery, disorderly conduct, indecent ex-
posure, family trouble, etc. The suspect is
usually ordered in directly to the office where
the officer intends to take further action. In
vice cases such as adultery, incest, lewd and
lascivious conduct, the suspect and witnesses
are given order in slips to the vice squad; in
neglect, truancy, contributing charges, the sus-
pect is ordered to the Youth Aid Bureau; traffic
cases to the Traffic Bureau, etc."
Many order ins are to the First District Station, merely as a convenient
meeting place because it is in the same building as the court and the city and
district attorney offices. The "order in" itself is a white slip, about two and
one-half inches by three and one-half inches in length, entitled: Milwaukee Po-
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One police officer who was interviewed estimated:
Most patrolmen spend about 90 per cent
of their time on traffic cases so custody
isn't necessary. I'd say 10 percent of mis-
demeanors not committed in my presence
and 25 per cent of those that are com-
mitted in my presence wind up taking the
offender into custody.59
The police have thus filled the void left by the legislature; given that the
legislature defined neither policy nor practice, they have done an excellent
job.60 One might argue that this example of initiative supports the view
lice Department Referral Memo. The only direction is: "Report to as checked
below" followed by a series of named bureaus and addresses, with a box next to
each which may be checked. There are spaces for date, time and reason for
appearance.
59 If the officer's estimate is accurate, the percentage of on-the-street release com-
pares very favorably with the new release program in New York City, see note
196 infra. In connection with research for the Code, a number of Milwaukee
police officers were interviewed during spring 1967, while they waited for their
cases to be called in the office of the Milwaukee District Attorney. [Research
aid: Marquette University law student, now attorney, Tom Bailey.] The Pilot
Project Report, supra note 54 at 1-18, indicates that "offenses which occur
in the presence of the officer are most likely to be minor ones, the commonest
being traffic offenses and being drunk in public." Recent field research has
divided police street patrol into "on-view" and "dispatched" situations and
has found that the characteristics of these encounters are essentially different.
Reiss and Black, Interrogation and the Criminal Process, 374 ANNALS 47 (1967).
60 Even though the Pilot Project Report, supra note 54, observed that the Wisconsin
statutory authorization for summons was used infrequently, it was also found
that the Milwaukee sheriff's department employed various devices to avoid
taking a person into custody where it appeared unnecessary. One such means
was to leave the officer's card at the residence with instructions that the wanted
person report to headquarters at an appointed time. Id. at 1I 5-6. LAFAvE, supra
note 45 at 171 n. 10, remarks:
[A] captain of one of the state traffic patrol
districts sent out a bulletin stating: "physical
arrest should only be made when the violator
is unable to care for his own safety or the
safety of others as in [drunken driving] cases, or
when the arresting officer has reason to believe
that the person arrested will flee the jurisdiction
of the court." This would appear to be a fair
statement of the general practice of all observed
police agencies in Wisconsin with respect to
traffic violators.
Nevertheless, the Milwaukee manual indicates that the concern is to act within
the limits of the law rather than in furtherance of a policy of nonarrest. See
Robinson, supra note 19 at 493-503. This is an eminent example of the
limitation of police capacity without legislative direction. The emphasis on the
presence requirement, a relic of the common law, is irrelevant to the question
whether a nerson need to be taken into custody. In fact, as recent observations
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that the police should be left to their own devices. Such an argument, how-
ever, does not consider that the police structure for the "order in" is with-
out legal foundation. In fact, the two statutes which govern most arrests
are in conflict: Section 954.03 authorizes the police to arrest only under
defined circumstances, while the statute governing the officer in the city
requires him to arrest "every person . . . violating any law of the state
or ordinance of such city . . .".61 Under present law, a law enforcement
officer has neither authority to give an "order in" nor authority to release
if he finds after investigation that no offense has been committed. There
is no authority to order a person to appear at the police station for review
by the commanding officer. Once the person is there, that officer has no
authority to order him to go to the office of the city or district attorney.
If the person attempts to escape during the interim between his appearance
at the police station and his appearance before the court, the officer has
no statutory authority to hold him. Moreover, it is irrational to provide
detailed, printed instructions on tickets for the most insignificant traffic
violation and at the same time to permit the oral "order in" for misde-
meanants. 6 2
have shown, and as is logically obvious, in the case of "on-the-view" arrests,
the officer is usually in possession of enough evidence to charge because of
what he has seen. Reiss and Black, supra note 59 at 53. Therefore, to the
extent that investigation for charging purposes is one reason for custody, where
the officer sees the offense committed, there is less reason for custody. The
importance of the custody requirement to the police probably is explained by a
desire to protect the officer (and the suspect) from unfounded complaints.
Therefore, he uses his full authority only when personally he is sure an offense
has been committed.
In the interviews, other reasons given for taking a person into custody were
that he was on probation; that he had a criminal record; or that it was "for his
own good," as for an intoxicated person. Such a reason was also applied to
one charged with indecent behavior because he "might have offended some
people and we take him into custody for his own protection." In an offense
such as lewd and lascivious conduct, custody is used to prevent its continuance
because "it takes two to tango." In cases of malicious damage to property or
concealed weapons, persons may be taken in for investigation. Under the pro-
posed section, determinations such as the above should be regulated by guide-
lines issued by the local district attorney, in consultation with the police
(§969.05(4)).
61 See Ws. STAT. §62.09(13) (1962).
62 Until recently, even though the police used a citation procedure for traffic
offenses there was no statutory authority for it. THE HIGHWAY SAFETY ACT,
WIS. STAT. §345.11 (1967) has created a "uniform traffic citation and com-
plaint" which "shall in the case of moving violations and may in the case of
parking violations be used" by all state and local officers. One apparent statutory
authorization for nonarrest is found in the FISH AND GAME LAWS, WIs. STAT.
§29.66(1):
A person arrested without a warrant . . . who
is not released at the time of arrest or without
necessary delay brought before a magistrate or
court, shall be allowed to make a deposit of
money . . . by going in the custody of the
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The police procedure outlined represents the end of a period of evolu-
tion- beginning with common law tradition, proceeding through inter-
pretive case law to legislation vaguely formulating a policy, and now cul-
minating with the operative implementation of that policy by the police.
Today is the moment for legislative intervention to enunciate clearly, on
the basis of this evolutionary experience, a policy which will formalize and
legitimize that which we wish to conserve and reject that which does not
conform. 63 Legislation consistent with former policy and practice, modify-
ing it only by rationalizing and legitimating it, is unlikely to be seen by the
police as an imposition. On the contrary, it should be accepted as a proper,
and even hoped for, exercise of the legislative function. 6 4
Those problems of policy and conception which have remained unre-
solved by case law, statutes and prior practice must be analyzed by the
legislature and the conclusions implemented. The policy of the custody
and disposition chapter is to minimize the taking of suspects into custody,
the legislation setting forth the circumstances in which such custody is
required.
2. Implementation of Reducing Number in Custody
969.01 AUTHORITY TO TAKE A PERSON INTO CUSTODY
(1) AUTHORITY TO TAKE INTO CUS-
TODY WITHOUT A WARRANT -
FELONY.
A law enjorcement officer (to be defined)
acting without a warrant may take a per-
son into custody if the officer has reason-
able grounds to believe that the person is
committing or has committed a felony.
arresting officer and making such deposit.
[Emphasis added.]
63 It has been suggested that the "growth of law" often pursues the following course:
. . . initial decision by the courts; followed by
legislative intervention; and finally, the choice
of a solution which required creation of admin-
istrative agencies and continuing efforts of
courts, legislatures, administrative agencies, and
executive agencies in manifold interrelation-
ships.
In this sense, the Code is "trail blazing" in the very act of blazing a trail
(goal orientation) through a maze of statutory undergrowth. AUERBACH, GAR-
RISON, HURST AND MERMIN, THE LEGAL PROCESS vi (1961). See also Auerbach,
Law and Social Change in the United States, 6 U.S.L.A.L. REV. 516 (1959).
With relation to the social scientist in law reform, see Bohannan, The Differing
Realms of the Law, in Bohannan (ed.), LAw AND WARFARE 49-50 (1967).
64 Goldstein, supra note 37.
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Ref. Wis. Stat. 954.03(1); U.S.C.A. Ti-
tle 18, s. 3052; Ill. Rev. Stat., Chap.
38, s. 107-2(c). 65
(2) AUTHORITY TO TAKE INTO CUS-
TODY WITHOUT A WARRANT -
MISDEMEANOR AND ORDINANCE
VIOLATION.
(a) A law enforcement officer, acting with-
out a warrant and having reasonable
grounds to believe that a person is
committing or has committed a mis-
demeanor or an ordinance violation,
may stop the person and require him
to remain in the officer's presence so
that the officer can determine whether
to issue a notice to appear, to take
the person into custody, or to release
the person pursuant to sub. (4).
(b) The law enforcement officer shall issue
a notice to appear unless the officer
has reasonable grounds to believe
that the person
1. Will not be apprehended unless im-
mediately taken into custody, or
2. May be likely to cause person or
property damage unless immediate-
ly taken into custody, or
3. Is unable to or has refused to give
sufficiently reliable information of
identity. The officer shall make a
reasonable attempt to ascertain the
person's identity before taking him
into custody.
(c) If the person does not qualify for a
notice to appear because he comes
within the exceptions listed in sub. (2)
(b), the officer may take the person
into custody.
Ref. Wis. Stat. 954.03; ALl Model Code
of Pre-Arraignment Procedure (1966),
hereafter referred to as ALI (1966), s.
2.02 and 3.01; Proposed Minimum Stan-
dards for Criminal Justice, Pretrial Re-
65 All statutes cited are in current compilations unless otherwise noted.
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lease, hereafter referred to as Release
Standards, s. 2.2 (c).
(3) NOTICE TO APPEAR AFTER TAK-
ING INTO CUSTODY.
A law enforcement officer acting without
a warrant who has taken a person into
custody may, subject to sub. (2)(b), issue
to the person a notice to appear in lieu
of taking him to a police station (to be
defined); or the officer or a superior offi-
cer at the police station may issue to the
person a notice to appear.
Ref. AL! (1966) s. 3.02.
(4) RELEASE OF PERSON.
A law enforcement officer who stops a
person and requires him to remain in the
officer's presence pursuant to sub. (1) or
(2) or who takes a person into custody
shall release the person as soon as it ap-
pears that he no longer has reasonable
grounds to believe that the person has
committed a crime or violated an ordi-
nance.
Ref. Ill. Rev. Stat. Chap. 38, Sec.
107-6; ALl (1966) s. 3.09.
969.05 NOTICE TO APPEAR IN LIEU OF OR IN CONNECTION
WITH TAKING INTO CUSTODY WITHOUT A WARRANT.
(1) NOTICE TO APPEAR WITHOUT
TAKING INTO CUSTODY.
A law enforcement officer, acting with-
out a warrant who has reasonable grounds
to believe a person has committed or is
committing an offense, may in the case
of a felony, and shall, in the case of a
misdemeanor or an ordinance violation,
subject to the conditions of s. 969.01
(2)(b), issue to the person a notice to
appear in lieu of taking him into custody.
(2) PROCEDURE FOR ISSUING NOTICE
TO APPEAR.
In issuing a notice to appear the officer
shall
(a) Prepare a written notice to appear,
containing the name and address of
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the person and the offense charged,
and stating when the person shall ap-
pear in court. The time specified in
the notice to appear shall be at least
__ days after the issuance of the
notice to appear.
(b) Deliver to the person one copy of the
notice to appear.
(c) Send to the district attorney, as soon
as practicable, one copy of the notice
to appear. Where the person is no-
ticed to appear in court, a copy of the
notice shall be sent to the court speci-
fied therein.
(3) NOTICE TO APPEAR IN PLACE
OTHER THAN COURT.
In any instance where the officer may is-
sue a notice to the person to appear in
court, he may issue a notice to the per-
son to appear at a police station or in the
office of the district attorney for the pur-
pose of a hearing pursuant to s.
(4) REGULATIONS TO ENCOURAGE
NOTICES TO APPEAR.
The regulations (guidelines) issued pursu-
ant to s. 969.90 shall include regulations
(guidelines) concerning the circumstances
in which officers shall issue notices to ap-
pear. Such regulations (guidelines) shall
be designed to provide the maximum use
of notices to appear, so that persons be-
lieved to have committed offenses will be
taken into custody only when necessary
in the public interest.
Ref. ALl (1966) s. 3.02; Calif. Penal
Code, s. 853, 6-8 (from which the ALI
section is derived); ill. Rev. Stat. Chap.
38, 107-12.
The legal framework provided by the Draft Sections regulates practice
according to the policy of minimizing the number of persons taken into
custody. This requires a notice to appear ("order in") (969.01(3)) and
details for its issuance (969.05). It also requires elaboration of the alter-
native decisions the officer may make after stopping a person for the com-
mission of an offense: he may issue a notice to appear at the time the
person is stopped (969.01(3)), he may release the person if it is found
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after further investigation that he has not committed an offense (969.01
(4)), or he may take him into custody if one of the conditions permit-
ting custody is fulfilled (969.01 (b)).
Although drafting such a framework is relatively simple, the problems are
more complex conceptually. The baggage of accumulated case and statutory
law has confused the meaning and function of "arrest". It has blurred the
distinction between the decision to stop a person found committing a crimi-
nal offense and the decision to take a person in custody in order to con-
duct him to a police station. It has tied the concept of "arrest" unhappily
to that of the search for evidence incident to the arrest.
"Arrest", as a word to describe a particular act, is no longer service-
able. "Arrest" may mean any restriction of liberty by a law enforcement
officer, whether authorized or not; or taking the person into custody to be
conveyed to a police station, whether for the purpose of investigation or
for criminal prosecution; or
detaining of a person by word or action in
custody so as to subject his liberty to the
actual control and will of the person mak-
ing the arrest. 6 6
Thus, arrest has become a confused concept, confused as to whether and as
to when it had taken place. One reason for this muddle is that "arrest" is
used to refer to several distinct situations in which police actions are not de-
limited adequately by legislation. 6 7 The first of these is the "stop and frisk"
where the officer knows of no crime having been committed but stops a per-
son who he believes has committed or may be about to commit a crime. The
Committee made no attempt to draft legislation to cover this situation because
6 6 Huebner v. State, 33 Wis. 2d 505, 516, 147 N.W.2d 646, 651 (1967). That this
is more than a semantic quibble has been evidenced recently by Terry v. Ohio,
supra note 19, where the Court for the first time dealt with the problem of
phraseology which by this time had reached constitutional proportions. "It is
plain that the Fourth Amendment governs 'seizures' of the person which do not
eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime - 'arrests'
in traditional terminology," at 4581. See especially the last paragraph of note
15. At 4584, the Court stated: "An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal
prosecution." Though helpful in selecting one out of a number of possibilities,
such statements retain the confusion of the term. Has a person been "arrested"
who has been given an order in? This is the first stage of the prosecution but
it did not "eventuate in a trip to the station house," at least not that day.
Cf. Peters v. New York, 36 U.S.L.W. 4589 (1968). "When the policeman
grabbed Peters by the collar, he abruptly 'seized' [arrested] him and curtailed
his freedom of movement on the basis of probable cause to believe that he
was engaged in criminal activity." Mr. Justice Harlan properly criticizes this
attempt to place the time of arrest. Terry v. Ohio, supra at 4586.
67 Remington, supra note 42 at 12; LAFAVE supra note 45 at 3-4; Oaks and Lehman,
supra note 21 at 19, 23; Taylor, The Supreme Court, the Individual and the
Criminal Process, 1 GA. L. REV. 386, 424 (1967).
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at the time the United States Supreme Court had not yet handed down its
decision concerning the constitutionality of the practice.68 The second situa-
tion involves a person, either drunk or otherwise physically or mentally
unable to care for himself, who is found in a public place. This is treated
under Draft Section 969.03 of the custody chapter. 6 9 The third concerns
a crime already committed and known to the officer, but there is insuffi-
cient evidence against the suspect to accuse him of the crime. Neverthe-
less, the police desire to question him. 70 This is treated in Draft Section
969.07 of the chapter. 7 1 Finally, the situation where there is enough evi-
dence to believe that a particular person has committed an offense is
treated under Draft Section 969.01 of the chapter. We usually think of
this situation in connection with "arrest" legislation. Yet even considering
"arrest" in this limited sense, we are not dealing with a single action. First
there is the action or decision of the officer to stop a person who he
reasonably believes has committed a misdemeanor or ordinance violation;
and second there is the determination whether it is necessary to take that
person into custody. 72 Section 969.01(2)(a) of the Code, therefore, re-
places the term "arrest" with words describing the action.73 The first de-
68 The resulting decision, Terry v. Ohio, supra note 19, is discussed infra at 38-40.
69 Draft Section 969.03 is set out in full and discussed infra beginning at 49.70 Heubner v. State, supra note 66. See MODEL PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE, supra
note 8.
71 Draft Section 969.07 is to be redrafted and is noted in the Appendix.
72.An alternative has been suggested: "the officer on the street could immediately
communicate the essential facts of the individual case back to the station, where
a superior officer trained to make these kinds of decisions would then say,
'Arrest,' or 'Give a notice to appear.' " Professor LaFave in BAIL AND SUMMONS,
supra note 54 at 133.
73 This, of course, solves neither the problem of the quantum of evidence required
by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution before an officer
may restrict the liberty of a person, nor that of the extent to which it may be
restricted. But it makes the intention of the provision precise in terms of what
action by the police it means to cover. Chief Justice Schaefer of the Illinois
Supreme Court has stated in another regard:
I see nothing in the language of the Fourth
Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable seiz-
ures of the person, that requires it to operate
as a blunt instrument. It seems to me more
relevant to ask whether there is probable cause
for restraining a suspect than to ask whether
there is probable cause for believing in the
suspect's guilt.
Schaefer, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 25 (1967). The Court in Terry v. Ohio,
supra note 19, has taken a similar stance. Compare Section 2.02 of the MODEL
PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE (1966), supra note 8 at 10, which permits "stopping
of persons having knowledge of crime:"
Detention under this section is not called an
arrest, since in the draft "arrest" is used in the
conventional sense to authorize the far more
onerous interference of removal of a police
station and eventually to court.
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cision of the officer is to "stop the person and require him to remain in
the officer's presence so that the officer can determine whether to issue a
notice to appear." The second decision is to determine whether "to take
the person into custody." 74
The draft section represents the step by step actions of the officer in
The conceptual and semantic problems in using "arrest" are easily illustrated
by Wis. STAT. §954.03 where the word, "arrest," only makes sense if it is trans-
lated as "taking the person into custody." This is so because the statute concerns
itself only with the conditions under which a person may be taken into custody
and gives the officer no authority to "arrest" in the sense of stopping initially
in order to make the determination whether the conditions are satisfied. Rea-
soning thus, there is no "arrest" statute in Wisconsin if the meaning of arrest
is to stop, supra note 43. Putting it another way, you cannot arrest (take into
custody) one already arrested (originally restrained). Compare Wis. STAT.
§175.05(3) (1967):
Any peace officer . may stop any person
found on any premises to which entry without
permission is forbidden by said subsection and
may detain and demand of him his name, ad-
dress and business in such place. If such peace
officer . . . has reason to believe from the
answers of the person so interrogated that such
person has no right to be in such place, such
peace officer . .. shall forthwith release or ar-
rest such person without a warrant on a
charge of violating the provisions of sub. (2).
The section makes a distinction between a "stop" and an "arrest." If we
assume that in order to stop, the peace officer would have to have reasonable
grounds to believe that a crime had been committed, then the section is
parallel to the draft section. Otherwise, it is authority for detention on less than
probable cause. In either case, the use of the word "arrest" does not aid in the
interpretation of the section. See also Wis. STAT. §110.075(2) (1967) where
the "operator of any motor vehicle shall stop and submit such motor vehicle
to an inspection ...." for mechanical defects. The District of Columbia Crime
Law, supra note 38 at §397(a), compounds the confusion, stating: "An officer
may arrest without a warrant and take into custody any person .... "
[Emphasis supplied] The term "arrest" is so unwieldy in practice that the
police must use additional descriptive words to tell what it means. The Milwaukee
police call it "summary (immediate) arrest," supra text at 31, and apparently
the state police call it "physical arrest," supra note 60. The same term, "formal
arrest" is used in Terry v. Ohio, supra note 19 at 4580 as is the term, "technical
arrest" at 4582.
74 Neither this terminology nor this concept is foreign to Wisconsin law. WIs. STAT.
§48.28 TAKING CHILD INTO CUSTODY provides that "No child may be taken into
immediate custody" except under certain conditions. Paragraph (2) of the same
section provides: "Taking into custody under this section shall not be considered
an arrest." Such provision is obviously an attempt to reduce the noxious effects
of an arrest record, permitting the child to reply in the negative to employment
forms asking if he had been arrested. This question would be meaningless under
the Code because the word has been eliminated. Although a change in phrase-
ology may be unable to change the concern of employers, it may nevertheless
aid in de-emphasizing the seriousness of mere contact with the police. In order
to strengthen this outlook, the notice to appear might be defined as not consti-
tuting an "arrest" for the purpose of such inquiries.
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making the "arrest": first noticing the violation; then stopping the offender;
then holding him while making the further determination whether the stat-
utory conditions for custody are satisfied. 7 5 This procedure follows closely
the practice of the Milwaukee police department. In addition, however,
it authorizes some actions now taken without authority, and it provides
the suspect with a statement detailing the "charge" against him and the
time he must appear to answer the charge.
3. Search and the Law of Arrest
Until Terry v. Ohio, Peters v. New York and Sibron v. New York, 76
the legal history of arrest had been no more than a study of the legal
consequences of arrest on the right to search for evidence of crime. 77
The attorney for the defendant attempted to suppress the evidence found
in the search and the court then determined whether there was probable
cause for the arrest. If there was probable cause, the evidence could be
introduced as procured "incident to a lawful arrest." In order to attain a
desired result, the courts moved the time of arrest back and forth like an
abacus and in this context the effort to define "arrest" rather obscured the
meaning of the term.
It is apparent that this connection of search with the law of arrest may
cause considerable conflict with the principle of promoting a policy of non-
arrest.7 8 If "arrest" for the purposes of search is accomplished only when
the person is taken into custody, the tendency will be for the police to
75 In practice it will be evident often that the person and circumstances satisfy the
statutory condition for custody, making further inquiry unnecessary. Recent
empirical studies show that for most field detentions the time taken to decide
whether the suspect should be "formally arrested or released" is remarkably
short.
About one-half of the suspects were detained
for less than ten minutes and three-fourths
for less than twenty minutes. . . . Over nine-
tenths of the suspects were detained less than
forty minutes . . . about 5 per cent were de-
tained an hour or more before the police made
a decision to book or release.
Reiss and Black, supra note 59 at 52.
76 Terry v. Ohio, supra note 19; Peters v. New York, supra note 66; Sibron v. New
York, 36 U.S.L.W. 4589 (1968).
77 LAFAVE, supra note 45 at 28: "[Mlore than 90 per cent of all searches coming to
[the attention of judges and prosecutors] are incident to arrests." TIFFANY,
MCINTYRE AND ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 122 (1967).
78 For example, Chicago Police Department Training Bulletin, Feb. 3, 1964, Vol. V.,
No. 5 at 3 reads:
Now the notice to appear can be issued by the
officer for any offense. Its use, of course, is
practicable only in cases where it reasonably
appears that actual arrest does not serve some
valid purpose, such as insuring the availability
of a person who otherwise might not appear or
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take the person into custody each time a search is desired.79 This again
points up the necessity to separate the term "arrest" into its compo-
nents. To stop and restrain a person under Section 969.01, the officer
must have reasonable grounds to believe the suspect has committed an
offense. To take the person into custody in order to conduct him to
the police station, the officer must have reasonable grounds to believe the
person will cause damage or will flee. Search is relevant to the decision to
stop the person, but not to the decision to take him into custody. Once
the officer believes that an offense has been committed and retains the
person under his control for the purpose of making a custody decision,
the person's liberty is restricted. If the search incident to arrest is to
attach at all logically it should attach at this point, regardless of the later
decision to take the person to the police station.
Nevertheless, it seems essential to draft a statute on search incident to
Section 969.01 situations in order to avoid the problem. Even before
Terry, case law had taken two approaches which were encouraging de-
partures from the traditional law of search. One approach had rejected the
traditional automatic recognition of the right to search where the arrest was
a pretext in order to conduct a search.S0 The other approach did not re-
quire the formalities of arrest where there were grounds for arrest.
Instead these courts had turned to the plain language of the Fourth Amend-
ment which asks only that the search be reasonable Without mentioning
arrest. 8 1
conducting a search of the offender for neces-
sary evidence.
7 There is authority which denies the right of search when a notice to appear is
given on the ground that there has been no arrest. LAFAvE, supra note 45 at
187, 230, 495-96. See also Tiffany et al., supra note 77 at 122; Note, Search
and Seizure -Search Incident to Arrest for Traffic Violation, 1959 Wis. L. REV.
347, 352; LaFave, supra note 72 at 134. Another approach treats the stopping
in order to give a citation as an "arrest" thereby permitting a search but the
reasoning is confused. People v. Valdez, 239 Cal. App. 2d 459 at 461, 48
Cal.Rptr. 840, 842 (1966).
80 LAFAVE supra note 45 at 187; League, The Fourth Amendment and the Law of
Arrest, 54 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 393, 407 (1963); Barnes v. State, 25 Wis.2d
116, 126, 130 N.W.2d 264, 268 (1964); State v. Dodd, 28 Wis.2d 643, 648,
137 N.W.2d 465, 468 (1965). The Milwaukee police department was found
frequently to have used such "subterfuges for conducting a legal search." Pilot
Project Report, supra note 54 at 1-50. This is especially true in searches of
automobiles. Id. at 38-49. One such incident caused the city of Milwaukee a
$6,000 false arrest suit verdict. A Negro man was stopped for a minor traffic
violation, allegedly having wooden boards extending too far beyond the tail
gate of a truck he was driving. The police testified that they arrested him and
then followed him into his own home, when [they said] they thought the truck
was being used for a burglary, and that the plaintiff was trying to escape. The
jury, a later interview revealed, could not understand why the police would
arrest for such a minor violation. Milwaukee Journal, Feb. 2, 1968, pt. 1 at 1,
col. 2 and Feb. 4, 1968, pt. 2, p. 1, col. 2.
s' Hoch v. State, 199 Wis. 63, 65, 225 N.W. 191, 192 (1929), permitted the sheriff
to search and seize bottles of intoxicating liquor on the premises where the
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The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that ritualistic ad-
herence to the formula of incidence to arrest will not satisfy constitutional
rationality. The precise holdings of Terry, Peters and Sibron have only
limited meaning here. Terry dealt with a situation where there was less than
probable cause to arrest. Both Peters and Sibron concerned the quantum
of evidence necessary to establish the reasonableness of police action. It
is the Court's movement away from the term "probable cause" toward
that of "reasonableness" which should interest the law revisor in this area.
On the basis of these decisions it is predictable that it will not be enough
to contend that a search was made incident to a valid arrest. The officer
must have reasonable grounds to believe that the person had committed
a criminal offense, which is substantially the requirement of Section
969.01. If he does the officer may search the person provided: a) the
offense is of such a nature that it is reasonable to believe that a search
would reveal evidence of the suspected crime;8 2 or b) there is reason to
believe that the person has instrumentalities with which to effect an escape
or injure the officers.8 3 Thus, the time, the place and the extent of the
search will be circumscribed by the purpose for which the person was
stopped under Section 969.01.84 Under such a search provision, the argu-
officer had sufficient grounds to arrest even though no arrest had taken place.
See also Potman v. State, 259 Wis. 234, 240, 47 N.W.2d 884, 886 (1951).
Perhaps Hoch may be explained on its facts as a seizure with consent. But see
Barnes v. State, supra note 80. Mr. Justice Harlan applies the reasoning of Hoch
in Peters v. New York, supra note 19 at 4599. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S.
58, 61 (1967); State v. Boykins, 50 N.J. 73, 232 A.2d 141, 143 (1967).
82 See note 81 supra.
83 Peters v. New York, supra note 19; Warden of Maryland Penitentiary v. Hay-
den, 387 U.S. 294, 299 (1967); Barnes v. State, supra note 71 at 124;
State v. Stevens, 26 Wis.2d 451, 458, 132 N.W.2d 502, 507 (1965). THE MODEL
PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE, supra note 8, Sectioa 2.02(5) provides:
A law enforcement officer who has stopped or
ordered any person to remain in his presence
. . . may, if he reasonably believes that his
safety so requires, search such person and his
immediate surroundings, but only to the extent
necessary to discover any dangerous weapons
which may on that occasion be used against the
officer.
See Commentary, Id. at 10, 101.04.84 Scope is very much one of the precepts of Terry, Peters and Sibron; being an
ingredient of reasonableness, it has constitutional perimeters. In State v. Dodd,
the Wisconsin court's view is indistinguishable:
The reasonableness of the search, to be valid
. . . is limited not only in time and place but
also by the purpose of the arrest. A search
which might be reasonable as incidental to an
arrest for one crime may be entirely unrea-
sonable as an incident to an arrest for another
crime.
State v. Dodd, 28 Wis.2d 643, 648, 137 N.W.2d 465, 468 (1965). See also
State v. Phillips, 262 Wis. 303, 55 N.W.2d 384 (1952); State v. Cox, 258 Wis.
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ment as to admissibility of evidence would not be concerned with the
formality of when "arrest" occurred. Although no section was drafted
during the life of the revision project, a provision on search incident to
the custody procedures of Section 969.01 should make explicit these stan-
dards governing the validity of a search.S5 If we look at the facts under-
lying Wisconsin Supreme Court decisions in search cases, rather than at
the language used, we find that such a provision would do no more than
clarify and codify the law as it stands today in Wisconsin.
4. Objections to the Mandatory Use of Notice to Appear
The crucial decision with respect to the custody provisions has been
well articulated by Professor LaFave:
One problem faced in drafting any kind
of legislation arises when you are trying
to set up a release versus custody deci-
sion. The question is, where do you start?
What kind of presumption do you start
with? Do you start with a presumption
of custody or a presumption of release?
That is, should we say that a person
arrested for a certain offense is entitled to
release unless certain special circumstances
are shown to be present, or should we
say that he is to be held in custody unless
specific circumstances are present?S6
162, 45 N.W.2d 100 (1950); State v. Campbell, 97 N.J. Super. 435, 235 A.2d
235 (1967). It is not evident, as is noted supra note 81, that the reasoning
of the Wisconsin court is applicable equally where the grounds for the arrest
are present but the ritual has not taken place, or where we consider the stop
under §969.01 as the "arrest" the court discusses. See Alston v. State, 30
Wis.2d 88, 95-96, 140 N.W.2d 286, 288-90 (1966) where the officers lifted
the lid of a car trunk after stopping and interrogating the defendant but before
arresting him. The search was upheld because of the "exceptional circumstances"
that "there was a great risk that the contraband [automobile tires] and the
suspects themselves would leave the area if the police were to seek a warrant.
30 Wis.2d at 96, 140 N.W.2d at 290. Since almost all on-the-street arrests
involve the same circumstances of risk, this set of circumstances is unexceptional.
85 Such a statute, of course, does not resolve all of the problems of search although
it presents a working principle. For a statement of the various ,uses to which
search is put in police work, see Tiffany et. al., supra note 77 at 141-43;
Pretrial Release Standards, supra note 38, Section 2.4 at 38 tries to resolve
the problem of search after issuing a citation:
Nothing in these standards should be construed
to affect a law enforcement officer's authority
to conduct an otherwise lawful search even
though a citation is issued.
It is unclear, however, how this will help if search depends on arrest.
86 BAIL AND SUMMONS: 1965, 132 (1966). Professor LaFave continues:
It was interesting to note this kind of distinc-
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Where the presumption of release is selected, objections may be antici-
pated to the mandatory requirement that only those misdemeanants and
ordinance violators who fall into the statutorily defined categories may be
taken into custody:
1. Release will permit persons to escape who, though arrested for a
minor offense, are later revealed to have committed a more serious offense.
Every police officer probably has a story of the arrest he once made
for a minor offense, where subsequently it developed that the suspect was
wanted for a major crime. In fact, the statutory categories under Section
969.01 are broad enough that the officer will still be able to take into cus-
tody those whom he realizes it is not safe to release. Even on the street,
technological advances today place the officer in constant touch with almost
limitless computerized information.8 7 While there remains some risk that a
person released on the street may be wanted for another more serious
offense, instantaneous communications now reduce this number to insig-
nificance. Such speculative gains as would accrue from eliminating the risk
entirely must not be allowed to outweigh the general advantages of early
release embodied in the principle of reducing the number of those taken
into custody.
2. The number of persons defaulting will increase.
The Code effectively formalizes the system presently used in Milwaukee
to reduce the number taken into custody: the "order-in". No statistics
are available to the author showing the percentage of defaults in Mil-
waukee, but since the system of "order-in" has long continued unchanged,
nonappearance has apparently not been a serious problem. Ample docu-
mented evidence is available demonstrating that with proper supervision
pre-trial release programs not only do not increase defaults, but have the
effect of reducing them.8 8 Moreover, it is well to keep in-mind that the
tion reflected in some of the forms currently
being used in the police release projects. Some
forms have a space where the officer has to
write an explanation of why he released some-
one: "I released him because-" In other
projects the question is, why didn't you release
this man, and you have to write in an ex-
planation.
It seems to me this shifted emphasis may make
a difference in how the program operates.
Id. Such a decision must be made by the legislature. Why this must be so is
stated by Goldstein, supra note 37.
87 It has been proposed that Milwaukee use computers which "could provide police-
man with data needed for identification and similar purposes in a matter of
seconds." An effort would be made "to connect the Milwaukee police department
with a nationwide computer network set up by the F.B.I." Milwaukee Journal,
Nov. 2, 1967, pt. 1 at 20, col. 2.88See BAIL & SIMMONS: 1965 page inset at 9 (1966) summarizing the findings
of release projects across the country and showing the "jump" problem to be
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persons to be given notice to appear would be the least dangerous offen-
ders. If the person is at the time considered likely to commit further vio-
lence to persons or to property, he is explicitly eliminated from consider-
ation for immediate release.
3. There are groups such as gamblers, prostitutes and other social un-
desirables who are frequently punished lightly or not at all by the courts
and "arrest" provides a lever for some control.
Arrest as a lever of police control has been extensively described in the
American Bar Foundation studies.8 9 Where there is no intention to prose-
cute and the arrest itself is the punishment, arrest is so obviously illegal
that it is unlikely that this objection would be voiced openly. 90 If such
practices are a response to a real need then the proper forum for clarifi-
cation is the legislature which defines the substantive criminal laws or the
courts which construe and enforce them.
4. Instances occur where the officer needs to detain the person for
purposes of investigation.
The need for post-arrest investigation could include, for example, inter-
rogation, identification by the victim, or fingerprinting. Recent studies,
however, have tended to show that even for serious offenses interrogation
as well as the need for additional investigation both at the scene and in-
custody have been overrated.9, This must be even more true for the mis-
insignificant. In New York City, only 400 of 25,000 or 1.6% defaulted. Id. at
15. This is considerably lower than the ratio of defendants who jump bail. Id.
The D.C. Bail Project included serious felonies but still had a 1.9% loss during
two years of operation. Id. at 80. See also Id. at 94-95, 111-12. For the ex-
perience of New York City's stationhouse release program, see Id. at 135-40,
and infra text accompanying note 196. Other programs, including a Denver
order-in project are discussed, Id. at 141-65. The Milwaukee District Attorney
is reported to have had an informal procedure in which letters were sent re-
questing persons suspected of passing bad checks to come to the office, warning
that failure to appear would result in a warrant. It was said to have been 99%
effective. Pilot Project Report, supra note 54 at 111-41.
89 LAFAvE, supra note 45 at 437-89.
90 Nevertheless, such is undoubtedly an important underlying consideration, not only
as to laws affecting "social undesirables," but for any legislation seeking to
reduce custody at tho arrest stage. One member of the revision committee
probably voiced the belief of many in the legal community when he said it
would do "them" good to spend a little time in jail. See LaFave, Alternatives
to the Present Bail System, 1965 U.ILL. L.F. 8, 13.
91See text infra accompanying notes 175-176 and Reiss and Black, supra note 75.
Although it is possible to object that recent studies are inconclusive, there seems
to be increasing evidence that the profile of the criminal justice system which
shows about 90% pleading guilty at the trial level descends without change to
the arrest stage. See note 101 infra. Reiss and Black, supra note 59 at 56. A
look at in custody interrogation developed similar conclusions:
Taking all assumptions and reservations into
account, it appears that interrogations may be
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demeanor and ordinance violation.9 2 Nevertheless, the code principle that
restrictions of personal liberty may be allowed where they serve a rational
police need cuts both ways: the revision committee should be receptive
to a police case supported by empirical evidence which demonstrates that
a statutory exception should be added allowing custody for purposes of
investigation. If such an exception is added, the statute should require the
authorities in each instance to state in writing the specific facts which
support this necessity. 9 3
5. Civil actions may be brought against officers by persons who believe
that the officer acted unreasonably in taking them into custody.
An action for false imprisonment or unlawful detention would be avail-
able to a person taken into custody when under Draft Section 969.01 he
should have been, issued a notice to appear. 94 In the past, however, such
even less necessary than our figures indicate.
In almost every case last summer the police
had adequate evidence to convict the suspect
without any interrogation. Interrogation usually
just cemented a cold case or served to identif-'
accomplices.
Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L. J. 1519,
1588 (1967). The study further concluded that, "questioning was necessary to
solve a crime in less than ten percent of the felony cases in which an arrest
was made..." Id. at 1523. Also, see note 101 infra.
92 See text accompanying note 175 infra.
93 See text accompanying notes 167-177 infra, for discussion of in-custody investigative
needs. Pretrial Release Standards, supra note 38, Section 2.2(d) at 34, requires
that, "when an officer makes an arrest pursuant [to a section setting forth reasons
to arrest, he should be required to indicate his reasons in writing." Such a
provision was also included in the Code but the revision committee believed
it would be ineffective and administratively cumbersome. The writer feels it to be
useful because it compels the officer to put himself on the line and permits later
review of his action. In any case, it is a detail best left to regulations. §969.05(4).
The Standards, in stating the "policy favoring issuance of citations," list the
"need to carry out legitimate investigative functions," but this need is not in-
cluded in the condition listed in Section 2.2(c), the provision giving arrest
authority.
94 The false imprisonment action is not based
upon the want of probable cause for the arrest
but upon the violation of the law or the exceed-
ing of its authority.
Note, Criminal-Law - Torts False lmprisonment - the Shoplifting Problem in
Wisconsin, 1964 Wis.L.REv. 478, 482 n. 23; Wallner v. Fidelity and Deposit
Co., 253 Wis. 66, 70, 33 N.W.2d 215, 216-17 (1948). But see Lane v. Collins,
29 Wis.2d 66, 69, 138 N.W.2d 264, 266 (1965) where the court stated what
appears to be a non sequitur:
If the arrest of plaintiff by defendant was law-
ful it would necessarily follow that the ensuing
holding of plaintiff in custody for an hour and
a half until he could provide bail was not an
unlawful restraint.
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actions have been rare and usually unsuccessful, 95 although it is the re-
What was meant by the court was that such detention for one and one-half
hours, under the conditions there prevailing, was reasonable. While arrest
without proper grounds makes any resulting detention illegal, a good arrest
cannot sustain the legality of an improperly prolonged detention. Each step in
the process has its own measure of reasonableness. This was the holding of the
court in Phillips v. State, 29 Wis.2d 521, 533-34, 139 N.W.2d 41, 46 (1966), cit-
ing with approval the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, Section 136, which makes it "mis-
conduct, . . . If the actor, having obtained the custody of another by a
privileged arrest . . . (c) fails to use due diligence to take the other promptly
before a proper court ....... Compare Schoerre v. Drake, infra note 119.
See Manos, Police Liability for False Arrest or Imprisonment, 16 CLEV-MAR.
L. REV. 415 (1967); Holliday, How Much Detention Constitutes False Im-
prisonment?, 15 CLEVE-MAR. L. REV. 75 (1966); 5 CALtF. L. REVIS. COMM.
404-54 (1953).
95 The problems of such suits are discussed in Foote, Tort Remedies for Police
Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 493 (1955), and LAFAVE,
supra note 45 at 169 n. 2. LaFave points out that in Odinetz v. Budds, 315
Mich. 512, 24 N.W.2d 193 (1946), the court was critical of the arrest of a
restaurant owner for the misdemeanor of operating a restaurant without a
license. The court remarked that a summons would have sufficed to produce
the defendant, a resident of the locality for 20 years. Nevertheless, the court
decided that no liability resulted from failure to issue a summons.
No official records of false arrest suits are kept by the Milwaukee office of
the city attorney but a check of the files of that office as of February 1968
reveals that in the last five years
a) twenty false arrest suits have been com-
menced against the city of Milwaukee and
its employees. Of this number five remain
open. Of the 15 closed, three were settled
by the city for a total of $11,621. The re-
mainder were concluded favorably for the
city;
b) there were four false imprisonment cases.
One case remains open. One case was dis-
missed upon payment by the city of $4,500;
and the remaining cases were dismissed in
favor of the city;
c) six assault and battery cases were com-
menced against the city and its employees.
Two cases remain open. Four cases have
been closed, one of which was settled by
payment of the city.
Most suits involve actual physical assault rather than unlawful detention.
See Milwaukee Journal, Fleb. 15, 1968, pt. I at 22, col. 1. Goldstein, Admin-
istrative Problems in Controlling the Exercise of Police Authority, 58 J. CRIM.
L., C. & P.S. 160, 162 (1967) states:
Only in a minority of cases alleging an abuse
of police powers will evidence clearly support
the fact that the officer did exceed his authority.
In the vast majority of such cases, the actions
of the officer, though they may have harshly
disrupted freedom or privacy, are legally justi-
fied and clearly within the scope of his police
powers. What is really at issue is the propriety
of his action (a) in terms of simple courtesy
and good public relations and (b) in deciding
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sponsibility of the officer to ascertain the facts before acting. Recent state
and United States Supreme Court decisions allow a substantial margin to
police discretion in such matters; 96 and even if they are found responsible,
indemnification statutes save them from personal loss where their actions
are in the line of duty and executed in "good faith." 97
5. Constitutional, Practical and Social Problems Noted
Although the claim has apparently not been advanced that unnecessary
custody or incarceration regardless of circumstances is unconstitutional,
whether he should do what he clearly had
power to do. [Emphasis in original.]
96 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Kagel v. Brugger, 19 Wis.2d I, 4, 119
N.W.2d 394, 396 (1963): Wallner v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., supra note 94; Quin-
nette v. Garland, 277 F. Supp. 999 (C.D. Calif. 1967). Cf. Riss v. City of New
York .... F.2d .... (2d Cir. July 7, 1968).
9 7 WIs. STAT. §270.58 (1) (1967) reads:
Where the defendant in any action . . . is a
public officer, and is proceeded against in his
official capacity and the jury or the court finds
that he acted in good faith the judgment as
to damages and costs entered against the of-
ficer shall be paid by the [agency] of which he
is an officer.
WIS. STAT. §59.22 (1967) covers "defaults or misconduct in office" of a
sheriff, his deputies or jailers. See special memorandum No. 6 of the Wisconsin
attorney general, Personal Liability for Acts of Officers, July 15, 1965. Wallner
v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., supra note 94, covers the problem posed by the Code
section nicely:
where an authority given by law is exceeded,
the officer loses the benefit of his justification,
and the law holds him a trespasser ab initio
although to a certain extent he acted under the
authority given. It is reasonable that when from
all the circumstances of the case it appears
reasonably clear that an officer has not acted
in good faith or has been a too ready instru-
ment in the perpetration of a grevious wrong
by arresting the wrong person, he cannot be
given the justification a writ of probable cause
would otherwise afford.... The officer is liable
if he fails to take proper precaution to ascertain
the right person, or refuses information offered
that would have disclosed his mistake, or if he
detains the person an undue length of time
without taking proper steps to establish his
identity.
Likewise, Pierson v. Ray, supra note 96, finds that "part of the background of
tort liability, in the case of police officers making an arrest, is the defense of
good faith and probable cause." In Quinnette v. Garland, supra note 96, a claim
was denied against a deputy sheriff who in good faith executed a 12-year-old
warrant. Compare also the statutory definition of, "reasonably believes," WIs.
STAT. §939.22(32) (1967) which "means that the actor believes that a certain
fact situation exists and such belief under the circumstances is reasonable even
though erroneous."
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the Supreme Court might be receptive to a case where state power has
been exercised to restrict personal liberty beyond the point necessary to
accomplish its object of law enforcement.9 8 There are strong reasons other
than the constitutional ones for a presumption of release.
Taking a person into custody where it would otherwise be possible to
release the person on notice to appear complicates the problem of crimi-
nal justice administration91 and creates undesirable consequences both for
the police officer and the citizen.100 Our trial-oriented judicial structure is
already badly askew in that most cases are disposed of either by a deci-
98 See note 30 supra. Indeed, if Terry, Peters and Sibron mean anything, it is that any
action subject to the Fourth Amendment search and seizure provisions may be
"judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer
at the point of seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief' that the action taken was appropriate?" Terry v. Ohio, supra note 19, at
3155.
09Where the power to arrest is seen as a direction to arrest it creates a double
problem for the officer. He often does not arrest in order to spare the minor
offender the punishment of arrest or conversely uses arrest as a punishment, thus
merging the decision to "arrest" with that to prosecute. The latter decision,
whether or not a police function, should not and cannot be permitted without
direction. Reiss and Black, supra note 59 at 53, 57; Remington and Rosenblum,
The Criminal Law and the Legislative Process, 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 481. The
notice to appear has been suggested even for use in riot situations to prevent
overcrowded jail conditions and to decrease tensions. Report of the National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 347, 350-51 (Bantam ed. 1968).
10 As to the effect of the arrest on a citizen, see Robinson, Alternatives to Arrest
of Lesser Offenders, t1 CRIME & DEL. 8, 11-12 (1965). The commentary of the
MODEL PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE (1966), supra note 8, at 107-108, well states the
effect: "Being arrested and held by the police, even if for a few hours, is, for
most persons, awesome and frightening." See also the Police Task Force Report,
supra note 12 at 178-180, 187; WILSON, POLICE ADMINISTRATION 194 (2d ed.
1965); CRAY, THE BIG BLUE LINE 192-93 (1967). Arrest presents a stylized
confrontation of force. Shellow, Reinforcing Police Neutrality in Civil Rights
Demonstrations, 1 J. App. BEH. Sci. 243, 248-49(1966). Arrest places the police
officer in a position of danger..
Statistically, if a policeman is going to be
killed, it will almost of a certainty be during
his attempt to make an arrest.
VALLOW, POLICE ARREST & SEARCH 3 (1962). It would require careful study
of the complex of circumstances under which an arrest is made in order to
determine whether the suspect attacks the officer because he fears custody or
prosecution. If the second, the proposed section would not ameliorate the situation.
Compare Bristow, Police Officer Shootings-A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J. CRIM.
L., C. & P.S. 93 (1963) and Robin, Justifiable Homicide by Police Officers, 54
J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 225, 230-31 (1963) concerning danger to police officers.
Such considerations were consequential to the Court in deciding Terry v. Ohio,
supra note 19, at 4584 n. 21, referring to the number of police officers killed
by guns and knives. See also SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 42-48 (1966);
Police Task Force Report, supra note 12 at 189. The necessity to compile an
impressive arrest record also has a deleterious effect on police work. NIEDER-
HOFFER, BEHIND THE SHIELD 70-72 (1967).
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sion not to charge or by a plea of guilty.101 Of those presently taken into
custody, there is evidence that the police interrogate or perform other
functions which require the suspect's presence in only the most serious
cases. 1 02 A further factor increasingly obvious is that the police already
have an informal non-arrest and non-prosecution policy for adjusting minor
disputes, particularly those involving domestic disturbances.1 03 Perhaps
most significant today is the undeniably deleterious effect of arrests on
police-community relations, particularly where the arrest is seen as "un-
necessary" in the community and where there is a minority group in-
volved.' 0 4 Yet unfortunately today arrests for minor crimes such as:
101 In many communities between one-third and
one-half of the cases begun by arrest are dis-
posed of by some form of dismissal by police,
prosecutor, or judge. When a decision is made
to prosecute, it is estimated that in many courts
as many as 90 percent of all convictions are ob-
tained by guilty pleas.
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice:
Task Force Report: The Courts 4 (1967). It does not follow, of course, that
when a case is dismissed the defendant should never have been arrested,
but it does emphasize the importance of that decision. A tally might show that
more time is spent in jail as a result of police custody decisions than
as a result of court sentences. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL xiii-iv (1967) argues
that what we have is not an adversary system but that it has "an administrative,
non-adversary character of 'bureaucratic due process.' " Id. at 29.
102 See note 91 supra and Yale Project, supra note 91, at 1587 n. 179.
103 Parnas, supra note 54 at 929-54. The Milwaukee method to avoid filing a
complaint in domestic matters is described at 947-48. Other aspects of non-arrest
are found in Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process:
Low Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L. J. 543
(1960); LaFave, The Police and Nonenforcement of the Law -Parts I and 11,
1962. Wis. L. REV. 104, 179. These drop-outs at various points along the
criminal justice assembly line are referred to as the "sieve effect" in Blumberg,
supra notc 101 at 51-52. One of the first things that a neophyte officer learns is
not to use all of his arrest power. Goldstein, supra note 95 at 163.
104 There is evidence that such arrests create great
antagonism against police officers in slum com-
munities. For example, many complaints filed
with the review board in Philadelphia involve
such ordinances and not a single complaint
has involved an incident during commission of
a felony. The reason for hostility resulting from
minor crimes is probably that while most of-
fenders know when they have committed major
crimes and expect that they will be arrested for
them, the issue as to most alleged minor crimes
is not as clear and the offender does not usually
believe, whether or not he has acted illegally,
that he has done anything sufficiently wrong to
justify arrest.
Police Task Force Report, supra note 12, at 187. This point is underscored
in the Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 206
(1968): "all the major outbursts of recent years . . . were precipitated by
routine arrests of Negroes for minor offenses by white police." See also Kamisar,
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vagrancy, disorderly conduct, use of ob-
scene language, loitering, failure to move
on, blocking the street or sidewalk, drunk-
enness, drinking in public, and curfew vi-
olations constitute almost one-half of all
arrests made each year in the United
States.105
C. Persons Unable to Care for Themselves
969.03 AUTHORITY TO TAKE INTO CUSTODY A PERSON UN-
ABLE TO CARE FOR HIMSELF.
(1) CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH CUS-
TODY IS PERMITTED.
A law enforcement officer may provision-
ally take a person into custody for the
purpose of transporting him to a safe
place if the officer has reasonable grounds
to believe that the person is so intoxi-
cated, or is so physically or mentally in-
capacitated that he is unable to care for
his own safety, and he is found in a pub-
lic place in such condition.
Ref. Wis. Stat. 947.03(1):
A person is so intoxicated that he is
unable to care for his own safety and is
found in a public place in such condition
... (to be repealed).
(2) DISPOSITION OF INCAPACITATED
PERSONS.
Any such person shall be conveyed to his
home or to a facility which is appropri-
ate to care for the person. The person
shall not be taken to a jail or other law
enforcement detention facility unless there
is no other appropriate facility in the
community which is able or willing to ac-
cept him. If the person is taken to jail,
he shall be released as soon as he is able
On the Tactics of Police-Prosecutor Oriented Critics of the Courts, 49 CORNELL
L.Q. 436, 457 (1964); CRAY, THE BIG BLUE LINE 183-94 (1967); Voss, The
Predictive Efficiency of the Glueck Social Prediction Table, 54 J. CiM. L.,
C. & P.S. 421, 422 (1963); Mylonas and Reckless, Prisoner's Attitudes Towards
Law and Legal Institutions, 54 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 479, 483 (1963);
KEPHART, RACIAL FACTORS AND RACIAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 64 (1957).
105 Police Task Force Report, supra note 12 at 187.
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to care for himself or as soon as another
more appropriate facility is available,
whichever is sooner.
A large part of the dreary picture of minor offense arrests is accounted
for by the offense of public drunkenness.
[I]n the year 1965 the police in 2,647
cities of over 2,500 population made
1,337,321 arrests for drunkenness. This
. . . is just short of one-third of all the
arrests made by the police in these com-
munities. And this does not fully describe
the situation, as many habitual drunks
are taken into custody on charges of dis-
orderly conduct (which is the second larg-
est category of arrests) and vagrancy. 106
Statistics for Milwaukee county show that in 1966, 10,837 persons
appeared in court on the misdemeanor of being drunk in a public place
(Wis. Stat. §947.03). Another 7500 were charged under the municipal
ordinance banning public drunkenness. 10 7 Wisconsin joins the rest of the
country in treating drunkenness as part of the criminal process, thereby
creating what has been called the "revolving door" cycle: the same person
frequently and recurrently goes through the same process.10s
The burden of processing so great a mass of minor offenders falls upon
the police and the administration of criminal justice (if we may use this
term for it). The legal tools placed in the hands of the police for this
106 LAFAVE, Penal Code Revision: Considering the Problems and Practices of the Police,
45 TEXAS L. REV. 434, 450 (1967). For a general discussion of the problem with
recommendations for its amelioration, see President's Commission Report, supra
note 13 at 233-37.
107 Milwaukee Journal, June 14, 1967 at 4, col. 1. This may be compared with
1954 figures when "6817 persons were convicted in court for drunkenness, while
7632 stipulations of guilt were entered." LaFave, supra note 45 at 442 n. 16.
[Most of the information about the process was gathered by two Marquette
University law students, now attorneys, Dennis Costello and Tod 0. Daniel.]
108 It has been estimated that "there were at least 33,800 alcoholics in Milwaukee
county but . . . this figure might be low." Milwaukee Journal, Mar. 18, 1967
at 11. There are at least 127,000 "alcoholics" in Wisconsin. Milwaukee Journal,
Sept. 22, 1967, pt. 1 at 23, col. 2. The President's Commission Report, supra
note 13 at 233, found:
A review of chronic offender cases reveals that
a large number of persons have, in short install-
ments, spent many years of their lives in jail.
In 1957 the Committee on Prisons, Probation
and Parole in the District of Columbia studied
six chronic offenders and found that they had
been arrested for drunkenness a total of 1,409
times and had served a total of 125 years in
penal institutions.
[Vol. 2:1
December 1968] Pre-Arraignment Procedure 51
purpose include a state misdemeanor statute; 109 state authority to commit
the "inebriate" under the Mental Health Act; 110 and municipal imple-
mentation of a state authorized public drunkenness act."' 1 Facilities for
treating alcoholics being practically non-existent, the Mental Health Act
is a dead-letter in this connection. 112
109 Section 947.03 reads:
(I) A person who is so intoxicated that he is
unable to care for his own safety and is found
in a public place in such condition may be
fined not more than $50 or imprisoned not
more than 30 days.
(2) A person who is an habitual drunkard who
is so intoxicated that he is unable to care for
his own safety and is found in a public place
in such a condition may be fined not more than
$100 or imprisoned not more than 6 months.
110 Section 51.09(2) reads:
The commitment of an inebriate or a drug
addict shall be for such period of time as in thejudgment of the superintendent of the institution
may be necessary to enable him to take care
of himself. He shall be released upon the cer-
tificate of the superintendent that he has so
recovered. When he has been confined 6 months
and has been refused such a certificate he may
obtain a hearing upon the question of his re-
covery in the manner and with the effect pro-
vided for a re-examination under section 51.11.
11 Section 66.12(l)(b) provides:
Local ordinances may contain a provision for
stipulation of guilt or nolo contendere of any
or all violations under such ordinances, and
may designate the manner in which such stipu-
lation is to be made and fix the penalty to be
paid.
Milwaukee ordinance 106-2 provides:
(a) Any person who shall be found intoxicated
in the city of Milwaukee . . . shall forfeit
a penalty of not less than one dollar nor
more than one hundred dollars ($100).
(b) Any person arrested under Section 106-
2(a) for being intoxicated may stipulate
his guilt to that offense and be released
from confinement upon payment of a
penalty of ten dollars ($10) to the city of
Milwaukee. No such stipulation shall be
permitted unless the officer authorized to
accept the stipulation is satisfied that the
person arrested has regained his sobriety.
112 A survey of Milwaukee county facilities for the treatment of alcoholism taken
in 1966 revealed:
of the 21 public and private hospitals and re-
habilitation centers questioned: None has a
program of information. Only one has a pro-
gram . . . to train members in detecting
alcoholism. There are practically no out-patient
facilities .... Only five agencies have a 24 hour
admitting service, even for acute cases of
Prospectus
The corruption of the judicial process is illustrated by comparing sta-
tistics of disposition with those of court appearances: of the 10,837 ap-
pearing, 10,121 pleaded guilty and 716 pleaded not guilty.113
The Milwaukee police officer may take an intoxicated person either to
the station or to the person's residence if he has one. If he is involved in
some rehabilitation program, the police may take him to the appropriate
institution. Whether he will be taken home will depend on factors such as
his appearance, his reputation as a known derelict, his present or past
attitude towards the officer, and his social class. One police officer stated:
"Most of the time the drunk is taken in for his own protection."114
If the person brought to the station is charged under the city ordinance,
alcoholism. . . . Only seven have facilities for
treating alcoholics after they are released from
the institution where they received original treat-
ment.
Milwaukee Journal, Jan. 13, 1967, pt. 2 at 13. One of these, the De Paul Re-
habilitation hospital devoted to treatment of alcoholics, has a capacity of 104
patients and a treatment program of three and one-half weeks. Outpatient care
which may properly last several years is not included. Milwaukee Journal, Oct.
6, 1967, pt. 2 at 11, col. 1. A program "seeking treatment for at least 10%"
of the estimated 33,800 alcoholics in the county was proposed. Milwaukee
Journal, Mar. 18, 1967, at 11.
113 In New York City where drunks are arrested usually on disorderly conduct
charges, the chief judge issued an order, effective Jan. 1, 1966, ordering the
appointment of legal aid attorneys to defend these defendants. Thereafter,
the conviction rate fell from a rate of 99%
to less than 2%. In response, the Police De-
partment in May of 1966 ordered the discon-
tinuance of daily mass "roundups" of derilicts
in the Bowery area.
Memorandum on the Manhattan Bowery Project, by the Vera Institute of Justice
(1967). Would it not be likely that the same would occur if these defendants
were represented?
114 Although a substantial number of those per-
sons found intoxicated in public are not ar-
rested, it is routine practice to take custody of
those drunks who might be harmed if not in-
carcerated. Typically the subject of such an
arrest is a habitu6 of skid row who must be
arrested for his own safety because he has
fallen and injured himself, because he needs
protection from the cold, or because he is
likely to become the victim of a jackroller.
The true purpose of these arrests is reflected
in different ways in major cities across the
country: The Chicago officer may enter "drunk-
safekeeping" or "Drunk & Down" on his arrest
slip, a Philadelphia policeman may make a
notation that the defendant was arrested "for
has own protection"; while the Detroit officer
uses the revealing term "golden rule drunk" to
describe such a person.
LAFAVE, supra note 106 at 448; See also LAFAVE supra note 45 at 440; Pilot
Project Report, supra note 54 at 11-10.
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he is usually held for four hours or until he is sober. As provided by the
ordinance he may stipulate his guilt, pay ten dollars which is forfeited and
be released without having to appear in court. If charged under the
state statute, he is held overnight in the "drunk tank" and appears in
misdemeanor court the next morning. The police determine whether it
will be a state or city charge. Observation in misdemeanor court indicates
generally that only the disheveled derelict is processed on a state charge,
although occasionally a college student is so charged to impress him with
the seriousness of his conduct.' 15
The court runs through the "drunk tank" as its first order of business,
disposing of thirty to forty cases a day. Sentence may be either to the
city jail or to the House of Correction. The latter is preferred perhaps
because it maintains a care center for alcoholics, although a more im-
portant consideration may be which one has space available on the day of
sentencing. Almost invariably defendants plead guilty and the standard
sentence is ten dollars or ten days.' 16 If the defendant has an extensive
record or there are other extenuating circumstances, the sentence may be
115 LAFAVE, supra note 45 at 442 states of Milwaukee:
Not all drunks are allowed to stipulate guilt.
A directive from the chief of police indi-
cates that this alternative is to be used only
with nonhabitual drunks who do not have any
outstanding warrants or cases pending against
them.
The Pilot Project Report, supra note 54, at 11-50 states:
Common drunks ordinarily are charged as or-
dinance violators. Prior to appearance in . . .
court they are interviewed and have their rec-
ords checked by a Milwaukee police department
sergeant, who selects a few for recharging on
a state warrant in order to insure a period of
incarceration. This occurs in those cases in
which (1) the defendant requires a term of
imprisonment; (2) he has been in daily for
several days; (3) he has fines outstanding that
he has failed to pay; or (4) other aggravating
circumstances exist.
In contrast to the procedures followed by
the Milwaukee police department, the sheriff's
department has little choice in bringing their
charges. All their cases must be taken to the
office of the district attorney, and it is left to
him whether the charge should be a violation
of the state statute or the county ordinance.
In practice the county ordinances are rarely
used, but on occasion they are resorted to as
a compromise between a more serious state
charge and a decision not to charge at all.
1t6 Thus, whether the charge is state or city, the monetary penalty is the same. But the
stigma of a state charge is much greater than that of a city charge and as indi-
cated in the text, this is used as a means of punishment. See text accompanying
notes 206-209 infra.
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increased or reduced. Representatives of various private service organiza-
tions will be in court and on their request certain defendants will have
their cases dismissed or held open so that they may be referred to the
agency. A sentence may be suspended if a defendant agrees to participate
in one of the programs.
All this is very costly:
A welfare department survey showed that
in one year the county spent more than
five million dollars merely to shelter
alcoholics in county institutions.1 17
Yet little has been expended on understanding causes and thereby reduc-
ing the fiscal or human waste that this repetitive process represents."l 8
The task of the police is clear: according to explicit state and city law,
public drunkenness is unlawful and the police are charged with perform-
ing the combined transportation and sanitation service to carry out this
policy. To the extent that the police act rationally and humanely in taking
some persons to their homes, they act outside their legal authority.l19
Within recent years, this irrationality has attracted the attention of com-
mentators, interested attorneys and the courts. 12 0 Several state and fed-
eral courts had held conviction under public drunkenness statutes in-
valid;' 2 1 and the Wisconsin Supreme Court without citing any of these
117 Milwaukee Journal, Jan. 6, 1967, Accent section at 1. Present costs in mainte-
nance of prisoners are approximately $3.40 per day in the House of Correction.
Id. Costs for maintaining a prisoner in the Milwaukee County Jail depend on
whether calculations are based on "out-of-pocket costs," that is, "food, food
preparation, and medical services," in which case the cost in 1968 is $1.73 per
day per prisoner; or on the "total cost of maintaining the prisoner," which
"includes the out-of-pocket expenses, plus salaries of Deputies assigned to the
jail, light, heat, maintenance, and all other operating costs." Letter from
Sheriff Edwin T. Purcell to the author, June 25, 1968.
118 Milwaukee Journal, Jan. 13, 1967, pt. 2 at 13. See note 112 supra.
119 In Schoette v. Drake, 139 Wis. 18, 120 N.W. 393 (1909), an officer failed
to bring a person arrested on a drunk charge before a magistrate until the
morning after the arrest. The court decided that "the lower court erred in
deciding as a matter of law that there had been no unreasonable delay, as the
local court had been open immediately after arrest" for disposition of the case
or for release on bail.
120 Logan, May a Man be Punished Because He is ill?, 52 A.B.A. J. 932 (1966);
Rubington, The "Revolving Door" Game, 12 CRIME & DEL. 332-338 (1966);
Szasz, Alcoholism: A Socio-Ethical Perspective, and Slovenko, Alcoholism and
the Criminal Law, 6 WASHBURN L. REV. 255, 269 (1967). The theoretical basis
for court decisions before the Terry case is analyzed in Starrs, The Disease
Concept of Alcoholism and Traditional Criminal Law Theory, 19 S.C. L.REV.
349 (1967) and see generally the symposium in this same issue, Id. at 303.
See also Drunkenness Report, supra note 113.
1 2lSeattle v. Hill, 72 Wash. 2d. 778, 435 P.2d 692 (1967); State v. Rickets, 2 CR. L.
2127 (Md. Cir. Ct. Oct. 11, 1967); Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir.
1966); and Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Cases
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cases concluded that "it is generally now believed by the medical pro-
fession that alcoholism is a disease."' 12 2 Unfortunately, the case accepted
by the United States Supreme Court to determine the right of a state to
make public drunkenness a crime, Powell v. Texas,123 could hardly have
been more ill-chosen. The opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall, representing
four justices, reads like a memorandum recommending that the appeal be
denied for failure to present properly a federal question rather than a
statement of the reasons that a state has a constitutional right to treat
alcoholics as they do.
We are unable to conclude, on the state
of the record12 4 or on the current state
of medical knowledge,1 2 5 that chronic
alcoholics in general, and Leroy Powell
in particular126 suffer from such an irre-
sistible compulsion to drink and to get
drunk in public that they are utterly un-
able to control their performance of either
or both of these acts and thus cannot be
deterred at all from public intoxication.
And in any event this Court has never
articulated a general constitutional doc-
trine of mens rea.12 7
contra include Budd v. California, and People v. Hoy, 380
N.W.2d 436 (1968).
12 2 State v. Freiberg, 35 Wis.2d 480, 151 N.W.2d 1 (1967).
123392 U.S. 514 (1968).
124 We know very little about the circumstances
surrounding the drinking bout which resulted in
this conviction, or about Leroy Powell's drink-
ing problem, or indeed about alcoholism itself.
The trial hardly reflects the sharp legal and
evidentiary clash between fully prepared ad-
versary litigants which is traditionally expected
in major constitutional cases. The State put on
only one witness, the arresting officer. The de-
fense put on three- a policeman who testified
to appellant's long history of arrests for public
drunkenness, the psychiatrist, and appellant
himself.
Id. at 521-522.
125 Furthermore, the inescapable fact is that there
is no agreement among members of the medical
profession about what it means to say that
"alcoholism" is a "disease."
Mich. 597, 158
Id. at 522.
126 Defendant had testified on cross-examination that before coming to court on the
trial date he had taken only one drink because he was afraid if he took more
he might not make it to court. Id. at 519.
127 The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity,
mistake, justification, and duress have histori-
cally provided the tools for a constantly shifting
adjustment of the tension between the evolving
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Mr. Justice White, concurring only in the result based on the facts of
the case,12 8 but thereby permitting the five to four majority, went further:
The fact remains that some chronic al-
coholics must drink and hence must drink
somewhere. Although many chronics have
homes many others do not. For practical
purposes the public streets may be homes
for these unfortunates, not because their
disease compels them to be there but
because drunk or sober, they have no
place else to go and no place else to be
when they are drinking. . . . As applied
to them this statute is in effect a law
which bars a single act for which they
may not be convicted under the Eighth
Amendment-the act of getting drunk.2 9
If Mr. Justice White and the four dissenters do indeed believe that the
public drunkenness law is unconstitutional as applied to those "chronics"
who are homeless or that the case as decided does not purport to consider
the homeless drunk, then Powell is inapplicable in a large proportion of
cases involving this offense. a3 0
aims of the criminal law and changing religious,
moral, philosophical, and medical views of the
nature of man. This process of adjustment has
always been thought to be the province of the
States.
Id. at 536.
128 Although Powell had been arrested for
public drunkenness more than 100 times,
the chronic alcoholic with a home [Powell] or
financial resources is as capable as the non-
chronic drinker of doing his drinking in private,
of removing himself from public places, and
since he knows or ought to know that he
will become intoxicated, of making plans to
avoid his being found drunk in public. For
these reasons, I cannot say that the chronic
who proves his disease and a compulsion to
drink is shielded from conviction when he has
knowingly failed to take feasible precautions
against committing a criminal act, here the act
of going to or remaining in a public place.Id. at 550.
129 Id.
130 Skid-row alcoholics compose the largest por-
tion of the 2 million public drunkenness arrests
made annually in the United States. A large
number of these are the repeated arrests of the
same men. These chronic drunks are arrested,
convicted, sentenced, jailed, and released - only
to be rearrested, often within hours or days.
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Moreover, in evaluating Powell for the purposes of Draft Section 969.03
it is essential to recognize that unlike the Court we are not concerned with
the substantive offense, but with the procedural problem of the police
officer encountering the orderly drunk found in the public way. The Court
proceeded on the assumption that it had only two choices: either to con-
tinue the "criminal process" of arrest and conviction or to opt for a "medi-
cal" solution in which "we run the grave risk that nothing will be accom-
plished beyond the hanging of a new sign- reading 'hospital' over one
wing of the jail house."13t
In the opinion this discussion is allied with that of whether the criminal
penalty deters further public drunkenness. 132 Such an inquiry indicates
a misconception of the current function of public drunkenness statutes.
Whatever their purpose might have been in the past, their raison d'tre
today is not to deter. These statutes now serve to legitimatize a police ac-
tivity that most law enforcement officials defend on humanitarian grounds:
to take the drunk off the streets "for his own good."133
The purpose of Draft Section 969.03 is to recognize and legitimatize this
process, while eliminating the necessity for court appearance and convic-
tion. In so doing the provision carries out the original intention of present
Section 947.03: to aid persons "unable to care for [their] own safety" in a
public place.1 3 4 But Section 947.03 designates this condition as criminal
and authorizes court appearance and conviction in order to provide the po-
lice with authority for accomplishing the humanitarian object. In contrast,
the effect of Section 969.03 is to remove public drunkenness from the crim-
inal code where it is the sole manifestation of "anti-social behavior."1 3 5
They are the men from skid-row for whom the
door of the jail is truly a "revolving door."
Drunkenness Report, supra note 113, at 11. See also Id. at 60.
t3l 392 U.S. at 529.
132 Id. at 531. See Cohen, Reflections on the Revision of the Texas Penal Code, 45
TEXAS L. REV. 413, 427-428 (1967). For empirical evidence to support these
reflections, see Chambliss, Types of Deviances and the Eflectiveness of Legal
Sanctions, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 703, 714-716.
133 See note 114 supra.
134 LAFAVE, supra note 45, at 184 notes that "The draftsman's comments [to Section
947.03, supra note 109] state that 'the police, as a matter of policy, should be
permitted to take him [the helpless drunk] into custody, if for no other
reason than that he needs protection,'" citing 5 Wis. Legis. Council, Jud. Corn.
Rep. on Crim. Code 45 (1953). LaFave further noted, however, that this is
"inconsistent with the notion that there is a right to prompt release on bail set
only to insure appearance."
135 The President's Commission Report, supra note 13, at 236, recommends:
Drunkenness should not in itself be a criminal
offense. Disorderly or other criminal conduct
accompanied by drunkenness should remain
punishable as separate crimes. The implemen-
tation of this recommendation requires the de-
velopment of adequate civil detoxification pro-
cedures.
December 1968]
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At the same time the Draft Section provides for handling a similar prob-
lem: the person "who is so physically or mentally incapacitated that he is
unable to care for his own safety." Presently there is no authority to take
such persons into custody even though they are in personal danger.13 6
Custody in such cases is designated as "provisional" because the officer
is authorized to take the drunk, or the physically or mentally incapacitated,
into custody only "for the purpose of transporting him to a safe place."
Subsection (2) provides that the person is to be taken to his home or to
a "facility which is appropriate to care for the person." He is to be taken
to jail only when "no other appropriate facility in the community ... is
able or willing to accept him"; he is not to be taken there to commence
a criminal prosecution. The "community" is left undefined, but should be
within a reasonable distance of the place where the person is found.
Although this approach is sound procedurally, it merely highlights the
tragic spectacle of men strewn like refuse in skid-rows in all our great
cities. Nevertheless, Draft Section 969.03 does fit into the scheme of re-
ducing the number of persons taken into custody for prosecution and ra-
tionalizing the process of criminal justice administration. 137
If the proposed section were made law, of course, §947.03 would be repealed.
The proposed change is also in accord with MODEL PENAL CODE Section 250.11
(Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961). Statutes permitting release of drunks are collected
in LaFave, supra note 45, at 448 n. 41.
136 A review of the right at common law of detention of a mentally deranged per-
son is found in Manos, Police Liability for False Arrest or Imprisonment, 16
CLEV.-MAR. L.REv. 421, 425 (1967).
137 A modest but successful effort is the Vera Institute of Justice Manhattan Bowery
Project begun in November 1967. In the first two months, it ministered to
180 off the street alcoholics. Its function is divided into 1 ) a street rescue team,
2) medical evaluation and alcohol detoxification for an average five day stay
and 3) placement in an aftercare agency.
The rescue team is composed of a civilian
medical aid and a plainclothes policeman. The
team cruises the Bowery area in an unmarked
station wagon, driven by the policeman. They
approach an inebriated, derelict man, offer him
a cigarette, and talk with him. They tell him
that if he is willing, they will take him to a
nearby infirmary, where he will receive medical
care. . . . Eighty-five percent of men so ap-
proached have agreed to come in on a volun-
tary basis. Most of the others were helped to
their lodging houses; the remainder refused help
and were left alone, except for a few cases in
which an ambulance was called for a medical
emergency.
Address to the Heads of New York State Alcoholism Treatment Units by Robert
R. Morgan, M.D., Jan. 31, 1968, Vera Institute of Justice, New York. The
project is described in Drunkenness Report, supra note 113, at 58-63.
Maryland recently has instituted 24-hour detoxification centers, right of com-
mitment for five days under controlled criteria and a Division of Alcoholism
Control which is to advise the governor on the "most effective methods of
coordinating the efforts of all public agencies within the state to deal with the
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D. To the Station
969.24 PROMPT TAKING TO POLICE STATION.
Any person taken into custody, if not re-
leased pursuant to subs. 969.01(3) or (4)
shall be brought promptly to a police
station.
Ref. ALl (1966) s. 3.09.
969.30 PRELIMINARY DISPOSITION OF PERSONS IN CUSTODY:
WARNING.
(1) APPEARANCE BEFORE STATION
OFFICER. Any person brought to a po-
lice station in custody shall be presented
forthwith before the station officer [to be
defined] prior to his being booked or in-
terrogated. The station officer shall make
a record of the time when the person is
brought before him.
Ref. Study Draft (1968) A4.01(1).
(2) WARNING.138 The station officer
shall immediately inform the person in
plain and understandable language:
(a) of the crime for which he is held;
(b) of the time limits of his detention and
the probable method of his disposition
pursuant to s. 969.32(1), as it applies to
his case and in accordance with the facts
then known;
(c) that he is not obligated to say any-
thing or to answer any questions, and that
anything that he may say may be used in
evidence against him;
(d) that he may promptly communicate
by telephone, letter or telegram with coun-
sel, relatives or friends and that, if neces-
sary, funds or facilities will be provided to
enable him to do so;
(e) that counsel, relatives or friends may
have access to him as provided in s.
969.70(3).
problem of alcoholism and alcoholics." 3 CR. L. 2074 (1968). The National
Institute of Mental Health has given a grant to the Legislative Drafting Research
Fund of Columbia University to prepare a model statute on alcoholism problems.
3 CR. L. 2152 (1968).
138 This subsection has been substantially revised since the project termination.
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(f) that he will not be questioned against
his wishes and that he may consult a law-
yer before being questioned and may
have a lawyer present during any ques-
tioning; and
(g) that if he wishes to consult a lawyer
or to have a lawyer present during ques-
tioning, but is unable to aflord or obtain
one, he will not be questioned until a law-
yer has been provided for him, and if he
does not know of a lawyer or cannot
afford one, he will be given a telephone
number to call where he may immediately
speak to one, who will advise him of his
rights either by phone or in person.
Ref. Study Draft (1968) A4.0](2). Min-
imum Standards for Criminal Justice:
Standards Relating to Providing Defense
Services, Section 7.1, at 59 (1967),
hereafter referred to as Defense Ser-
vices Standards.
(3) PRINTED FORM TO BE GIVEN.
The person shall forthwith be given a
printed form which in plain and under-
standable language contains the substance
of the matters listed in sub. 2.
Ref. Study Draft (1968) A4.01(2).
(4) INCAPACITY TO UNDERSTAND
WARNING. In any case where a person
in custody is in such condition, on ac-
count of illness, injury, drink, or drugs,
that he is incapable of understanding the
warning, the warning shall be given as
soon as such person is able to understand
it. Interrogation concerning any crime
shall not proceed until the person has
sufficiently recovered from the condition
to understand the warning.
Ref. Study Draft (1968) A4.03(3).
(5) TELEPHONING RIGHTS. Prompt-
ly after the warning the station officer
shall aftord the person an opportunity,
including if necessary funds in a reason-
able amount, to use a telephone. In in-
stances where the person is incapacitated
so that he cannot himself make a tele-
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phone call, the station officer shall tele-
phone to a designated attorney, friend or
relative. If he is unable to reach the per-
son on the first try the person may call
another party or he may continue from
time to time to try to reach the first party
until he meets with success. If the person
reached is a lawyer, the person must be
given an opportunity to speak to him in
private. If the person reached is a friend
or relative, an officer may monitor the
call if there are reasonable grounds to
believe the person in custody will be
charged with one of the crimes listed in
s. 969.32(2)(a), and that he may obtain
or disclose some information which will
interfere with the investigation of the mat-
ter or matters for which the person is be-
ing held. The person shall be informed
that the call is to be monitored and the
reason therefore.
Ref. Study Draft (1968) A4.03(5),
A5.07.
(6) INFORMATION CONCERNING
LOCATION OF PERSONS IN CUS-
TODY. Upon the arrival of the person
in custody at a police station, information
concerning his location shall be promptly
made available to a relative, attorney or
friend upon a single inquiry at a central-
ized location.
Ref. AL! (1966) 4.01(6).
(7) INFORMATION CONCERNING
CUSTODY DECISION. The station offi-
cer shall promptly set in motion the means
of obtaining any additional information
he may need to make a decision to issue
to the person in custody a notice to ap-
pear, to release the person on his own
promise to appear, or to admit him to
bail.
As with many other aspects of Wisconsin criminal procedure, there is
no code provision which informs the policeman what to do with the person
once he has taken him into custody. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has
instructed the officer to "take the person arrested before a magistrate
December 1968]
Prospectus
without unreasonable delay, but any officer who followed the advice liter-
ally would receive astounded stares from court personnel.1 39 Such lan-
guage preserves the image of eighteenth century law enforcement before
the organization of police forces, when the constable brought the alleged
offender directly from the street to the magistrate. Draft Section 969.24
reflects present practice in directing the officer to take the person in custody
"promptly" to the police station.1 40
The person brought to the station is to be taken "forthwith" before the
station officer who is responsible for seeing that these statutory procedures
are carried out (969.30(1)). His duties, although not yet fully defined,
will include responsibility for keeping the requisite records of custody. 14'
This officer shall give warnings based on Miranda though these may have
been given by the arresting officer (969.22); the warnings will include
fully informing the person of his rights of communication and of the time
13 9 Schoette v. Drake, 139 Wis. 18, 21, 120 N.W. 393, 395 (1909); Peloquin v.
Hibner, 231 Wis. 77, 86-87, 285 N.W. 380, 385 (1939); LaFave, Detention
for Investigation by the Police: An Analysis of Current Practices, 1962 Wash.
L.Q. 331, 332-334. Law and practice in Wisconsin is discussed in Pilot Project
Report, supra note 54 at II 32-40. Diverse sections throughout the WIs. STAT.
command a like duty: §26.14 Forest fires, law enforcement, "to take such
person before any court in the country"; §46.05 Bonds of Employes, "take the
offender before a magistrate"; §61.28 Marshall, "take before the justice of the
peace"; §62.09(13)(a) City Police, "take before the Police justice or other
proper court"; §74.11(2) Tax Collection, "take him before such nearest jus-
tice"; § 196.16 Gaming, Railroad Cars, "bring him before any court of competent
jurisdiction"; §192.47 Railroad Police, "take each offender before some magis-
trate having jurisdiction; §945.47 Car Conductor, "bring the offender before a
magistrate of the city where the crime was committed." State prompt arraign-
ment statutes are collected in MODEL PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE (1966), supra
note 8 at 230. If arrested upon a warrant, the person "shall be taken before the
magistrate before whom it is returnable ...." WIs. STAT. §954.04.
140 The MODEL PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE, supra note 8 at 23 in its note to the analo-
gous section states:
The section, in using the term "promptly," does
not intend to preclude a delay when this is
necessitated by an emergency, such as a call
to the arresting officer to rescue some person
in the vicinity from danger or to proceed to
the scene of another crime in the vicinity.
For the time this normally may take, see text accompanying note 164, infra.
141The station officer is a creation of the MODEL PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE, supra
note 8, Section 1.04 at 3, where he is defined as follows:
The chief officer of each law enforcement
agency shall assure that at all times there will
be one or more officers in each police station
specifically designated as station officers. The
station officer shall be the most senior and re-
sponsible officer who reasonably can be made
available for the purpose.
For suggested record-keeping see Id. at 40-41. As with the MODEL PIE-ARRAIGN-
MENT CODE, the proposed Code leaves the designation of what records are to
be maintained to the local district attorney who will issue guidelines or
regulations pursuant to §969.80(1).
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limits he may be legally held (969.30(2) ).142 The station officer is man-
dated to "promptly set in motion" means for obtaining enough informa-
tion to determine the charge, if any, and whether the person is to be ad-
mitted to stationhouse bail, released on his signed promise to appear, given
a notice to appear or taken before a magistrate. 1 43
E. Disposition
969.32 DISPOSITION OF PERSONS TAKEN INTO CUSTODY.
(1) ALTERNATIVE DISPOSITIONS.
Unless an order is entered under sub. (2),
not later than two hours after a person
in custody arrives at the police station the
station officer shall make one of the fol-
lowing dispositions:
(a) If the station officer has concluded
that the person has committed no crime,
the station officer shall order his release
forthwith.
Ref. Study Draft (1968) A4.03(1)(a).
(b) If the station officer has reasonable
grounds to believe that the person has
committed an ordinance violation or a
misdemeanor in which the maximum sen-
tence for the offense charged does not ex-
ceed six months imprisonment, he shall
issue to him a notice to appear or release
him on his signed promise to appear in
court or in the office of the district attor-
ney or city attorney at a time and place
specified, unless the defendant in the past
three years has defaulted in a court ap-
pearance for an offense other than a mi-
nor one such as a parking violation, in
which case he may admit him to bail.
142 An extreme case of fears that may be engendered in a prisoner through mis-
information or misrepresentation is found in Gosczinski v. Carlson, 157 Wis.
551, 147 N.W. 10, 18 (1914). Plaintiff was arrested on a civil warrant and
was informed by the defendant officer that he would either have to post bond
or remain in jail several months. Hearing this, the plaintiff tried to escape and
was wounded seriously by the officer.
113 The exact apparatus for obtaining this information will be subject to regulations
issued by the attorney general and the local district attorney (§969.90). Models
conceived by the Vera Institute of Justice would be appropriate. But see text
accompanying note 199, infra. Present practice in Milwaukee approximates
the Code prescribed procedure of review. See text accompanying notes 56-59,
supra and Pilot Project Report, supra note 54 at 11-23, quoted infra note 177.
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Ref. ALl (1966) 8.01(1); Study Draft
(1968) A4.03(1); Standards 2.2(b);
3.2(a).
(c) If the station officer has reasonable
grounds to believe that the person has
committed a crime not included in sub.
(b), he shall, on direction or in accor-
dance with regulations issued by the dis-
trict attorney, issue to the person a notice
to appear, release him on his signed
promise to appear in court or in the office
of the district attorney at a time and place
specified, or admit him to bail, pursuant
to the provisions of 969.40 [stationhouse
bail- to be drafted].
Ref. Study Draft (1968) A4.03(1)(c).
(d) In lieu of requiring bail, such person
may be released to his attorney, spouse,
relative or other responsible adult.
Ref. Wis. Stat. 345.135.
(e) Bail shall be required only where it
appears necessary to secure the availabil-
ity of the person for prosecution and the
regulations promulgated by the district at-
torney pursuant to sub. (c) shall promote
this policy. In each instance in which the
station officer determines that the person
may not be released without bail, he shall
state in written form the factual basis of
his determination.
Ref. ALI (1966) 4.04(4); Standards
1.2(c).
(f) If the person in custody does not fur-
nish bail, or if the crime to be charged
is not bailable by the police, further dis-
position shall be in accordance with s.
969.50.
Ref. ALl (1966) 4.04(4).
(2) ORDER FOR SCREENING IN
CERTAIN CASES. The station officer
may, in lieu of making one of the disposi-
tions authorized by sub. (1), order that
the person be detained for a period of
screening, but only if
[Vol. 2:1
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(a) he has reasonable grounds to believe
that the person has committed one of the
following crimes
(i) murder or manslaughter
(ii) kidnapping
(iii) armed robbery
(b) the investigation is reasonably neces-
sary to determine if there is sufficient evi-
dence to charge such person with a crime.
Ref. Study Draft (1968) A4.03(2).
(3) DURATION OF THE PERIOD OF
SCREENING. The period of screening
authorized by sub. (2) shall not exceed
the time actually necessary to charge such
person with the crime for which he is be-
ing investigated.
Ref. Study Draft (1968) A 4.03(3).
(4) DISPOSITION AT END OF PE-
RIOD OF SCREENING. If an order is
entered under sub. (2), at the end of the
period of screening, the station officer
shall make one of the dispositions author-
ized by paragraphs (a) - (c) of sub. (1).
Ref. Study Draft (1968) A4.03(4).
(5) REFUSAL OF COMPLAINT. Not-
withstanding any other provision of this
section, if at any time the district attor-
ney determines not to issue a complaint
charging the person with a crime, the
station officer shall order the person re-
leased forthwith.
Ref. Study Draft (1968) A 4.03(5).
1. In General
Originally this Draft Section closely followed the Model Code of Pre-
Arraignment Procedure, published in 1966, but changes necessitated by
the Miranda decision were made. The Model Pre-Arraignment Code au-
thorized a four hour detention period for preliminary screening of all per-
sons taken into custody (Section 4.04(1)), with the possibility of extend-
ing detention time from eight to twenty-two hours in the case of certain
serious felonies (Section 4.05(1). Draft Section 969.32 maintains the dis-
tinction between misdemeanants and felons, permitting detention of the for-
mer for two hours and detention of the latter for a period sufficient to obtain
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"enough evidence to charge such person."14 4 In April 1968, the Ameri-
can Law Institute released Study Draft No. 1145 which substantially re-
vises the screening procedure of the Model Pre-Arraignment Code. The
reporters produced four "models;" Model A, with modifications, seems
most appropriate for Wisconsin and has been adapted as Draft Section
969.32.146
Except as noted below, Model A requires that within one hour after
the suspect arrives at the station, the station officer must release him
outright if he finds there is no reason to believe that the person has com-
mitted a crime (A4.03(I ) (a)). If he finds that there is reasonable cause,
he releases the person either on citation (notice to appear) (A4.03 (1) (b)),
or on his recognizance or on bail (A4.03 (1) (c)). Each alternative dis-
position is made dependent on the district attorney's decision to issue a
complaint. If the district attorney does not issue a complaint within the
time period, the person must be released on notice to appear. Only if the
complaint is issued within the hour may the officer require bail or release
on recognizance (A4.03( 1 ) (c)).
The one hour limitation may be extended if the charge is "a crime"
or one of a list of crimes, the choice being left to the revisor. Extension
to three hours is suggested by the three hour limit recently permitted the
District of Columbia police,1 4 7 provided that the "investigation permitted
during the period of screening is reasonably necessary" to accomplish
stated purposes (A4.03 (2) (b) ),148 and the period of detention "shall not
exceed the time actually necessary" to carry out that purpose (A4.03 (3)).
'4"This followed Phillips v. State, 29 Wis.2d 521, 534-535, 139 N.W.2d 41, 47
(1966), discussed infra at 68.
145 ALI, MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, Study Draft No. 1
(1968), [hereafter referred to as Study Draft].
146 Model A, described in the text, is similar in structure to the former draft. Model
B is close to A but introduces a "custody magistrate" into the police locale who
takes on the warning and supervisory responsibilities of the station officer.
Models C and D, as do most state statutes, provide for prompt production before
a judge. Model C permits no pre-appearance interrogation without the presence
or consent of counsel and Model D permits such questioning, subject to the
limitations of Miranda. Both models allow post-judicial appearance, remand
for a line-up and interrogation with the person's consent. Study Draft, supra
note 145 at xvi-xviii. Another important change eliminates the distinction in
procedure between the person taken into custody with and without a warrant.
Id. at 10.
147 The provision permits an arrested person to "be questioned with respect to any
matter for a period not to exceed three hours immediately following his arrest."
D.C. Crime Law, supra note 38. The Study Draft is, however, more restrictive
in that it allows a total of three hours, including interrogation.
148These are: to determine whether a complaint should be issued; to determine the
nature of the crime to be charged; to obtain information to prevent harm to
person, or property "of substantial value"; to obtain information to discover
accomplices "or in preventing the loss of evidence relating to such crime."
§A4.03 (2) (b).
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Study Draft No. I is more tightly constructed than the 1966 draft
in that it has incorporated responsibility and means of control by the
district attorney in addition to specific standards and limitations to guide
the police officer in extending the time limit for detention beyond the
normal one hour. Unfortunately, the Study Draft did not indicate how the
reporters arrived at the one hour limit. But Professor Vorenberg, one of
the code reporters, states that this period was selected "on the basis of
observation and consultation with people working in the field."149
The district attorney's control of disposition by the police is exercised
through his issuance or non-issuance of a complaint. 150 Although there
may be advantages to this type of control, the present district attorney
hearing151 which occurs after police disposition but prior to the initial
appearance before a magistrate seems such an advantageous type of
review that a change should be carefully weighed. An informed judg-
ment may be prezluded by requiring the district attorney to make a de-
cision to file a complaint based entirely on police information available
at the stage of determining whether to extend time limits for detention.
Moreover, such a procedure would tie the decision to file a complaint to
that requiring bail. While guarantees to assure appearance may be desirable
from the district attorney's view at this time, a formal charge may not be.
He may, of course, always withdraw a complaint; but once he has taken
an official position, withdrawal may be unlikely. Certainly the informality
and the options available at the district attorney hearing will be affected.
Therefore, in Draft Section 969.32 the station officer's decision to release
is independent of the issuance of a complaint by the district attorney.
The one exception is that the district attorney may determine during the
period of detention that no complaint will issue in a particular case, in
which case the person shall be released (969.32(5)). Nevertheless, as we
shall see, the district attorney plays an important role under the proposal. 152
The Code adopts the major premise of the Study Draft that within a
stated time of the person's arrival at the police station the station officer
must make a decision as to his disposition. The time of permissible deten-
tion in the Draft Section is raised, however, from one to two hours. If the
station officer concludes that the person has committed no crime, he is to
be released outright (969.32(1)(a)). For all ordinance violations and for
misdemeanors where the statutory penalty does not exceed six months im-
prisonment, the station officer must issue a notice to appear or release on
the person's signed promise to appear unless in the past three years the
149 Letter to author of June 27, 1968.
160 The Study Draft is strangely silent about this result. The MODEL PRE-ARRAIGNMFNT
CODE, Section 6.02(1), supra note 8, at 54, provides that "a complaint charging
a person with an offense shall be issued only by a prosecuting attorney . . . and
shall be filed only with his approval."
151 This is described in the text accompanying notes 213-214, infra.
1 52 See text accompanying notes 182-183, infra.
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person has defaulted in a court appearance of some importance (969.32-
(1) (b)). For felonies and for misdemeanors where the statutory penalty
exceeds six months imprisonment, the station officer may require bail, but
the choice must be exercised under the direction of the district attorney
and pursuant to regulations issued by him (969.32(1)(c)). As an alter-
native to bail, the station officer may release on notice to appear, or on
the person's signed promise to appear (969.32(1) (c)), or to the person's
attorney or another responsible adult (969.32(1) (d)). If bail is required,
the station officer must state "the factual basis for this determination."
Bail is to be demanded "only where it appears necessary to secure the
availability of the person for prosecution" and the regulations to be issued
by the district attorney "shall promote this policy" (969.32(1)(e)).
The period of two hours detention may be extended to three hours on
the condition that the station officer reasonably believes the additional
time is necessary to obtain sufficient information to charge the person with
one of a series of named crimes such as murder and armed robbery
(969.32(2)). The period of extended detention "shall not exceed the time
actually necessary to charge such person with a crime." (969.32(3)).
In discussing the Draft Section we should consider: 1 ) its relation to
Wisconsin law; 2) the feasibility of limiting detention either in purpose
or in time; 3) the mandatory requirement that most misdemeanants and
all ordinance violators be released without bond; and 4) the intervention
of the district attorney in the disposition process.
2. Wisconsin Law on Detention Time
Even though the Wisconsin Supreme Court has not been called upon
directly to decide whether detention for the investigative considerations
listed by the Study Draft is permissible,1 53 the Court in deciding on the
length of time the person can be detained for interrogation seems to have
limited its purpose as well. In Phillips v. State154 the Court held that de-
tention of five hours made an otherwise voluntary confession involuntary.
A detention for a period longer than is
reasonably necessary for such limited pur-
pose ["to make a formal complaint"] vio-
lates due process and renders inadmissi-
ble any confession obtained during the
unreasonable period of the detention ....
While one may be detained by the police
and interrogated to secure sufficient evi-
dence to either charge him with a crime
or to release him, the police cannot con-
153See the forms of investigation, other than for charging, which are listed supra
note 148.
154 29 Wis.2d 521, 534-535, 139 N.W.2d 41, 47 (1966).
[Vol. 2:1
Pre-Arraignment Procedure
tinue to detain an arrested person "to sew
up" the case by obtaining or extracting a
confession or culpable statements to sup-
port the arrest or the guilt. [Emphasis
added]1 55
Phillips merely refined the decision of Peloquin v. Hibner,'5 6 a false
imprisonment action. Rejecting any particular time limit on detention, the
Peloquin court stated that "the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the
period of detention must be determined from the facts and circumstances
in each case."1 5 7 Wisconsin law thus places no time limit on detention as
long as the detention is necessary to obtain sufficient information to file
a formal complaint15 8 or to release the suspect. Once that information
t55 Id. Note, Reasonableness of Detention, 1960 Wis. L. REV. 164.
156231 Wis. 77, 86-87, 285 N.W. 380, 385 (1939).
157 The quotation from the text continues:
There is no suggestion that Sheriff and District
Attorney ... did not expedite their investigation
on Monday night with due diligence and dis-
patch. The [Sheriff] and the District Attorney
were entitled to a reasonable time on Tuesday
. . . as a matter of law, to determine whether
to make a formal complaint against the plaintiff
or release her from custody.
Id. See also State ex rel. Van Enden v. Burke, 30 Wis.2d 324, 338, 140
N.W.2d 737, 744 (1966). Peloquin also disposed of the more basic assertion
that detention by the police for any reason was impermissible. Peloquin v.
Hibner, supra note 156, at 85, 285 N.W. at 384, and Study Draft, supra note
145, at 36. Where the period of interrogation, and hence custody, is short
enough, the police seem to make a prima facie case for reasonableness:
Since the defendant was only detained for inter-
rogation for an hour and a half, on its face
the defendant's detention was not for an un-
reasonable length of time under Reimers (three
hours) [See note 159 infra] and Phillips (five
hours).
State v. Carter, 33 Wis.2d 80, 96-97, 146 N.W.2d 466, 475 (1966).
158The term "formal complaint," used by the court, is troublesome. Undefined, it
is unclear whether it requires a more onerous or different standard than that pro-
posed by the Code language "sufficient evidence to charge." Wis. STAT. §954.02
defines a complaint as a "written statement of the essential facts constituting
the offense charged and may be upon information and belief." This is sub-
stantially the definition of complaint found in the MODEL PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
CODE, Section 6.01, supra note 8, at 54, and both are based on Rule 3 of the
FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. That the court juxtaposes "formal
complaint" and "release" at one point and further on writes of the police
interrogating "to either charge him with a crime or to release him" would lead
one to believe that the court did not mean "formal complaint" in its "formal"
sense. See LAFAVE, supra note 45, at 330, who assumes this interpretation of
Peloquin. The distinction is important because the quantum of evidence needed
by the police to decide between charge and release is or may be substantially
less than the "essential facts" required by the prosecutor at a later stage of the
process. If the police may retain a person in custody until they have enough
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is available, it follows that there is no further right to custody. 15 9
3. Feasibility of Limits on Detention as to Purpose and Time
If the Draft Section defines what is "reasonably necessary" as two to
three hours does it not neglect investigative needs other than charging?
Does it leave enough time to carry out the charging function in all cases,
including the most serious crimes and complex fact situations? From the
decision in State v. Carter16o it may be argued that since the total period
of custody allowable to police for any purpose is limited, that custody
is prima facie reasonable, as is questioning for any rational law enforce-
ment objective authorized by the Code and connected with the reason for
which the person was taken into custody. Straining a bit more, one may
reason that the Phillips doctrine is restricted to detention for interroga-
tion. While the police cannot continue to detain in order to interrogate
further, custody may be retained for other valid purposes, even to deter-
mine whether the victim wishes to prosecute. 16 1 It does not take excessive
imagination to reinterpret these as investigative devices necessary in the
particular case to determine the charge decision.
In considering whether to incorporate this provision in the Code, a
thorough empirical investigation would be useful, if not essential, to evalu-
ate the importance to the police of interrogation for reasons other than
formal charging.16 2 The Draft Section, after all, is offered in the same
evidence for the prosecutor's complaint, then the detention in many cases will
need to be lengthy. See Peloquin, supra note 156, which is apparently explained
by this circumstance.
15 9 Thus, in Reimers v. State, 31 Wis.2d 457, 470-71, 143 N.W.2d 525, 532 (1965),
a delay no longer than that in Peloquin was unacceptable because it was un-
explained except by the "unavailability" of the magistrate. (Dictum.)
160 Note 157, supra.
161 See LAFAVE, supra note 45, at 311, 366-67 and 377.
162 The Discussion portion of the Study Draft, supra note 145, at 103, states:
One of the important issues not adequately
explored is the value of questioning for pur-
poses other than establishing whether a suspect
committed the crime for which he was arrested.
The Yale study indicates that questioning may
be significant in identifying accomplices and
solving other crimes. Thus, that study found
interrogation necessary or important to solve
the crime for which the arrest was made in
12 of 90 cases and, for identifying or con-
victing accomplices in 16 of 36 cases. In
three of the 8 cases where detectives questioned
suspects about other crimes the Yale writers
indicate that questioning appeared important.
In a nationwide questionnaire survey by the writer taken just before Miranda
in April and May 1966, respondent detectives in cities of 100,000 population
and over reported that interrogation of suspects was valuable to them to obtain
a confession (46%); to aid in clearing suspect of unfounded complaint (26%);
to clear up other offenses committed by the suspect (7%); to obtain leads to
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spirit as the Study Draft; and one reason given by the reporters for pro-
posing a "Study Draft" is that
they believe it may be helpful in provid-
ing a focus for comment and analysis by
those concerned with problems in this
area and for the development of empirical
data needed as a basis for future deci-
sions.163
There appear to be no published data clocking the time taken by vari-
ous police operations - booking, identification, record and warrant checks
- which constitute routine administrative processing. The Vera Institute
of Justice, however, did conduct an unpublished Arrest- Arraignment
Time Study in a large metropolitan police department establishing the
approximate time taken by each step in processing. 164 It was found that
the time from arrest to arrival at the station ranged from ten to sixty-one
minutes and averaged about twenty-three minutes; the most frequent
ranges were ten to twenty-five and thirty to forty minutes. 16 5 Our main
concern here is the time between the arrival at the precinct station and
charging. The Time Study was statistically divided into fingerprintable (FP)
and non-fingerprintable (NFP) offenses, a distinction which approximates
the Code categorization between lesser and more serious offenses. For the
FP offenses, average time between arrival at the station and booking
(charging) varied from fifty-one to one hundred and eighty-three min-
utes. 166 Seventy-four percent of the average times fell within the limits of
other offenders (5%) and to recover the victim's property (5%). Together, the
confession and clearing the suspect categories total 72%. These represent the
charging decision. See Robinson, supra note 19, and text accompanying note 53.
163 Study Draft, supra note 145, at xix.
164The Time Study, as it is hereafter referred to, dated June 1967, took in the
period, May 12 to May 22, 1967. Each arresting officer appearing in the
"arraignment court" was required by the department to prepare a time study
report on which he recorded at each stage the time it took him to pass with
his prisoner through that step. The times recorded for each stage were totaled
separately and averaged so that the resulting numbers represented the average
time in minutes recorded for each step that day. Averaging has the disadvantage
of being skewed one way or the other by the recorded extremes. To reduce this
bias, the writer obtained modal figures by taking the daily averages for the
stage involved and regrouping them according to frequency of occurrence within
certain time spans.
165 Id. This, of course, would vary according to the distance of the arrest from the
precinct, the number of prisoners, and the availability of transportation.
166 All FP offenses are brought to the detective squad office, usually on the second
floor of the precinct station, for fingerprinting, identificatior and other investi-
gation including interrogation. The fingerprinting and identification procedure
itself takes about one hour. This appears to be irreducible since a manual search
through the files is required. If done by computer, this part of the processing
could be reduced to minutes. When the detectives are finished with the investi-
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sixty and one hundred and five minutes, and most of the rest required one
hundred and thirty minutes or less. The NFP or lesser offenses ranged from
eleven to seventy-seven minutes for the charging process, most lasting from
thirty to fifty minutes.
This survey tends to show that certain operations ordinarily associated
with serious offenses take at least one hour to process and most take less
than two hours with a small number exceeding that time. The vast major-
ity of minor offenders, if not all, may be processed within the two hour
Code provision, and probably even within the one hour period proposed
by the Study Draft.
No special study of appellate cases was conducted to compare detention
and interrogation times, but in the cases discussed above interrogation
varied from one and one-half to five hours. A recent study observing in-
custody interrogation found that in eighty-three percent of the cases in-
volving persons suspected of more serious crimes the questioning lasted
from one-half to two and one-half hours. In only eleven percent did the
interrogation continue beyond that time.1 6 7
One must also take into account investigative activity which, though
not involving interrogation, takes time: for example, verification of alibis,
tests on physical evidence, interviewing of complainants and witnesses.
The time of arrest may make a difference with respect to time required
for these activities. During non-business hours records and even persons
may be unavailable. 168 In some cases precinct police may wish to have
the suspect interrogated by specialized bureaus such as narcotics, sex or
robbery; this may require transporting the suspect from the precinct to the
bureau in another part of the city and back again. 1 69
Observation studies taken together with the operative practices described
seem to raise serious doubts about the feasibility of the hour limitation
proposed in the Study Draft. Nevertheless, there are other facts which
indicate that time in detention can be reduced without sacrificing police
needs. For instance, "in Milwaukee statements either are written out in
longhand by the arrested person or are taken in shorthand by a stenog-
rapher. . . .";170 and the same observer found that "[i]n practically all
the interrogations observed, more than one officer participated and some-
times as many as a dozen were involved."' 17 1 The same rather cumbersome
"horse and buggy" operation was reported by the Yale Study:
gation, the suspect is walked downstairs to the precinct for booking, which by
that time is only a bookkeeping operation occupying a few minutes.
167 Yale Study, supra note 91, at 1541 n. 63.
168 In the MODEL PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE, supra note 8, at 34, 159, Section 4.05
provided different allowable detention times, depending on the time of day or
night the person was arrested.
169 LAFAvE, supra note 45, at 304.
170 Id. at 304-305.
t7l Id. at 305.
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[M]ost suspects spent more than an hour,
often two hours or more, in the station-
house before they were released on bail
or locked up, although this time was sel-
dom devoted to intensive questioning.
Some time elapsed as the suspect waited
at the desks in the main room while the
detectives familiarized themselves with the
case. Photographing and fingerprinting af-
ter questioning usually took about 30 min-
utes. Often interruptions and breaks in the
questioning for one reason or another
took most of the time the suspect spent
in the interrogation room. 1 7 2
Discovering the amount of "wasted" time in an interrogation, the re-
searchers then recorded the time actually employed by the detectives to
interrogate. This was found to be less than fifteen minutes in thirty-five
percent of the cases and less than one hour in eighty-five percent of the
cases.' 7 3 Although these sketchy data do not prove that detention time
can be reduced to the limits of the Study Draft or the Code proposal,
they do suggest that the objective is not absurd. Particularly with respect
to minor offenders, processing should be re-examined with such a goal in
mind.174
With reference to these minor offenders, recent evidence makes apparent
that by the time the person in custody arrives at the station, the charge
has been determined and all that remains is the processing. With almost
no exception, the evidence is available either because the offense was com-
mitted in the presence of the arresting officer, or the person has admitted
it, or the officer has found physical evidence of it, or there is a com-
plainant who has seen it.1,75 In order to test this conclusion and particu-
172 Yale Study, supra note 91, at 1541. An attorney friend reported that in attempt-
ing to obtain the release from police custody of an important client, he had
to wait while he watched the officer slowly peck out the complaint on a type-
writer. Finally exasperated, he offered to and did type the form himself.
173ld. at 1542.
'74 It may be objected that even though the processing of any single charge may be
attained within the time limitation, from time to time, as in any organization,
there will be administrative overloading such as occurs at certain times of the
day, during a shortage of personnel, multiple arrests, particularly where there
has been a riot or mass demonstration. A partial answer may be found in the
suggestions for contingency planning, Report on Civil Disorders, supra note 104,
at 348-57, and text accompanying note 197 infra. An alternative possibility
would be that under emergency conditions the district attorney could suspend
the rule for a stated limited period, the criterion then being the time necessary
to charge.
175 Reiss and Black, supra note 59, at n. 56, 67 and 87, and Yale Study, supra note
91, The Pilot Project Report, supra note 54, at II 23-24 that "Misdemeanor
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larly to find out if local police could live with a two hour limitation on
detention of those to be charged with ordinance violations and all mis-
demeanors, students interviewed officers from the city of Wauwatosa (a
suburb of Milwaukee), the Milwaukee sheriff's office, the Milwaukee police
department and three Chicago precinct stations.
In Wauwatosa persons who are brought to the station to be charged with
such offenses are given an identity, criminal record and warrant check;
their version of what happened is verified. Normally a driver's license,
identity card with a photograph, a draft card or even a social security card
is acceptable proof of identity. Record checks are made at the Wauwatosa
detective bureau and the Milwaukee police department, and it was observed
that a central file would simplify the process. This procedure is supervised
by the shift commander who decides whether to release or to charge on
the basis of respective versions of the incident told by the arresting officer
and the suspect, together with the information gathered by the various
inquiries. In the event that the review ends in a city charge, the officer
himself may set bail; if it is a state charge, bail must be set through the
county clerk in Milwaukee. The officer instead may take the person to the
office of the district attorney in Milwaukee that day or the following morn-
ing depending on when the arrest was made. There is also a procedure
for releasing the person on his own recognizance, although there is no
statutory authority for this.176 Under ideal conditions, this procedure takes
from one-half to one hour. Complications may be caused by the arrival of
several suspects at once, uncooperative suspects, confused or conflicting
stories or the involvement of station personnel in other matters.
In Chicago the system is basically the same, but with a central com-
puterized file system, record checks may be made in a matter of minutes.
The system in Milwaukee is essentially similar, as is that of the depart-
ment involved in the Vera Institute study.1 7 7 A different time factor may
be encountered in cases where the person is to be questioned by detectives
and the only detectives are in the Safety Building downtown. However,
this can generally be made up at the other end because the detective
bureau is the same building as the court.
arrests invariably are made for a specific charge and the booking card so
indicates."
176 But see text accompanying note 155 for case authorization.
177 The Pilot Project Report, supra note 54, at It 23-24 describes the Milwaukee
police procedure as follows:
In most misdemeanant cases, the prisoner is
usually booked at the local district station. In
crimes where followup investigation by the de-
tective division is necessary, the offender is
booked at the district station if the arrest has
been made by a patrolman, or taken directly
to the detective division, if the arrest had been
made by detectives. In the former instance, the
station commander determines whether the of-
fense is sufficiently serious to be brought to
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4. Mandatory Release for Misdemeanants
The arguments noted in relation to Draft Section 969.01 and mandatory
use of the notice to appear are a fortiori applicable to this later stage
of the process when the charge has been made and checks on the identity
and reliability of the person in custody have been concluded. We raise a
false note if we imply from the term "mandatory" that a system has been
"imposed" on the police officer. In fact the Draft Section provides him
with precise guidelines which make his overall work easier.178 The best
argument for the "mandatory" nature of the provisions is their viability in
practice. If the Draft Section were not feasible in this respect, then
it would be foolish to make it mandatory. At the same time our experience
has shown that if a viable and desirable requirement is not mandatory and
precise in the direction which it gives to police, it is often hardly worth
placing on the statute books.
Wisconsin police in the past have been quite sensitive to a specific
statutory time limitation on detention, preferring the more elastic "reason-
able" formula of the Wisconsin courts. State law enforcement officers
opposed an attempt to promote the Uniform Arrest Act, which allows an
additional twenty-four and forty-eight hours of detention upon judicial
approval, and it failed of adoption, assertedly for that reason. 1 7 9 During
the American Bar Foundation study in Milwaukee, police "usually in-
dicated that the authorized detention is for a reasonable time up to seventy-
two hours."' 180 Such extended periods of custody for continuing an investi-
gation have apparently been recognized by courts in Wisconsin. "[J]udges
at habeas corpus hearings will continue the hearing for twenty-four or
forty-eight hours and return the suspect to police custody when the police
make some showing that they are presently engaged in an in-custody in-
vestigation."ls' Problems such as these can only be resolved through a
better understanding of police operations.
the attention of the detective division and the
arresting officer then transports the prisoner to
police headquarters where he is interviewed
by the detective supervisor and is sent to
the identification bureau for fingerprinting and
mugging.
Administrative procedures used in identification checks and fingerprinting for the
Milwaukee police and sheriff's department are found Id. at II 25-26. (Research
aid: Marquette University law students, now attorneys, Dennis H. Wicht and
Peter J. Wick.)
178 See Goldstein, supra note 37.
179 LAFAVE, supra note 45, at 331.
180 Id. at 333.
t81 Id. at 307 and 336-337. Another "investigative device" was noted by the American
Bar Foundation study as being in use in Milwaukee. Called the "ten day vag
check," the person was arrested on suspicion of vagrancy in matters where he
was suspected of having committed a serious crime but the police had in-
sufficient evidence for a charge. With the cooperation of the district attorney
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5. Intervention of the District Attorney in the Practical
Release Process
Although the Code leaves basic pretrial release decisions to the station
officer, he is enjoined to act in cases of more serious offenses "on direction
or in accordance with regulations issued by the district attorney"
(969.32(1) (c)). The district attorney ultimately controls the custody of
any person in that the station officer is directed to release the person if
the district attorney decides not to issue a complaint (969.32(5)). In
practice, however, this "control" is likely to be very mild, consisting en-
tirely of the regulations or guidelines which the district attorney is to issue
detailing the standards to be used for release in the serious cases.
This duty of the district attorney is consistent with the overall obliga-
tion of the attorney general and district attorney to issue guidelines "neces-
sary to implement the provisions of this Code applicable to the operation
of law enforcement agencies . . ." (969.90). Although the part played by
the district attorney under the Code is substantially less than that in the
Study Draft, l82 it is still a recognition that this official is best able both
to determine what procedures are legally within the Code and to bear
responsibility for seeing that police adhere to legal limitations.' 8 3
6. Alternative Means of Release
The present hodge-podge of statutes, ordinances, case law and practice
which governs release approximates the Code provisions. From the view-
point of a revisor or presumably of a practitioner the present disorganiza-
tion is a nightmare. If the system effectively performed a function of pre-
trial release, it could be defended chaotic though it is. The little evidence
and the court, the police obtained a ten day continuance when the matter reached
court. If the accused objected to the continuance, he was usually convicted of
vagrancy; otherwise, he was held until the investigation was completed, at which
time he was charged or released outright. LAFAVE, supra note 45, at 354.
1s2 See text accompanying note 150 infra.
183 LaFave, improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule - Part 11:
Defining the Norms and Training the Police, 30 Mo. L. REv. 566, 604 (1965),
states:
Local prosecutors have sometimes given assis-
tance [to police], but typically the demands made
on the prosecutor in conducting the business of
his office leaves little time for such efforts.
Most prosecutors do not conceive of their job
as including a continuing responsibility to ele-
vate the quality of police performance through
training. And even the largest police depart-
ments are usually without competent legally-
trained personnel on their staffs.
This problem has been alleviated somewhat in some departments by the addition
of police legal advisors, Id. at 608, but this does not solve the problem of the
need for legal supervision by one who stands responsible for police action.
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available, however, indicates that a great many who are charged are de-
tained for no purpose.
A 1962 national survey by the American Bar Foundation showed that
of a sample of one hundred and ten persons charged with felony in Mil-
waukee county, thirty-nine per cent were released on bail, and sixty-nine
per cent of those made bail on the day of arrest.' 8 4 This means that
sixty-one percent were not released on bail and that of the original number
arrested only twenty-seven per cent were released on bail the day of their
arrest.'S 5 At present in Milwaukee county between two hundred and two
hundred and fifty men are in jail awaiting trial at any one time. It has
been estimated that "the average time between arrest and trial would be
three to four months in felony matters; misdemeanor violations are ordi-
narily handled within a matter of one or two weeks."1 86
In June 1964, students at the University of Wisconsin Law School in-
stituted a pretrial release study modeled on that of the Vera Institute of
Justice.'87 Their pertinent findings follow:
Of the 1,088 defendants considered,
436 were eligible for and had bail set.
[Six hundred fifty-two defendants entered
pleas of guilty.] Seventy-four of these 436
(16.97 per cent) could not make bail
at all, and an additional twenty-nine (6.65
per cent) spent some time in jail before
furnishing bail. This total of 103 de-
fendants spent an average of 23.91 days
in detention . . . before they either fur-
nished bail or their case was disposed
of. 188
Another project, employing the same criteria as the Vera Institute project,
was completed by two researchers from the University of Wisconsin School
of Social Work who evaluated the release potential for men in detention
awaiting trial in Chicago's Cook County Jail:
184 Strangely enough, Milwaukee was found to be one of the counties in which de-
tention was of shortest duration. Silverstein, Bail in the State Courts - A Field
Study and Report, 50 MINN. L. REV. 621, 638 (1966). It was also found that
compared with other counties surveyed, Milwaukee had one of the lowest original
bail settings, less than $3,000 in 70 per cent of the sample. But, of course, this
liberality must be measured against the defendant's ability to make bail in the
sum set. See note 195 supra.
185 This survey, of course, tells us nothing about misdemeanants and ordinance
violators.1s6 Letter of May 28, 1968 from Sheriff Edwin T. Purtell, Milwaukee County, to the
author.
187 Note, The Development of Release on Recognizance and the Dane County Bail
Study, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 156, 164.
188ld. at 165.
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Information about persons detained...
was collected on three occasions between
1964 and 1967. The percentage of men
who met ROR criteria ranged from 57%
in 1965 to 46% in 1967.189
Such detention is not simply a matter of more equitable treatment of ac-
cused persons, important as this is. Over the years detention increasingly
has become a costly burden for those who are charged with custody of
prisoners awaiting trial.190
Locally the bail problem has been somewhat alleviated by the Milwaukee
Plan Legal Services-Bail Services Project begun in September 1966, and
modeled on the Vera Institute's verification process. 19 1 The program itself
is able to aid only a minority of those affected. 1 92
189 O'REILLY AND FLANAGAN, MEN IN DETENTION 10 (1967).
190 See LaFollette, Bail Bond Law Administration, History, Criticism; Release on
Recognizance, 27 MIL. BAR. Assoc. GAVEL 12, 16 (1967). Milwaukee county
Sheriff Edwin T. Purtell stated that "overcrowding of prisoners in the county
jail makes supervision difficult and creates tension among the inmates . . ." and
"makes it easier . . . to hide contraband and weapons." The annual number of
jail prisoners have increased from 8,806 in 1956 to 11,831 in 1966, a large
percentage of these being persons awaiting trial. Milwaukee Journal, Jan. 18,
1968, pt. I at 15, col. 2. County Executive Doyne and the county supervisors
criticized court policies which result in the
jailing of defendants on minor charges when
they cannot pay fines or raise small bail
amounts. Supervisor Thomas J. Duffy suggested
that the county or some organization interested
in the plight of indigents provide bail in such
cases.
Pointing out that 29 prisoners were in jail
because they were unable to raise bail of less
than $500, he suggested that their cases be
reviewed by judges with a view to "cleaning
some of them out."
Milwaukee Journal, Dec. 16, 1967, pt. 2 at 1, col. 6. See also Milwaukee Journal,
Dec. 21, 1967, pt. 2 at 3 col. 1. O'REILLY AND FLANAGAN, supra note 189,
concluded:
It costs an average of $3.12 a day to keep a
man in the Jail. When this figure is related
to the days men are held before bail or trial
it is possible to arrive at an approximation of
the yearly cost of detention for ROR qualified
persons. Based upon figures obtained from the
500 men interviewed during the summer of
1967, the yearly cost of detaining those who
meet the criteria for ROR is about $372,452
a year.
191 See Ares, Rankin and Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project. An Interim Report on
the Use of Pretrial Parole, 38 NYU L.REv. 67 (1963).
192 Program results are summarized in a letter from Mrs. Margadette M. Demet,
deputy director of Milwaukee Legal Services, to the author, May 2, 1968,
quoted in part:
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The Code requires bail only in cases where a felony is charged, or a
misdemeanor carrying a statutory penalty of more than six months' im-
prisonment is charged provided that it "appears necessary to secure the
availability of the person for prosecution" (969.32(1)(e)). This criterion
is already statutory in Wisconsin.' 93 Moreover, recent case law has affirmed
the single purpose of bail: "to assure the appearance of the accused when
it is his duty to appear to answer the criminal prosecution."' 9 4 At the
same time this case law provides material from which the district attorney
may draw his guidelines. 1') 5
Since the beginning of the project the Bail
Services staff has interviewed 3,085 accused
offenders. Of these 493 have been recommended
for release without bail and 147 have been
recommended for lower bail. In the other 2,445
cases, negative recommendations have been
made or the cases were matters in which the
client was going to be tried on the same day
as the interviews. Of the 640 positive recom-
mendations made, the judges have accepted the
recommendation in 595 cases. Only one person
did not return who was let go on his own
recognizance and that person died before the
date set for his return.
We may ask whether this last statistic attests to the success or failure of the
program.
Another response to this bail problem in Wisconsin has been the development
of a rather unusual procedure to release persons on bail who are in custody
for either felonies or misdemeanors, where the arrest is without a warrant. The
police have authority to set what is referred to as an "appearance bond." Wis.
STAT. §345.13 (1967).
This appearance bond is posted with the police
district which has effected the arrest and serves
to insure the prisoner's appearance at the police
station at the designated time - usually the next
A.M. Upon the prisoner's appearance, all of
the appearance bond is returned to the prisoner.
At the police station he is then retaken into
physical custody. In felony or serious misde-
meanor cases, traditionally the commander of
the detective bureau determines the amount of
the appearance bond.
[Emphasis in original.] Letter to author of June 8, 1968 from Victor Manian,
First Assistant District Attorney, Milwaukee County.
193 Ws. STAT. §954.15(1) (1967) ". . . The bail bond shall be sufficient to secure
the appearance of the defendant for trial"; and Wis. STAT. §954.36(1) (1967)
"... A defendant's bail for his appearance in the trial court shall be conditioned
for his appearance at the current term .... "
19 4 Whitty v. State, 34 Wis.2d 278, 286, 149 N.W.2d 557, 560 (1967), the court's
first exposition on the subject.
195 Id. The conditions for setting bail were to
include the ability of the accused to give bail,
the nature and gravity of the offense and the
potential penalty the accused faces, the character
and reputation of the accused, his health, the
character and strength of the evidence, whether
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Probably the program most like that conceived by the Code is the New
York City precinct summons project pioneered by the Vera Institute. Per-
sons in custody who pass a screening process are released from the station-
house on a summons. After about one and one-half years of operation by
the Institute the project was taken over by the city police department on
July 1, 1967, and made citywide. The report issued at the end of six
months operation touches on many of the problems of such a program:
During the six month reporting period
a total of 22,916 persons were arrested
for offenses which, theoretically, were
eligible for the summons process. Of those,
13,725 or 60% were waived by desk offi-
cers for various reasons, such as admitted
narcotic addicts, intoxicated persons and
female and female impersonators charged
with disorderly conduct and loitering. Re-
lease of the latter on a summons would
permit such persons to return to the
streets to pursue their disorderly beha-
vior. The remainder of cases waived by
desk officers include instances where large
groups of demonstrators and protestors
are arrested, as was the case in Harlem
during July and August. In these cases
the time required to conduct summons in-
vestigations may have prejudiced the
rights of the defendants by delaying their
arraignment. During December a number
of arrests were waived when large groups
of persons were arrested for disorderly
conduct in connection with picketing dur-
ing "Stop the Draft Week." Those persons
were centrally booked and immediately ar-
raigned at the Manhattan Criminal Court,
which is in close proximity to where the
demonstrations took place.19 6
Of 9,191 persons determined eligible for
interview, which comprised 40% of per-
sons arrested for summonsable offenses,
5,575 or 60.66% were released on sum-
the accused is already under bond in other pend-
ing cases, and whether the accused has in the
past forleited bond or was a fugitive from jus-
tice at the time of arrest.
[Emphasis added.] The "forfeiture of bond" criterion is incorporated into Wis.
STAT. §969.32(1)(b) (1967). The court's accent on objective conditions is
especially encouraging.
196 See text accompanying note 232, infra.
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monses .... This figure, taken in relation
to the total number of persons arrested
for summonsable arrest actions, means
that 25%, or one of every four such per-
sons was released on a summons.
Of those determined eligible, 1,186 or
12.9% failed to qualify after the sum-
mons investigation was conducted. Those
persons were unable to attain the mini-
mum 5 points required on the investiga-
tion, which attempt to determine the de-
fendant's roots in the community.
Of the 5,575 persons summoned under
this program 351 failed to appear on re-
turn date which reflects a "jump" rate of
6.3%. . . . Further analysis of jumpers
revealed that 3.5% of the persons who
failed to appear on return date were in-
volved in cross complaints against each
other. . . . Some of those persons, when
contacted by telephone, were under the
impression that since neither wished to
pursue the case further they were not ob-
ligated to report to court on the return
date.
The increased use of the summons
process results in a concomitant in-
crease in police man-hour savings, a re-
duction in transportation and detention of
defendants and an overall improvement in
police-community relations.
With the elimination of the verfication
process, except where absolutely neces-
sary, the average time expended in cases
which result in a summons is approxi-
mately one hour. Where two or more ar-
rests are effected in connection with the
same incident the summonsing officer is
assisted by officers on duty in the station-
house or his radio car partner.
Taking into consideration custodial per-
sonnel, transportation of the defendant to
court and related court appearances, a
conservative estimate of man-hour savings
is approximately five hours per arrest.
This is based on the fact that a person
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released on a summons is usually pre-
pared for trial, has secured counsel, etc.,
on the return date, and the officer's pres-
ence in court is confined to one appear-
ance as such cases are usually disposed
of at the time. This can be contrasted to
arrest situations where the officer's initial
appearance at arraignment, usually results
in an adjournment requiring the officer's
presence at least a second time. Subse-
quent appearances by the officer are re-
lated to whether defendant was released
on bail or confined pending trial without
opportunity to prepare his case. [Em-
phasis added]197
Although the New York City summons project has included encourage-
ing developments in "screening," most of these programs have an im-
portant flaw: the exclusion of many persons who do not have sufficient
'roots in the community" to score the required point total.198 Although
these projects obtain impressive appearance records because they include
only the best risks, the purpose of the program to release as many persons
as possible is sacrificed to the unfounded assumption that those without
"roots" will not show up for trial. In addition the fact that such a
"rootless" person would be released if he could find money for bail con-
tributes to serious questioning of such a "screening" system. 199 Most "root-
less" persons are relatively minor offenders who offer no threat to society
even if they do not appear, and most are repetitive offenders (drunken-
ness, vagrancy, petty assault) so that any "jumpers" are most likely to
be picked up again. If the fear of being punished for non-appearance
should deter from further crime, this is so much the better. Taken together
with the more serious questions about "screening", these facts have
prompted the elimination of screening as a prerequisite for release in
minor offenses under the Code (969.32( 1 ) (b).
So far we have discussed the needs of the police - how long they need
to retain the person in custody in order to accomplish police business.
The purpose of Section 969.32 is to shorten this period as much as pos-
sible and, when the need has terminated, to provide pretrial release alter-
natives assuring the release of most persons. There will always be some,
however, who remain in custody. For these persons, the question then
197 New York City Police Department P.B. 1127 s. 1967, Manhattan Summons Proj-
ect - First Six Months of City-wide Activity for the Period: July 1st to De-
cember 31st, 1967 (Jan. 30, 1968).
198 The scoring procedure used is described in Ares, Rankin and Sturz, supra note 191.
199See Robinson, Alternatives to Arrest of Lesser Offenders, 11 CRIME & DEL. 8,
11, 18-21 (1965).
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becomes how much longer they must be detained before their detention
may be reviewed before a judge. We shall see that the length of continued
detention is more related to administrative delay than to police needs.
F. Prompt Appearance Before a Magistrate
969.50 DISPOSITION OF PERSON IN CUSTODY-PROMPT PRO-
DUCTION BEFORE A JUDICIAL OFFICER.
In any case where a station officer makes
or has enough evidence to make a deci-
sion to seek to have a person in custody
charged, the person, unless he has been
issued a notice to appear, released on his
promise to appear or on bail, shall be
brought before a judicial officer for initial
appearance at the earliest time that such
officer is available. In the event a judicial
officer is not then available, and the per-
son has not been released or cannot fur-
nish bail in accordance with s. 969.40,
no further interrogation shall occur until
he is presented before a judicial officer.
Ref. ALI (1966) 4.06(1).
The ancient admonition to the arresting officer to produce the person
in custody before the magistrate "without unreasonable delay" ignores not
only the trip to the police station but also the realities of the trip from the
station to the magistrate. The instructions of the Milwaukee police depart-
ment 20 0 provide that a person in custody is to be conducted before the
"Commanding Officer" of the district station for "review" of the charge. 2 0 1
If after review it is decided that a charge is to be lodged and there is
neither "order in" by the commanding officer nor release on bail, the
20o See text accompanying notes 57-59, supra.
201 The Pilot Project Report, supra note 54 at 11-23 indicates that this has been the
practice in Milwaukee for a long time:
After an officer has made an arrest, he is
required to bring his prisoner to the nearest
district station where a supervisory officer
reviews the facts, interrogates the subject, and
decides whether the arrest was made properly
and lawfully. The subject may be released with-
out charge if the supervisory officer is of the
opinion that there is insufficient basis to proceed
with prosecution, or he may be brought to the
detective division for further investigation by
the detective lieutenant on duty.
The description in the text is simplified. See the description of the operation in
the letter of Mr. Manian, supra note 58.
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prisoner either may be taken to the city jail or may spend the night at the
district station. The choice will depend on the availability of transport and
of quarters in one place or the other, and in the case of serious misde-
meanors (such as carrying a concealed weapon) and felonies, the prisoner
will be sent downtown to the detective bureau. 2 0 2 Each Milwaukee dis-
trict has two patrol wagons; on a busy night there may be a wait of as
much as two hours before a wagon is able to respond. 203
If the person arrives downtown at night, he will be questioned by de-
tectives and will then spend the night in jail. In the early morning he will
be interrogated again and placed in a lineup to be viewed in connection
with other crimes detectives may be investigating. There may be further
questioning at this time. 20 4 He is then picked up by the original arresting
officer and brought to the office of either the city or the district attorney,
both situated in the same building as the jail.2 05 A person to be charged
with a state offense is brought to the office of the district attorney; one
to be charged with a city offense is taken to the office of the city attor-
ney. No regulations determine whether a case is to be treated as a state
or city offense, although a fairly rational division of labor has been worked
out over the years between the two offices.
Whether the person is charged by the city or the district attorney is,
of course, consequential. 2 06 City ordinance violations are by statute civil
202See note 177 supra.
203 The information with regard to delay in transport was collected by students. A
district attorney with years of experience as a police officer disputes this: "The
district commander always notifies the detective bureau that a felon or serious
misdemeanant has been apprehended. The team of detectives assigned to that
district is immediately dispatched . . . when they take over the interrogation of
the prisoner and often convey him to headquarters in their squad car. . . . The
prisoners who must wait for the wagon in the "station run" in the morning
are the drunks, disorderlies, etc. who were unable to post bail or were too
drunk to be released because no one would come to get them." Letter dated
July 8, 1968, from Victor Manian, First Assistant District Attorney, Milwaukee
County.
204 Pilot Project Report, supra note 54, at 11-32. "Once the prisoner is 'down town'
. . . a complete 'booking' of the prisoner takes place, including social history,
a complete set of fingerprints, photos, if no recent picture is in the files, and
other identifying information. The average booking and bureau of identification
procedure is done in less than an hour. This of course is exclusive of inter-
rogation time, if necessary in the course of investigation, or a 'show up'
if that is deemed necessary." Letter, supra note 203.
205This information was collected by Marquette University law students, now
attorneys, Dennis W. Dugan and Thomas F. Konop.
206 The choice between the two is uniquely a city and village problem. State police
may charge only state offenses. These go to the district attorney who also
handles county ordinances when these are charged by county law officers. Except
for serious offenses, smaller cities and suburbs tend to use local city ordinances
in preference to state statutes covering the same conduct because it takes too
Much time to go downtown to the district attorney's office and then wait in
court for trial. Moreover, ordinance violations keep the fines at home. There
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offenses2 07 and the trial procedure is civil, meaning that guilt need only
be proved by a preponderance of the evidence and that conviction does
not leave a criminal record. As a result it is not thought necessary to
accord the same constitutional safeguards as would be provided in a
criminal matter. 2 08 There is a serious gap, however, in the failure to fur-
nish an attorney for an indigent even though refusal or inability to pay
fines will result in imprisonment.2 0 9
Although the police initially decide to which office the case should be
sent, the city or district attorney determines whether it remains there.
In Milwaukee a police investigator, assigned to the district attorney and
stationed at the entrance to his office, screens these cases. If in his judg-
ment it is not a case for that office he sends it to another office, usually
that of the city attorney:
The kind of cases brought by the police
to the city attorney include assault and
battery cases, drunks, disorderly conduct,
and operating an automobile while intoxi-
cated. Of these, the drunk charges are
most numerous. 21 0
Serious cases including those where an assault results in hospitalization,
or where a weapon is used, or where there are threats of serious bodily
harm are taken by the district attorney. 2 1' There are other factors which
may influence the police to bring the person to the district attorney or
the district attorney to accept a case: the past criminal record of the sus-
pect; his cooperation with the police; belief that a criminal charge will act
as a deterrent to future criminal conduct; the relationship of the parties
(violence between husband and wife or between relatives is more likely
to be referred to the city attorney).212
is also reluctance to give local residents a criminal record. Pilot Project Report,
supra note 54, at II 46-52, and supra notes 23, 115 and 116.
207WIs. STAT. §939.12 (1967) Crime defined. ". . . Conduct punishable only by a
forfeiture is not a crime." State-city interplay is discussed in Conway, Is Crim-
inal or Civil Procedure Proper for Enforcement of Traflic Laws?- Part 1I,
1960 Wis. L. REV. 3, 4.2 0 8 City of Milwaukee v. Stanki, 262 Wis. 607, 55 N.W.2d 916 (1952); Village
of Bayside v. Bruner, 33 Wis.2d 533, 148 NW.2d 5 (1967).
209 City of Milwaukee v. Horvath, 31 Wis.2d 490, 143 N.W.2d 446 (1966). On the
facts, this case is unclear because the defendant, even though able to pay,
challenged the right of the court to jail her for refusal to pay the fine.
210 Pilot Project Report, supra note 54, at 111-9.
211 Id. at 111-48.
212 A check of city attorney records from January 1, 1967 to April 11, 1967, showed
45 referrals from the city attorney to the district attorney: 7 disorderly conduct;
3 theft; 14 battery; 12 assault and battery; 3 non-traffic auto offenses; 1 drunk;
1 contributing to the delinquency of a minor; 1 vagrancy; I adultery; 1 van-
dalism and 1 reckless use of a weapon. No such record is maintained by the
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The city or district attorney holds a hearing to determine wl-at charge,
if any, is to be recommended. 2 13 If it is decided to charge, the person
is conducted to the county court by the original arresting officer. Here
there will be a trial in the case of ordinance violations and misdemeanors
and an initial appearance in the case of felonies.2 14 Although the hearing
before the city or district attorney is extremely valuable from the point
of view of both the defendant and the law enforcement authorities, it is
burdensome for a man who remains in custody. In a proper case such a
detention and hearing may be challengeable as illegal. 215 There is no
statutory provision for obtaining counsel until the person in custody ap-
pears in court. Since the city or district attorney hearing may ordinarily
occur only during business hours, this means that a person arrested in the
afternoon must wait until the following morning to appear before the city
or district attorney2 16 and even later to appear before a judicial officer
district attorney's office, apparently because of the informal way the screening
is done, as described in the text. Information compiled by Marquette University
law students, now attorneys, Martin Love and Seymour Pikofsky.
213 Pilot Project Report, supra note 54, at III 4-6, 44-46. The district attorney, who
normally handles more serious cases, for that reason, holds a more thorough
hearing than does the city attorney.
214 Prior to State ex rel. White v. Simpson, 28 Wis.2d 590, 137 N.W.2d 391 (1965),
the district attorney was authorized to issue warrants, Wts. STAT. §954.02(3)
(1965), although in practice, at least in Milwaukee, he drew up the complaint
and left the warrant to be issued by the clerk of court. As a reaction to the
White case, two magistrates were appointed to hold warrant hearings. Even
though the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that there is no need to "rearrest"
one already in custody, Pillsbury v. State, 31 Wis.2d 87, 92-94, 142 N.W.2d
187, 190-91 (1966), the practice has continued. See also Rigney v. Hendrick,
355 F.2d 710, 713 (3rd Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 975 (1966). This
situation has been clarified recently by Wis. STAT. §954.02(4m) 1967):
If the defendant has previously been validly
arrested without warrant and is still in custody,
no summons or warrant is required and the
defendant may be brought before a judge of
the county court with a complaint subscribed
and sworn to before either the district attorney
or a magistrate.
Present procedure involves taking the accused directly to court on a complaint
where the person has been arrested "validly". This procedure has been con-
tested in trial court twice and upheld. Letter, supra note 203.
215This deviation from the police-magistrate route has been upheld in the circum-
stance where "the district attorney had not made up his mind to prosecute at
the time he sent for the defendant," State v. Francisco, 257 Wis. 247, 252,
43 N.W.2d 38, 40-41 (1950). See also Commonwealth v. Brines, 29 Pa. Dist.
1091 (1920). The court rejected the reasoning of McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1943). In a case where the hearing resulted in prejudice for
the defendant, for example, a confession during the hearing, the court might
see the matter differently. See Schoette v. Drake, 139 Wis. 18, 21, 120 N.W.
393, 395 (1909), infra note 220 and United States v. Glover, 372 F.2d 43, 47
(2nd Cir. 1967).
216 At the time of writing, no district attorney personnel are on duty during non-
business hours except at the time of a three-day holiday. See note 219 infra.
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for his initial hearing.2 17 This problem is aggravated for an indigent de-
siring appointment of counsel where, by special provision for Milwaukee,
only the circuit court is permitted by statute to appoint counsel. 2 18 Conse-
quently, the county court judge at the initial hearing must transfer the case
to the circuit court for this purpose. Even though this usually takes place
the same afternoon, an attorney notified of his appointment may not be
able to interview and appear for his client until thirty-six to forty-eight
hours after the person is taken into custody.
This review of the routine processing makes apparent that whether the
person has committed a serious or a minor offense may have little effect
on the time it takes him to travel from his arrest to his appearance before
a judge. In fact, interviewers discovered that in the aftermath of decisions
such as Reimers v. State,2 19 a serious felony offender may move through
the process more quickly because of concern that delay might interfere
with his conviction. The real villain from the standpoint of a person in
custody is not so much lengthy interrogation as the long period of perhaps
unnecessary delay between the time the police have completed charging
and the time he appears before a magistrate and is placed in contact with
an attorney to represent him. 22 0
On the last day of that holiday an assistant district attorney and magistrate are
available. Two assistant district attorneys are on "24 hour" call but these are to
give information or advice to the police. A district attorney is on call, however,
for bail hearings. See note 223 infra.
217 The classic case of delay due to "unavailability" of a magistrate is Reimers v.
State, 31 Wis.2d 457, 470-471, 143 N.W.2d 525, 532 (1965) where the court
said:
Upon its face, a detention from midnight Satur-
day until 10 a.m. Tuesday, without satisfactory
explanation
is "unreasonable." The "explanation" that the magistrate was unavailable on
either Sunday or Monday (a legal holiday) was rejected.
21s WiS. STAT. §957.26(2) (1967).
219 See note 217 supra.
220 This is apparently a long-standing problem. In Schoette v. Drake, 139 Wis. 18,
21, 120 N.W. 393, 395 (1909), the following sequence is recounted:
The plaintiff was arrested between 5 and 6
o'clock in the afternoon and put in the lockup
and left there until the forenoon of the follow-
ing day. There is evidence that in the evening,
shortly after he was confined, an effort was
made to bring him before the court for the
disposition of his case or for release on bail
and that the municipal court was open for that
purpose; that although defendant Drake was in
the city and requested to take plaintiff before
the court, he neglected to do so, but suffered
plaintiff to remain in jail all night and until
about 9 or 10 o'clock in the forenoon of the
following day. . . . The law . . . is well settled
. . . that where an officer makes an arrest
without a warrant . . . it is his duty to take the
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III. Pre-Trial Proceedings
A. The Initial Hearing
970.01 INITIAL APPEARANCE BEFORE JUDICIAL
PERSONS IN CUSTODY.
(1) FILING OF REASON FOR CHA RG-
ING WITH COURT. At or before the
time the person in custody is brought be-
fore the judicial officer, the station officer
shall cause to be filed with the court a state-
ment setting forth the charge to be sought
against the person, and briefly stating the
facts upon which the charge is based,
except that if the district attorney has al-
ready filed a complaint against the person,
the statement of the station officer is un-
necessary. In every case in which either
the station officer or the district attorney
shall oppose the person's release on his
promise to appear, one or both shall file
with the judicial officer three copies of
a statement of facts upon which he relies
to oppose the person's release on his own
promise to appear.
(2) ADVISING THE PERSON IN CUS-
TODY. Upon the initial appearance of
the person in custody, the judicial officer
shall:
(a) Inform him of the charge, or the
charge sought against him, and provide
him with a copy of the statement setting
forth the charge, filed pursuant to sub. (1);
(b) Advise him that he is not required to
OFFICER OF
person arrested before a magistrate without
unreasonable delay.
The assistant district attorney, supra note 203, writes:
Every person in cusody in the city jail is
always taken before a magistrate or district
attorney or city attorney the next session of
court. No person is ever kept in confinement
past the next session of court after his arrest.
[Emphasis in the original.]
Taking this as correct, the "next session of court" may easily be twenty-four
hours after his arrest. For example, one arrested at 10:00 or 11:00 a.m..
depending on the time required for processing, may not be ready for a District
Attorney hearing until that afternoon, too late for a court hearing that day.
Pre-Arraignment Procedure
say anything and that anything he says
may be used against him;
(c) Advise him of his right to communi-
cate with counsel, his family or, where he
desires, his friends and that, if necessary,
facilities will be provided to enable him
to do so;
(d) Advise that counsel, relatives or friends
may have access to him as provided in s.
(e) If he is as yet unrepresented, advise
him of his right to be represented by
counsel, and if he is financially unable to
afford counsel, unless counsel is waived,
forthwith appoint counsel to represent him;
(f) If bail has been required, or there are
objections to his release on his promise
to appear, give to him a copy of such
objections;
(g) Where applicable, advise him that he
may appear at the hearing of the district
attorney to determine if a complaint is to
issue against him, and his right to a pre-
liminary examination;
(h) Advise him of the nature and approx-
imate schedule of all further proceedings
to be taken against him.
(3) PRINTED FORM TO BE GIVEN.
The person shall forthwith be given a
printed form which in plain and under-
standable language contains the substance
of the matters listed in subs. (b) - (h).
(4) FURTHER PROCEEDINGS TO
AWAIT APPOINTMENT OF COUN-
SEL. Except for any proceedings neces-
sary to determine the person's release
from custody, or as to proceedings dis-
posed of pursuant to sub. (5), no further
steps in the proceedings shall be taken
until the person and his counsel have had
an opportunity to confer unless the per-
son has waived the right to be represented
by counsel. Waiver of counsel shall be
discouraged and shall be accepted only if
the judicial officer is completely satisfied
December 19681
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that the waiver is intelligently made with
full knowledge of the consequences.
(5) SUMMARY TRIAL OF SOME
CASES. With the consent of the person
in custody, the judicial officer shall have
jurisdiction to summarily adjudicate any
ordinance violation in which it is agreed
by the court and the city attorney that if
the person is found guilty a fine of no
more than one hundred dollars will be
incurred and that he shall have at least
thirty days to pay the fine and any mis-
demeanor in which it is agreed by the
court and the district attorney that if the
person is found guilty a sentence of no
more than five days will be incurred or
a fine of one hundred dollars and that he
shall have at least thirty days to pay the
fine.
(6) JUDICIAL OFFICER TO DECIDE
RELEASE QUESTION PROMPTLY. In
every case not summarily disposed of,
and except in those cases in which the
city or district attorney has stipulated that
the person may be released on his promise
to appear, the judicial officer shall decide
promptly in accordance with the stan-
dards set forth in s. -_ [to be drafted],
the question of the person's release pend-
ing further proceedings. If the person has
not been released, the judicial officer shall
commit him to the custody of the sheriff
until later release or trial.
(7) DISTRICT ATTORNEYS TO PRO-
MOTE RELEASE OF PERSONS IN
CUSTODY. District and city attorneys
shall encourage, whenever possible, the re-
lease of persons in custody upon their
promise to appear.
Ref. Standards 4.1-4.3. For conditions
to be placed on release in lieu of bail,
see 5.2, and for standards on which
bail should be set, see 5.3.
Clearly the person remaining in custody will not be helped by an effort
to hurry him through the charging procedure if he must wait in jail an-
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other fifteen or twenty hours before being brought to a judge. This problem
involves two subsidiary questions: (1) How can a judicial officer be made
available for an initial hearing as soon as practicable after the period of
police detention is terminated? and (2) What should be the nature of that
initial hearing? Because the type of hearing to be held will affect the speed
with which we may wish to hold it, the second question will be discussed
first.
The purpose of the initial hearing in Wisconsin has recently been ex-
plained by the State Supreme Court:
The chief purpose is to bring the accused
without delay before a magistrate with
the power to commit a person charged
with the offense. The functions of the
magistrate at that hearing are limited to
formally charging the defendant with the
offense for which he has been arrested,
informing him of his right to counsel and
of the right to have a preliminary exami-
nation and setting bail. It is also sug-
gested that the magistrate advise the de-
fendant that he is not obliged to make any
statement whatsoever and that any state-
ment made can be used against hin.
Moreover, the magistrate shall not ask for
nor accept any plea. . . . [W]e suggest
that the interests of justice will be served
if the lawyers, judges and laymen clearly
understand that the term, "arraignment,"
refers not to the initial appearance before
a magistrate, but only to the appearance
for the purpose of reading and filing, and
pleading to, the information in a court
having jurisdiction to accept such a plea
and to impose sentence. [Emphasis
added[221
It has been said that the "principal function of the initial appearance is to
provide for the defendant's release on bail, pending later steps in the
proceeding."2 22 Yet present procedures frustrate these aims by promoting
rather than preventing delay. The sole effective accomplishment of the
221 Eskra v. State, 29 Wis.2d 212, 224-225, 138 N.W.2d 173, 179-180 (1965).
222 Miller and Remington, Procedures Before Trial, 339 ANNALS 111, 121 (1962);
Note, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 430, 440; LeFave, supra note 139, at 342-43. The
further function of the initial hearing should not be forgotten: "bringing a
person before the magistrate promptly after arrest in order to enable the judicial
officer to decide whether there was probable cause for the arrest and detention."
LaFave and Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making
and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 987, 988 (1965).
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initial hearing at this late stage in the process is to assure the "formal
charging" of the person in custody.
Here as elsewhere in the system, the response to such inadequacy has
been improvisation. Zealous attorneys have reduced this delay somewhat
by utilizing the writ of habeas corpus to obtain earlier pretrial release. 22 3
In order to handle this approach and to relieve jail overcrowding which
is due in part to pretrial detention,2 2 4 Milwaukee judges have assigned
two of their number to conduct habeas corpus hearings. 22 5
Although this concept of the initial hearing may be accurate as a state-
ment of Wisconsin law, it actually confounds two separate and inde-
pendent functions: the court's duty to see that the person is formally
charged with a crime and its duty to accord "without delay" the full meas-
ure of legal rights set out by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. While the dis-
trict attorney should have as much time as needed to "formally charge"
the person, rights such as pretrial release and counsel become more val-
uable the earlier they are available. 2 26 A requirement that the district
attorney file a complaint before he may be ready to do so is not only un-
reasonable but may well be against the interests of the person in custody.
At the same time, however, a requirement that persons in custody remain
in jail until a determination is made the following morning whether a
formal complaint is to be issued against them is not only unconscionable,
but worse it is unnecessary. 22 7
Draft Section 970.01 provides for an initial appearance of persons in
custody before a judicial officer in such a sequence that in most instances
no complaint will have been filed yet.2 28 The station officer is to cause
223 Following an arrest for a curfew violation during a period of racial rioting in
Milwaukee, the defendant's attorney challenged the arrest contending that the
Mayor's curfew order was without authority. The defense attorney countered
the assistant city attorney's complaint that the hour 1:30 a.m. was an unreason-
able time to argue such a point with the statement that it was more unreasonable
to hold the defendant overnight. The court commissioner ordered the de-
fendant released without bail. Milwaukee Journal, Aug. 31, 1967, pt. 1 at 9,
Col. 4. In another matter, a circuit court judge was called to court at midnight
to hear a writ of habeas corpus for reduction of bail. Milwaukee Journal,
Mar. 4, 1967, at 18.
224 See note 190 supra.
225 Most such hearings deal with matters other than pretrial release, and of those
that deal with pretrial release, the majority are conducted after bail is set by the
court and are in the nature of an appeal from that decision to a circuit court
judge.
226 For an extreme case of delay in advising of the right to counsel, see Jones v.
State, 37 Wis.2d 56, 154 N.W.2d 278, 284-85 (1967), and cases cited therein.
227 This is not to say that the district attorney is "unconscionable," but the adminis-
trative arrangement that permits such an abuse is.
228 The Code eliminates the district attorney hearing before the initial appearance.
But since the district attorney has not filed his complaint by then, there should
be a strong inducement for the defendant or his attorney to attend the hear-
ing voluntarily in order to obtain release or reduction of the charge. There
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to be filed a statement setting forth both the charge and a brief statement
of the facts upon which it is based. In every case where either the district
attorney or the station officer opposes release on the person's promise
to appear, one or both are to file three copies of a statement setting forth
the facts on which they base their opposition (970.01(1)).229 The ju-
dicial officer is to inform the person of the charge being sought against
him and provide him with a copy of the charge filed pursuant to Draft
Subsection (1). He is to be advised of his rights under Miranda in lan-
guage substantially the same as that previously given by the station officer
(969.30(1); if indigent and without counsel, counsel shall be appointed
for him at once. Where applicable, he is to be advised that he may
appear at the hearing of the district attorney to determine if a complaint
is to issue and that he is entitled to a preliminary examination. He is also
to be informed of the nature and the approximate schedule of all further
proceedings to be taken against him (970.01(2)) and is to be given a
form which recites this information in plain and understandable language
(970.01(3)).
No further proceedings are to be taken, other than the decision on
custody, until the person has had an opportunity to confer with his coun-
sel (970.01(4)). A summary trial, however, is permitted in minor cases
where the defendant agrees to trial and the penalty will be limited
(970.01(5)). In all cases not tried, the judicial officer is to decide the
custody question promptly in accordance with standards to be drafted
(970.01(6) ).230
B. Judicial Availability
A "24-hour arraignment" system has been tried in both New York City
and Philadelphia as a means of shortening the delay between arrest and
initial hearing. These systems are substantially similar except that the
Philadelphia plan is established by statute,2 3 1 while the New York City
plan is operated through administrative fiat. The person is taken before
the Philadelphia court only with his consent. Under the New York plan
is nothing which prevents the district attorney from holding the hearing in the
absence of the defendant and with the complainant, the police officer and
witnesses.
229 Section 976.01, Duties of the Clerk, will require the clerk to retain one copy in
the defendant's file and maintain a separate file of this and like copies for all
other defendants so that they may be tabulated at such time and manner as
the attorney general may direct (969.90(1)). The third copy is to be given to
the defendant (970.01(3)).
23OPretrial Release Standards, Section 5.3(a), supra note 38, at 18, prescribes:
"Money bail shall be set only when it is found that no other conditions on
release will reasonably assure the defendant's appearance in court." See also
section 5.3(d) which lists considerations the judge should take into account
when setting bail.
23142 PA. STAT. ANN. §1110 (1966).
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all interested parties, the arresting officer, the defendant, and witnesses are
brought directly to a central location. Here the defendant is booked; a
complaint is drawn up by the officer aided by a district attorney on duty
in the court for that purpose. If the person in custody does not have an
attorney, a public defender is present to advise him. The person is then
taken before a judge where bail is set or he may be released on his own
recognizance. 23 2 If the defendant is agreeable and the matter is within the
court's jurisdiction, he may be tried forthwith.
A recent study of the system shows that in one city the time lapse from
the arrest to arrival at court was three and one-half to four hours for
felonies and the more serious misdemeanors and one and one-half to two
and one-half hours for less serious offenses. Court procedure required
about two or three hours regardless of the serious or minor nature of the
offense. The total time from arrest through court processing or trial was
from six to seven hours in serious offenses and from three to six hours in
lesser offenses. 23 3
Two elements are evidently essential if we are substantially to reduce
the delay between the time when the police have terminated their need for
custody and the time when the person remaining in custody reaches a
judicial officer. First, there must be some means promptly to obtain the
services of a judicial officer day or night. Second, the function of custodial
adjudication must be separated and emphasized as distinct from ordinary
court proceedings. Although the Draft Section does delineate this function
in detail,234 its companion Section 969.50 does not propose how to make
such a judicial officer available on more than a "business hour" basis. The
Section merely requires that the person remaining in custody "shall be
brought before a judicial officer for initial appearance at the earliest time
that such officer is available." To propose a precise plan on "availability"
232 4 DEFENDER NEWS. No. 2, at 21 (1967). Processing involves booking procedures,
photographing and fingerprinting; preparation of a complaint; a background inter-
view to obtain information for a bail recommendation; an interview with a Legal
Aid lawyer; a conference between the lawyer and the prosecutor; and finally, the
court hearing; criminal justice administration, cafeteria-style. Of the 28,000
persons "arraigned" during the night sessions through June 10, 1967, 75 percent
were released without spending the night in jail; 50 of those charged with mis-
demeanors and ordinance violations were released without bail, as were a "sub-
stantial number" of those charged with felonies. N. Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1967,
at 45, col. 1.2 3The New York plan was in operation from Jan. 1, 1967 to June 30, 1967. In
actual practice, there were two short adjournments during the day, one at
dinner-time and another late in the early morning hours when most of the cases
had been disposed of. On July 1, 1967, the court went on a nighttime 7 p.m.
to 2 a.m. basis in order to provide additional personnel for night court in
another part of the city. Id. An additional factor appeared to be complaints of
court personnel about the "lobster" shift, as the early morning shift was called.
234Compare §970.01 with the "custody magistrate" created for the Study Draft,
supra note 145, at 43-75.
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without sufficient information would be futile. 2 35 In seeking a solution we
must first determine the need on the basis of which the judicial work must
be distributed. It may be that a single magistrate and clerk working the
hours of the present New York City night court could handle the load in
Milwaukee. 23 6 In some areas of the state where non-business hour arrests
are infrequent, judges could be available to decide custody questions on the
telephone. Modern telephone conference arrangements even allow for a
"telephone court." A recently suggested answer calls for a "system of
appointed 'temporary judges' who would serve as volunteers for a month
at a time to help meet rising caseloads and shortages of judicial man-
power." 2 37
IV. Guidelines Supplementing the Code
969.80 DUTY OF DISTRICT ATTORNEY AND ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL TO ISSUE REGULATIONS [GUIDELINES].
(1) DISTRICT ATTORNEY TO PRE-
PARE REGULATIONS IMPLEMENT-
ING CODE. The district attorney of each
county shall issue regulations [guidelines]
necessary to implement the provisions of
this Code applicable to the operation of
law enforcement agencies in the county
and shall convey the regulations [guide-
lines] to these agencies. The regulations
[guidelines] shall be amended and aug-
mented from time to time in accordance
with the district attorney's evaluation of
the constitutional, statutory and case law
requirements.
235 Answers to the following questions would be useful: What is the distribution in
time, numbers and nature of charge, of persons still in custody issuing from
police stations? What would be the problem for the police in delivering such
persons to some central place for the custody hearing? What problems of verifi-
cation are presented when a custody hearing is held at 2 a.m.? In sum, if
there was a magistrate available immediately to review custody questions, would
this have any substantial effect on the number of those released? What will be
the expected collateral benefits and disadvantages provoked in the rest of the
system by such changes? Will it be necessary to hire additional personnel or
could the present number of judges, magistrates or commissioners, district attor-
neys and clerks man the additional load? What would be the dollar cost of one
plan as against another?
236 See supra note 233.
237 Mayor John Lindsay of New York City made the suggestion to an American Bar
Association conference adding:
a local bar association of a city could establish
a screening committee to recommend distin-
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(2) ATTORNEY GENERAL TO AID
DISTRICT ATTORNEYS. (a) The at-
torney general shall issue and distribute
regulations [guidelines] to local district at-
torneys implementing the provisions of
this Code applicable to law enforcement
agencies with a view to aiding district
attorneys in the promulgation of regula-
tions [guidelines] and for the establish-
ment, where appropriate, of uniformity of
criminal enforcement procedure through-
out the state.
(b) The attorney general shall request
each district attorney to collect and to
cause the law enforcement agencies in
his county to collect specified statistical or
other information which will aid him in
evaluating the effective operation of Code
provisions relating to law enforcement
and in fulfilling his duties pursuant to
sub. (2)(a).
(c) Statistical and other information col-
lected by each district attorney shall be
sent periodically as requested to the at-
torney general who shall make a compila-
tion from which he shall prepare an
annual report describing the operation
of the Code. This report shall be for-
warded to the governor of the state and
to the legislature with such recommenda-
tions for executive and legislative action
as the attorney general believes appro-
priate.
(3) PUBLIC DOCUMENTS. Regulations
[guidelines] issued and statistical informa-
tion collected under this section shall be
public documents.
Ref. ALl (1966) 1.03; Model De-
partment of Justice Act generally,
and Sec. 10, National Conference
guished lawyers with at least 10 years experi-
ence to the Mayor for appointment as tem-
porary judges.
N.Y. Times, May 21, 1968 at 37, col. 1.
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on Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws.
A code of criminal procedure is basically a regulatory code. Yet if it
attempted to supervise every detail of law enforcement operations it would
stifle the structure it was meant to supervise. The Code is intended to guide
by establishing limits and direction. An essential part of this direction
must be to provide means by which some of the gaps and ambiguities nec-
essarily left by a code may be filled in by the law enforcement agencies
themselves.
Draft Section 969.80 stems in part from the 1952 Model Department
of Justice Act drafted by the American Bar Association Committee on
Organized Crime and approved by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws. Whereas that proposal leaves "ultimate
accountability to a single coordinating official," however, the Code in
almost all of its sections relies on inducements to cooperative effort. 238
To a great extent the Draft Section merely formalizes and structures the
loosely functioning law enforcement hierarchy which now exists in
Wisconsin. For the past few years the attorney general has communi-
cated regularly to law enforcement personnel through conferences and
bulletins his interpretations of the latest legislative enactments and court
decisions in order to disseminate current information about important
changes or difficult problems in the law.2 39 Locally, police find themselves
calling on their district attorney more often as the legal requirements so
basic to their work become more complex.24 0 It has been reported that the
Milwaukee district attorney's office "frequently requests the attorney
238 The relevant objectives of the Act are:
to restore what has been lacking in local crim-
inal prosecution in this country for a long time,
namely ultimate accountability to a single co-
ordinating official and some measure of admin-
istrative responsibility for acts of discretion.
Even in states with more than one type of
prosecuting official, there is no organic connec-
tion between the different layers of authority.
Each office operates as a separate and unre-
lated entity, independent of the other and free
from any centralized control or supervision.
1952 MODEL DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ACT, National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, 6.
239 Beginning May 1, 1965, the attorney general issued on a biweekly basis memo-
randa on such subjects as "Confessions," "Release of Information in Criminal
cases," "Entrapment" and "Personal Liability for Acts of Officers."
240 During the race riots in Milwaukee, the district attorney and an assistant rode
with the police "advising them on legal implications of investigation, search and
arrest." The then District Attorney O'Connell commented that "there is a
tacit understanding that we are part of the law enforcement team here." Mil-
waukee Journal, Aug. 3, 1967, pt. 1 at 6. It was also reported that two assistant
district attorneys went with the police on a major narcotics raid to "advise them
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general's office to settle issues on which the law is vague."2 41 Within the
state structure itself the office of the attorney general has been organ-
ized lately into a Department of Justice242 as part of a restructuring of the
executive branch, 243 and law enforcement officers from different counties
have been empowered to give each other aid in emergencies. 24 4
In order to encourage such trends, Draft Subsection (1) requires the
local district attorney to issue guidelines from time to time to implement
the provisions of the Code. 245 There is no obligation on the part of the
police to follow such guidelines or regulations. 2 46 Since courts prob-
ably will use them as behavioral yardsticks for determining compliance
with the Code in suits brought to redress violations,247 the guidelines may
be expected to be taken seriously. There is no attempt to emphasize a
formal structure of superior and subordinate as between the district
attorney and the police. The Subsection rather recognizes the natural
relationship of the district attorney to other law enforcement authorities:
that of lawyer to client.2 48 A working relationship between the district
attorney and the police is sought in which the district attorney is the legal
aid and guiding hand for the police.
Draft Subsection (2) (a) places such local legal aid within a framework
on how to conduct the raids." Id., Sept. 20, 1967, pt. I at 5, col. 3. For the
detailed aid given by the Los Angeles district attorney to police, see Younger,
Crime in the Space Age, 3 GA. BAR J. 277, 280-281 (1967); for the California
attorney general's program of state-wide law enforcement assistance, see Lynch,
Interrogation of Criminal Defendants-Some Views on Miranda v. Arizona,
35 FORD. L. REV. 169, 222, 224 (1966), and 3 R. L. 2356-2357 (1968).
241 Pilot Project Report, supra note 54 at 1-15.
242WIs. STAT. §15.25 (1967). An even more ambitious project was proposed-to
create a new state department of public safety, consisting of the council on law
enforcement, the state crime laboratory, the criminal investigation division of
the attorney general's office, conservation wardens, the state highway patrol
and the patrol academy; the arson investigator unit of the insurance department
and the criminal investigation function of the beverage and cigaret tax division
of the state tax department. Milwaukee Journal, July 14, 1967, pt. 1 at 11,
col. 1.2 43 WIs. STAT. §15.001 (1967).
24 4 WIS. STAT. §66.305 (1967).
245 For special policy emphasis, other Code sections specifically require the issuance
of guidelines: 969.05(4), "concerning the circumstances in which officers shall
issue notices to appear," and 969.32(1 ) (e) to promote a liberal policy of release
from stationhouse custody without bail. But there are many provisions which
require more precision: §969.32, disposition of the person in custody; §969.40,
stationhouse bail; §969.50, prompt production before a judicial officer.
246 Either designation may be used in the Code. Guidelines carry the connotation
of being broad, suggestive and sanctionless, while regulations are thought of as
more precise, detailed and carrying sanctions for their violation. Functionally,
the Code provision conceives of something in between. For the present, "guide-
lines" is probably the better descriptive title.
247 See discussion at 114-16 infra of Draft Section 969.90, yet to be drafted.
24 8 See SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 199-202 (1966) and Robinson, Book
Review, 45 TEXAS L. REV. 599, 608 (1967).
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of state-wide coordination by requiring the attorney general to issue guide-
lines. A local district attorney may use, modify or discard these guidelines
according to his estimate of their local applicability. If he discards them,
however, he still will be obligated under Subsection (1) to issue his own.
A major goal of such a provision is to extend the talents and facilities of
the attorney general's office to all parts of the state. Collaterally, uniformity
of law enforcement procedures is promoted where it is most appropriate.
Subsection (2) (c) requires the attorney general to send to the governor
and to the legislature an annual report describing the operations of the
Code relating to law enforcement, together "with such recommendations
for executive and legislative action" as he believes appropriate. 24 9 To aid
in gathering information he is to "request" each district attorney to collect
data from his own office and to cause the law enforcement agencies of the
county to provide statistical or other information useful in evaluating the
effective operation of Code provisions. 25 0
The discretion accorded law enforcement agencies in accepting these
guidelines recognizes that they are frequently jealous of interference with
their methods of operation. Yet the initiative of the attorney general in
providing them with informative bulletins and in arranging conferences
has been well received in the past. It may be expected, therefore, that
guidelines which are not legally imposed will be seen as less of a threat
and will be accepted more readily. By their very nature guidelines should
increase the cooperation and understanding among the attorney general,
the district attorneys and the police: as a matter of practicality they will
require police participation in formulation. Finally, guidelines may be
expected to make for a less traumatic introductory period for the new
Code.
Draft Section (3) opens to public inspection any guidelines issued or
statistics and other information collected. Although Wisconsin law permits
the argument that even without this provision such records would be
accessible to the public, the Section makes explicit the public interest. 25 1
249Compare WIs. STAT. §110.99(3) (1967) requiring the Governor's council on
traffic law enforcement to "report to the governor any proposals for changes in
the law which it believes will bring about a better over-all enforcement effort
250 Present statutes which require officials to collect information concerning crime
include: WIs. STAT. §68.15 (1965) Pauperism and Crime, "Each ... city clerk
shall make to the county clerk .. .at such time as such department may require,
reports concerning pauperism and crime in his town, village or city"; Wis. STAT.
§110.99(3) (1967), Governor's council on traffic law enforcement "may inspect
or examine the records of any law enforcement and may call upon any enforce-
ment officer or supervisor of any officer or group of enforcement officers for
advice or information"; Wis. STAT. §345.11(7) (1967), "Each law enforcement
agency issuing uniform traffic citations and complaints shall . . .prepare and
submit such records and reports relating to the uniform traffic citations and com-
plaints in the manner and at the time prescribed by the commissioner."
251This was the criterion in Beckon v. Emery, 36 Wis.2d 510, 153 N.W.2d 501
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Even though considerable care has been taken to reduce possible ob-
jections of law enforcement authorities to this provision, there is evidence
that such opposition may be expected. A bill to form a law enforcement
commission "to develop and promulgate guidelines for law enforcement
officers" and to institute "legal assistance programs" by providing grants
covering up to ninety percent of local costs for such projects was defeated
in the 1967 legislature. This was due in part at least to opposition from local
law enforcement officials. 2 52 In New York opposition to formation of a
similar department on a state level was raised by district attorneys who
"objected to giving supervisory powers to the proposed department on the
ground that the new unit could interfere with local law enforcement
officials and prosecutors." 25 3 Although the guidelines are only suggestive,
(1967) involving a request to inspect over a year period all traffic citations
issued by the officer who cited the defendant. Such a request may be rejected
by a governmental authority
only in the unusual or exceptional case, where
the harm to the public 'interest that would be
done by divulging matters of record would be
more damaging than the harm that is done to
public policy by maintaining secrecy, that the
inspection should be denied.
Id. at 516, 153 N.W.2d at 501. The court founded its decision on WIs. STAT.
§18.01 (1957):
(2) Except as expressly provided otherwise, any
person may with proper care, during office
hours and subject to such orders or regulations
as the custodian thereof may prescribe, examine
or copy any of the property or things mentioned
in subsection (1) [all property and things
received from his predecessor . . . and required
by law to be filed . . . or which are in the
lawful possession or control of himself or his
deputies .... ]
252Assembly bil! 610, an act to create §§14.44 and 20.180(2)(a) of the statutes.
A representative of the Milwaukee police department objected before the Mil-
waukee common council judiciary committee that "the measure was in conflict
with the statutory powers of the fire and police commission and the powers of
the police chief. . . . [It] would interfere with the prerogative of the chief to
set up a training program." Milwaukee Journal, May 1, 1967, pt. 2 at 12. Its
estimated cost of $396,000 may also have been a stumbling block, although
this covered two years of operation. Id., Nov. 21, 1967, pt. 1 at 1, col. 1.
Originally proposed as part of the executive branch, it was changed to a board
and moved to the local offices and development department. It was to provide
up to fifty percent training aid as an inducement for local departments to meet
minimum standards. One charge against it was that "the training program could
lead to state control of local police forces." Id. Dec. 6, 1967, pt. I at 26, col. 2.
It is also reported that although Wisconsin is only one of four states lacking a
central identification file, "what has blocked the idea repeatedly is the fear of
some local law enforcement men that such a central file would be a 'foot in the
door' for a state investigative agency, which then would swoop into local police
jurisdiction unbidden." Id., Feb. 18, 1968, pt. 1 at 1, col. 1.
253 The proposal was a constitutional provision creating a department of justice "to
assist, coordinate and supervise local law enforcement and prosecution efforts."
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fear of a "foot in the door" is an apprehension not without substance. What
local officials do not see is that their control will be more secure if the
"intruder" is invited to enter the door rather than forced to break down
the door as he inevitably would do. This reflects in miniature the confron-
tation between the state criminal justice system as a whole and the federal
courts: the problem is not whether there will be a change but whether and
to what extent local law enforcement will have an effective voice in con-
trolling that change and retaining the best aspects of local control. The
President's Commission on Law Enforcement has pointed out the "frag-
mented, complicated and frequently overlapping" nature of law enforcement
machinery in this country. 25 4 This description is accurate for Wisconsin
and for other states as well. Whether such primitive approaches to law en-
The legislature would implement this. One judge contended that removal of this
supervisory power would make the agency, "a paper tiger, a cardboard depart-
ment of criminal justice." N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1967 at 27, col. 1. The intro-
duction to the MODEL DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ACT, supra note 238, at 6,
explains the evolution of this problem:
The autonomy of the local prosecuting attorney
and his relative freedom from supervision and
control by any state official is a peculiar
characteristic of American law enforcement.
He achieved this independence in the early part
of the 19th century. Prior to that time, the key
figure in the enforcement of the criminal law
and the prosecution of crime was the Attorney
General. The Attorney General was endowed
with all the powers in the prosecution of crim-
inal cases, which had been exercised by his
English counterpart. He could intervene in any
criminal prosecution in which the State had an
interest. He could take over criminal prosecu-
tions initiated by others, either himself or
through deputies. When the various courts re-
quired local prosecutors to assist them in dis-
posing of criminal cases, these local prosecutors
were deputies or assistants of the Attorney
General. The Attorney General was unquestion-
ably the chief prosecutor of the state. This
system of criminal prosecution is still in force
and effect in Rhode Island and Delaware, where
local prosecutors are still the deputies and assis-
tants of the Attorney General. But in other states
the twin forces of Jacksonian democracy and
local home rule have given us the locally elected
prosecuting attorney, largely independent of any
centralized direction, accountability or control.
Id. at 7-8. See State ex rel. Beck v. Duffy, 38 Wis.2d 159, 156 N.W.2d 368, 371
(1968) stating, "In this state the attorney general is devoid of common law
powers and duties," naming his statutory duties. See DELONG, Powers and Duties
of the State Attorney General in Criminal Prosecutions, 25 J. CRIM. L. C.,
& P.S. 358, 372 (1934) and the "Attorney General and Law Enforcement," a
chapter in The Powers, Duties and Operations of the Attorneys' General Offices,
mimeographed, Council of State Governments, Chicago, Ill.; and R. PoUND,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 150-51 (1930).
254 President's Commission Report, supra note 13, at 119.
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forcement will be corrected by local law enforcement agencies will in large
part depend on the reception given to proposals such as Section 969.80.
V. Sanctions for Violations of Procedure
What means are available to assure that the desired goals and pro-
cedures outlined above are maintained? As one critical observer has
demanded, "If the police break the rules, what should the consequences
be? . . . In today's crisis in confidence [in the police] the question of
sanctions is the central question." [Emphasis in original] 2 5 5
There has been little imaginative response to this question. No legislature
has attempted to cope with the problem. Available literature either lists
the inadequacies of present "remedies" such as private suits for false arrest
or illegal detention2 56 or urges additional "remedies" including internal
controls by the police department,2 5 7 external controls such as the civilian
review board, 2 58 a sharpening of the exclusionary rule, 2 59 and more
effective police training. 26 0
The most convincing proof of the inadequate resolution of this significant
problem is that the exclusionary rule, despite all of its recognized de-
ficiencies, constitutes the frail reed on which the Model Pre-Arraignment
Code "puts its principal reliance . . . as a means of enforcing its pro-
255 Packer, Policing the Police, Nine Men are Not Enough, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
Sept. 4, 1965, at 21. Continuing, the author says:
The main source of hostility to the police
among minority groups is the helpless frustra-
tion, engendered by the certain knowledge that,
whatever the police do, there is no way in which
they can be called to account for it.
256 See note 95 supra.
257 Goldstein, Administrative Problems in Controlling the Exercise of Police Author-
ity, 58 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 160, 171 (1967).
258 Inbau, Democratic Restraints Upon the Police, 57 J. CRIM. L., C., & P.S. 265
(1966); Beral and Sisk, The Administration of Complaints by Citizens Against
the Police, 77 HARV. L. REV. 499 (1964). See also Burger, Who Will Watch the
Watchman?, 14 AM.U. L. REV. 1, 16-20 (1964) where a review board of legal
and police specialists is proposed to meet objections of police to being judged
by those who know nothing about their work. GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS
COMPLAIN 171-195 (1966) criticizes the idea of the review board as not being
able to reach the major problem of "making police heads unremittingly respon-
sible for what all their subordinates do." Id. at 193. Instead he proposes an
ombudsman who "does not single out the police department for special treat-
ment as though it were an especially despicable enemy. It does not remove
from police hands the power to direct, judge and discipline the staff members
whose actions are challenged ... ." Id.
259 LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule, Part I:
Current Police and Local Court Practices, 30 Mo. L. REV. 391, 457 (1965).
260 Id. Part 11: Defining the Norms and Training the Police at 593-609.
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visions."261 In Terry v. Ohio'22 the United States Supreme Court relied
on the same slight reed in validating the police stop and frisk "as a
principal mode of discouraging lawless police conduct." In that decision
the Court said of the exclusionary rule:
[Ilts major thrust is a deterrent one...
and experience has taught that it is the
only effective deterrent to police miscon-
duct in the criminal context, and that
without it the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures
would be a mere "form of words." Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). The
rule also serves another vital function -
"the imperative of judicial integrity."
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
222 (1960). Courts which sit under our
Constitution cannot and will not be made
party to lawless invasions of the con-
stitutional rights of citizens by permitting
unhindered governmental use of the fruits
of such invasions.
The exclusionary rule has its limitations,
however, as a tool of judicial control.
.. .Regardless of how effective the rule
may be where obtaining convictions is an
important objective of the police, it is
powerless to deter invasions of constitu-
tionally guaranteed rights where the police
261 MODEL PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE, supra note 8, at xxv; Article 9.10-9.12, at 63-82,
206-221.
262 Terry v. Ohio, supra note 19, at 4580. The classic defense of the exclusion-
ary rule in degrogation of other remedies is Mr. Justice Murphy's dissent in
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 42-46 (1949), where the majority, at that
time, refused to make the rule applicable to the states. Wisconsin previously
had followed Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) in excluding evi-
dence unlawfully seized: see Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89
(1923). As part of his argument, Mr. Justice Murphy pointed to Milwaukee
where "a stout volume on the law of search and seizure is made the basis of
extended instruction." Id. at 45. At this point, note 8 states:
Chief of Police John W. Polcyn notes, in a
Foreword to the book, that officers often were
not properly informed with respect to searches
and seizures before thoroughgoing instruction
was undertaken. One of their fears was that of
"losing their cases in court, only because they
neglected to do what they might have done with
full legal sanction at the time of the arrest,
or did what they had no legal right to do at
such time."
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either have no interest in prosecuting or
are willing to forego successful prosecu-
tion in the interest of serving some other
goal.
The wholesale harassment by certain
elements of the police community, of
which minority groups, particularly Ne-
groes, frequently complain, will not be
stopped by the exclusion of any evidence
from any criminal trial. Yet a rigid and
unthinking application of the exclusionary
rule, in futile protest against practices
which it can never be used effectively to
control, may exact a high toll in human
injury and frustration of efforts to prevent
crime. No judicial opinion can compre-
hend the protean variety of the street
encounter, and we can only judge the
facts of the case before us. 2 6 3
The Court says, in effect and almost as a confession of helplessness, that
though the rule is the best we have, it serves its purpose only where
conviction is desired by the police. A major part of their operation in-
volves cases in which a conviction is not necessarily sought.2 64 In these
circumstances a rule which excludes prosecution evidence in court has
scarcely any leverage.
The functioning of such a rule depends on three variables which are
absent from the police scene today:
(a) that the requirements of the law on
arrest, search and seizure and in-custody
investigation be developed in some detail
and in a manner sufficiently responsive to
both the practical needs of enforcement
and the individual right of privacy; (b)
that these requirements be fashioned in a
2 6 3 1d. at 4580-4581.
264 LaFave, supra note 259, at 448, states:
As the chances of conviction diminish these
other consequences take on added importance,
and finally they become the primary objectives
within certain avenues of enforcement. Police
come to view arrest without conviction as a
means of imposing some sanctions upon offend-
ers, getting weapons out of circulation, recover-
ing stolen property, and "keeping the lid on"
in high-crime areas of the community.
See also Robinson, supra note 19, at text accompanying n. 159-169.
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manner understandable by the frontline
lower-echelon police officer and that they
be effectively communicated to him; and
(c) that the police desire to obtain convic-
tions be sufficiently great to induce them
to comply with these requirements. 2 65 .
In the absence of these variables trial court rulings are inadequate to sanc-
tion violations of procedure. Often they are not communicated to the police.
But even if they are communicated, the decisions of different judges are
often so diverse within the same court that the police officer "may conclude
that if the judges cannot agree then it is futile for him to try to determine
and abide by any set standards." 2 66
The rule also ignores the distinction between those complaints against the
police concerning the conduct of individual officers and those touching on
agency policy. Professor Herman Goldstein with years of experience as a
police administrator has pointed out this problem nicely:
a complaint that cites such illegal conduct
[illegal use of police authority] on the part
of an officer does not really raise ques-
tions regarding individual conduct, but
rather questions the informal policies of
the agency. Existing control mechanisms,
designed as they are to control individual
behavior, cannot adequately perform the
quite different and more complex task of
exposing and reviewing enforcement poli-
cies and practices. This is especially true
with regard to the internal disciplinary
machinery of a police agency. However
strongly committed an agency may be to
disciplining the conduct of its employees,
it is not likely to criticize the actions of an
officer which, though of questionable le-
gality, are in accord with a practice know-
ingly and consciously engaged in by the
agency. This suggests that department-
265 LaFave, supra note 259, at 395-396.
266 Id. at 404, 401.
[L]ocal judges are time and again called upon to
evaluate questioned police conduct without an
adequate development of the facts, without a
sufficient presentation of existing authority, and
without the necessary understanding of the law
enforcement context within which the practice
in question occurs.
Id. This seems to be the principal difficulty the Court found with the rule. See
its comment in Terry v. Ohio, supra note 19, text accompanying note 263 supra.
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wide policies, as distinct from the individ-
ual conduct of police officers, can be
adequately controlled only from outside
a police department. [Emphasis added]267
Accepting Professor Goldstein's conclusion that it is necessary to go
outside a police department 268 in order to change any conduct worth
changing, it becomes apparent that we must search for more systematic
approaches than the exclusionary rule as applied by the courts. Proposals
for civilian review boards are more symptomatic of a need than serious as
a response. 269
We may analogize the police function to that of an administrative
agency and subject police action to judicial review like the action of other
agencies. 2 70
Perhaps [the court's] responsibility can
better be discharged if the judge is not
viewed as a direct participant in the mak-
ing of law enforcement decisions, but in-
stead is seen as the person responsible for
review of the policies, as is generally the
court's relationship with other administra-
267 Goldstein, Administrative Problems in Controlling the Exercise of Police Author-
ity, 58 J. CRIM. L., C., & P.S. 160, 164 (1967).
268 1 have argued elsewhere that because the police are structured along military
lines, because they are in a "service" relationship to society, and because police
goals developed out of this role are conceived narrowly to promote police
"craftsmanship," the police are unaccustomed to make, and it is unrealistic to
expect them to make, broad policy decisions outside the scope of their restricted
world-view. This reasoning applies equally to expectations of the creation of
effective internal controls. One cannot anticipate internal management to require
conformity to goals with which they are not in accord. This is not simply
because of obstinacy. Worse, one cannot conform to goals which are not even
understood. See Robinson, supra note 19, at 497-506.
269 See note 258 stupra, and Robinson, stpra note 19, at n. 192.
270 The Court in Terry v. Ohio, supra note 19, while referring to some of the prob-
lems of the rule also reaffirmed its faith in a judicial remedy:
Under our decision, courts still retain their
traditional responsibility to guard against police
conduct which is overbearing or harassing, or
which trenches upon personal security without
the objective evidentiary justification which the
Constitution requires. When such conduct is
identified, it must be condemned by the judici-
ary and its fruits must be excluded from evi-
dence in criminal trials. And, of course, our
approval of legitimate and restrained investiga-
tive conduct undertaking on the basis of ample
factual justification should in no way discourage
the employment of other remedies than the ex-
clusionary to curtail abuses for which that
sanction may prove inappropriate.
[Emphasis added.] Id. at 4581.
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rive agencies. This might provide a more
significant judicial control over law en-
forcement decisions particularly if courts
were systematically to require police to
articulate their enforcement policy and
practice relevant to the issue in the indi-
vidual case. Both courts and police would
then be forced to consider the propriety
of the general policies applicable in a
particular case, instead of merely consid-
ering individual situations on an ad hoc
basis. [Emphasis added] 27 1
The desirability of such a development evidently has been so apparent that
it already has occurred. Although almost unnoticed by those most concerned
with the problem, both mandamus and injunction suits are being utilized
271 LaFave and Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making and
Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 987, 1011 (1965).
For other references to the police as an administrative agency see LAFAVE,
ARREST, THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 65-68 (1965) and
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9, 79 (1965). The acceptance of the police
as just another "administrative agency," though a fascinating idea, provides no
solutions but does permit a new perspective. DAVIS at 79 states:
Are ordinary policemen administrative officers?
Analytically, the answer must be yes, and the
French have always said yes, but in an Amer-
ican law school curriculum the unstudied habit
is to commit them to the course in criminal
law and procedure and not to the administrative
law course. Do the police have practical power
to set aside whatever criminal law the legisla-
ture enacts? Are the limits of what is criminal
fixed, not by the legislature, but by the police
within the limits fixed by the legislature?
Though these are provocative questions, it seems more fundamental to ask
whether the police as presently constituted really resemble the kind of agency
we are visualizing. It might also be asked if the police may be considered
functionally an appendage of a full agency - the enforcement branch. If we
consider the prosecutor and the police as "one," would this alter the picture?
Id. at 51.
If police departments are really administrative agencies, it is fair to ask why
the judicial review feature has been "overlooked." It is suggested that in part
this is because the police "became" what we now recognize as an adminis-
trative agency while most such agencies were created whole by the legislature
at a time when they were seen as a serious threat to the area being regulated.
JAFFEE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 324-327 (1965) and
JAFFEE, note 272 infra. Police are not alone in having features of such an
agency without the checks controlling "true" administrative agencies. In schools,
prisons, and welfare programs recent changes in attitudes stimulated by court
decisions have brought about some change. One common characteristic of each
of these agencies applicable equally to the police is that those who are the
"objects" of the process constitute the parts of our population weakest in
political power.
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with increasing frequency to obtain judicial review of unauthorized police
action. 27 2 Technical limitations inherent in the use of mandamus makes
it less attractive as a code enforcing mechanism 27 3 and the frequency of
its use has declined in favor of actions to enjoin objectionable police
behavior. Decisions in these actions foretell the increasing significance of
the injunction as a new regulatory force, even if such a device is not
refashioned in legislative form.
27 2 See for example, LAFAVE, supra note 271, at 160 and GELLHORN, supra note 258,
at 55. The evolution of this process has been abstracted by Professor Jaffee:
Until the era of modern social legislation it
was not usually considered necessary to make
specific provision for judicial control of admin-
istrative action. Administrative activity prior to
the present era consisted mostly of the summary
action of licensing, health, or tax authorities,
often taken without hearing, though there were
a few bodies exercising authority in a more
formal fashion. The courts controlled these ac-
tivities by the prerogative writs - certiorari,
mandamus, etc. - or permitting common law
actions against officers alleged to have exceeded
their authority. In later days injunction- became
available for alleged irreparable injury in situa-
tions where no legal remedy existed. All of
these remedies are still available, particularly
in the states, both for control of traditional
administrative activity and the more recent reg-
ulatory action.
JAFFEE, supra note 271, at 155.27 3 In Rex v. Barker, 3 Burr 1265, 97 Eng. Rep. 823, 824 (K.B. 1762), Lord Mans-
field gave the writ an expansive interpretation:
The original nature of the writ, and the end
for which it was framed, direct upon what oc-
casions it should be used. It was introduced,
to prevent disorder from a failure of justice,
and defect of police. Therefore it ought to be
used upon all occasions where the law has
established no specific remedy, and where in
justice and good government there ought to be
one.
[Emphasis in original.] Id. at 1267, 97 Eng. Rep. 824-825. See Comment, The
Writ of Mandamus in Wisconsin, 1961 Wis. L. REV. 636. It was reduced finally
to "an order by a court to a delinquent official to comply with some positive
duty required by law." Id. This duty to act must be clear and there must be
no other legal remedy available. Id. at 657; 64 A.L.R. 975-976 (1929); JAFFEE,
supra note 271, at 176-193, 330-332, and DAVIS, supra note 271, at 445-448.
A recent pertinent case is State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 32 Wis.2d 11, 144
N.W. 2d 793 (1966). Mandamus was allowed to compel the defendant mayor
to permit inspection of "police reports, statements of police officers and other
persons, and those transcripts of the interrogation of police officers and other
persons in an inquiry conducted by the city attorney of Waukesha on the subject
of police brutality." The most famous use of the writ, of course, is in
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Using the mandamus as
a model for legislative regulation of police action would be unwise because the
remedy is focused on a specific, nondiscretionary act rather than on a course
of behavior.
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Most of such injunctions have issued from federal courts pursuant to
statutory authorizations of injunction,2 74 special civil rights legislation, 2 75
and the federal court tradition of policing state incursion on civil rights and
civil liberties.2 76 State courts in contrast have generally been hesitant to
use their equitable powers to "interfere to prevent the enforcement of the
criminal law." 2 7
7
A few early state decisions relied on the inherent equitable powers of the
court for relief without asserting any clearer theory of jurisdiction than the
duty to enjoin governmental interference with a citizen's rightful activi-
ties.2 78 Later federal cases were based on the authority of the federal
274 FED. R. CRIM. P. 65 and see note 275 infra.
275 Most of the described actions are brought under the following sections:
28 U.S.C. 1343 (1962) The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any
person: ...
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable
or other relief under any Act of Congress
providing for the protection of civil rights ....
42 U.S.C. 1983 (1964) Every person who, un-
der color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
276 From a functional point of view, far from being a policing force for the police,
state courts have seen themselves frequently as protectors of the police, legiti-
mizing police action, as a part of the enforcement arm rather than as an
independent review board. In Wisconsin, until McKinley v. State, 37 Wis.2d 26,
154 N.W.2d 344 (1967), the state supreme court had never thrown out a
confession due to police misbehavior, although its exclusionary rule was adopted
in 1923, supra note 262. Cf. Greenwald v. State, 35 Wis.2d 146, 150 N.W.2d
507 (1967), rev'd., 390 U.S. 519 (1968).
2 77 The citation is from Delany v. Flood, 183 N.Y. 323, 76 N.E. 209 (1906), and
see cases collected in Comment, Federal Injunctive Relief from Illegal Search,
1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 104, 108-109. This reserve undoubtedly also is due to the
history of equity as a protector of property rather than personal rights. See
Sedler, ninnctive Relief and Personal Integrity, 9 ST. Louis L.U.L.J. 147 (1964).
278 In Itzkovitz v. Whitaker, 117 La. 708, 42 So. 228 (1906), it was alleged that
the complainant was a citizen, a property owner, who payed taxes; that he, "has
conducted himself in a proper and becoming manner," and that he had not
then been convicted of the offense for which he was arrested. He successfully
asked the court to enjoin the police from placing his photo in the rogue's gallery
and sending copies throughout the United States. The police defended that they
could not be "lawfully controlled by an injunction from a civil district court."
Other state cases are collected in Sedler, supra note 277, at 174-177; Moscovitz,
Civil Liberties and Injunctive Protection, 39 ILL. L. REV. 144, 154 n. 63 (1944);
Comment, Federal Injunctive Relief from Illegal Search, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 104,
108-109.
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court to enjoin state action contravening rights under the United States
Constitution.2 79 Almost all recent cases are class actions brought under
the Civil Rights Act28O by civil rights, civil liberties or legal services organ-
izations seeking various degrees of regulation of police activity. Pro-
gressively these cases have demanded (1) that the court enjoin illegal acts
aimed at a single individual or organization; (2) that the court enjoin future
actions based on a proven past of illegal conduct; and (3) that the court
utilize the opportunity to bring about a substantial change in the structure
and policy of police procedures.
A typical case of the first category is Rafoule v. Ellis. 281 Police sus-
pected that the plaintiff had murdered his wife, but they did not have suffi-
cient evidence to arrest him. Instead on four occasions they took him into
custody and questioned him for prolonged periods, ignoring his requests to
see counsel and friends. His suit for an injunction under the Civil Rights Act
alleged a denial of due process of law and requested that the conduct com-
plained of be enjoined and that a confession obtained from him relating
to another crime be suppressed. The first request was granted, but the
second was disallowed on the ground that he had an adequate remedy at
law. The rationale, the extent of the relief given, and the circumspection
of the court in giving it are illustrated in this statement:
This [injunction] does not violate the
general principle that equity does not or-
dinarily interfere with the administration
of criminal laws. Plaintiff seeks to enjoin
not the administration of criminal laws by
the State of Georgia, but the illegal man-
ner of administration by defendants as
agencies of the State.
Defendants do not deny the detentions
and questionings above described and have
failed to express any intention to cease the
279 In Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939), police were alleged to have prevented
petitioners from conducting meetings and assembling or distributing literature by
unlawful searches and seizures in violation of their constitutional rights. The
Supreme Court directed that the police be restrained from "exercising personal
restraint over them without warrant or confining them without lawful arrest and
production of them for prompt judicial hearing .... ." Id. at 517. See also
Gomez v. Layton, 394 F.2d 764 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d
877 (8th. Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 851 (1948) and American Steel
Wire Co. v. Davis, 261 Fed. 800 (N.D. Ohio 1919); Comment, Federal in-
junctive Relief from Illegal Search, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 104, 107. Bell v. Hood,
327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) is a key case expressing the widespread relief
available where state officials do "what the 14th amendment forbids the state
to do."
28°See note 275 supra, 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1964), [hereafter referred to as the CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT.]
28174 F. Supp. 336 (N.D. Ga. 1947).
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commission of such acts in the future, but
on the other hand, have strongly insisted
that they were within their rights in doing
what they have done and in continuing
to do so in the future if they find it desir-
able to do so.
In view of this attitude, it seems that a
preliminary injunction is demanded to
protect plaintiff from infringements of his
rights under the Constitution and Civil
Rights Statute.
A preliminary injuction will issue en-
joining the exercise of personal restraint
over plaintiff by defendants without a war-
rant or confinement without lawful arrest
and from further questioning plaintiff
without his consent after being afforded
an opportunity of consulting with his
counsel.2S2
The next step in the progression dealt with a practice antedating the
particular incident complained of and resulted in a decree with a more gen-
eral sweep. Lankford v. Gelston2s8 involved police searches of more than
three hundred buildings in nineteen days, most of which were private homes
in a Negro section of Baltimore. Police had arrest warrants for two Negro
men suspected of armed robbery and attempted murder of a police lieuten-
ant. Most searches were in response to anonymous telephone calls placing
these persons in or near the places searched. Searches were made at all
hours of the day and night by a squad equipped with machine guns, tear gas
apparatus and bullet-proof vests. Relief was sought in a class action against
the police commissioner under the authority of the Civil Rights Act and
the Fourteenth Amendment, as it makes applicable to the states the search
and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. The district court denied the petition on grounds that the in-
junction would be "difficult to frame," "difficult to enforce and its en-
forcement would place severe burdens on the police and on this Court,"
that the action complained of had ceased, and that the police would make
2 S2 1d. at 343. The following cases also restrict their relief to the complainants:
Itzkovitz v. Whitaker, supra note 278; Hague v. C.I.O. and Sellers v. Johnson
(Jehovah's Witnesses entitled to police protection from mob opposed to their
holding a public meeting), supra note 279; Local 309, United Furniture Workers
v. Gates, 75 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ind. 1948) (Police enjoined from attending
union meetings); Butler v. Crumlish, 229 F. Supp. 565 (E.D.Pa. 1964) (police
enjoined from requiring petitioner who was awaiting trial and could not make
bail attend lineup), but see Rigney v. Hendrick. 355 F.2d 710, 715 (3rd Cir.
1965), cert. denied. 384 U.S. 975 (1966).
283 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
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a bona fide effort to observe the rules of law stated by the court. 28 4
According to trial testimony the use of anonymous, unverified tips to
authorize searches was standard procedure for the department. During the
trial the police commissioner promulgated a general order directing police
officers to arrest a person upon a warrant only if there is probable cause to
believe he is on the premises. The Court of Appeals rejected this attempt
to moot the issue, stating:
The grave character of the department's
conduct places a strong obligation on the
court to make sure that similar conduct
will not recur. Police protestations of
repentance and reform timed to anticipate
or to blunt the force of a lawsuit offer in-
sufficient assurance that similar raids will
not ensue when another aggravated crime
occures. . . . In fact, it is perhaps more
reasonable to view the cessation of the
raids and the promulgation of General
Order 10388 not as belated acts of re-
pentance but as the recognition of the
futility of continuing the searches when
it had become manifest that the Veneys
had made their escape. [Emphasis
added.]285
The Lankford court demonstrated none of the caution and need for self-
supporting rationalization expressed by the decision in Rafoule:
After so vast a demonstration of disre-
gard of private rights, the complainants
are entitled to a clear response. While the
immediate pressure of wholesale raids has
been withdrawn, the practice of indis-
criminate searches of homes has been re-
nounced only obliquely, if at all, and the
danger of repetition has not been re-
moved. The sense of impending crisis in
police-community relations persists, and
nothing would so directly ameliorate it as
a judicial decree forbidding the practices
complained of.
[The decree granted should enjoin] . ..
the Police Department from conducting a
2
s4 Lankford v. Schmidt, 240 F. Supp. 550, 562 (D. Md. 1965).
285 364 F.2d at 203.
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search of any private house to affect the
arrest of any person not known to reside
therein, whether with or without an arrest
warrant, where the belief that the person
is on the premises is based only on an
anonymous tip and hence without prob-
able cause.2 8 6
Such a decree is neither the declaration of a new point of law nor a broadly
sweeping revision of police practices. On the contrary, the point is ob-
vious and the injunction narrowly drawn.28 7 The notable portent of the
decree is rather that the court legislated a specific rule of future conduct
for the police for all like situations, permitting in the event of infractions
later access to the court through its power to defend its own injunctive
decrees: the contempt power. 288
The third and most audacious action, Kidd v. Addonizio et al.,2 8 9
was also based on the Civil Rights Act and was provoked by the suppres-
sion of Negro riots in Newark, New Jersey, in the summer of 1967. Plain-
tiffs, a class composed "of all residents of the City of Newark, New Jersey,
who are of the Negro race," sought injunctive relief. The defendants (the
286 Id. at 204, 206. Reliance of the court on the community relations effect of its
decree has been criticized. Note, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 104, 111.
287 Plaintiffs had asked that the police be required to obtain search warrants except
in exceptional circumstances. Id. at 205-206.
288 Cases are all recent where relief demanded is similar in extent to that given in
Lankford, and most are still in litigation. All actions have been filed by civil
liberty, civil rights or legal services organizations and are class actions juris-
dictionally based on the CIVIL RIGHTS ACT. In Burmeister v. Leary, 275 F.
Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), an injunction was requested to enjoin unlawful
invasion of premises and arrests of plaintiffs by police for alleged narcotics viola-
tions. Injunction was denied because plaintiffs did not assert that they were assem-
bled lawfully and no such lack of probable cause was shown as entitled plain-
tiffs to equitable relief. In Aronson v. Giarrusso, Civil No. 66-281, E.D. La., a
declaratory judgment was requested and also an injunction against police photo-
graphing or investigating persons attending public meetings except where necessary
for apprehension of persons to be charged with a crime. In Press v. Leary, Civil
No. 67-2402, S.D.N.Y., an injunction was requested to order discontinuance of
alleged police practice of issuing summons and arresting those distributing anti-war
leaflets and to take necessary measures to insure that all members of the depart-
ment were advised of the court order. Another federal court suit filed by the New
York Civil Liberties Union on behalf of three photographers sought to enjoin the
police department "from continuing alleged harassment of free lance photog-
raphers and others who peacefully attempt to record 'the facts of police actions'
at large demonstrations . . . with the purpose of protecting individual policemen
from discipline, criticism or legal action for these acts." N.Y. Times, July 8,
1968 at 19, col. 1. See also Note, 81 HARV. L. REV. 625, 631 (1968); Note, 45
N.C.L. REV. 518 (1967) and Note, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 104. Research aid: Mar-
quette University law student, now attorney, Joan Kessler.
289Civil No. 67-899 (D.C.N.J. July, 1967). [This case, filed during the Newark
disorders, never reached the point of formal disposition by the court. Ed. note.]
December 1968]
Prospectus
mayor, the director of public safety and the chief of police of Newark)
were alleged to be responsible for a "systematic pattern of conduct"
consisting of "a large number of individual acts of violence, intimidation
and humiliation visited upon members of plaintiff's class solely on ac-
count of race, by members of the Newark Police Department." The plain-
tiffs requested that a preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the de-
fendants from engaging in such conduct and in addition:
That pursuant to the Equity power of
this Court, an order issue ordering and
directing that a special Master be ap-
pointed receiver of the Police Department
of the City of Newark, with full power
to direct and control all affairs of that de-
partment and its members in order that
law enforcement in Newark not further
deteriorate until such time as that depart-
ment can be so reorganized so as to pro-
tect the lives and property of all citizens
of Newark equally and impartially with-
out regard to race. 2 90
In Lankford the court accepted a role as conciliator of police-community
relations; but that role is necessarily limited to the facts of the particular
case. The attempt in Kidd to make the police department a ward of the
court represented a response to the void left by failure of the legislature
to articulate rules against which a court may measure police behavior. The
roles which these courts were asked to play in control of police misconduct
are destined to be either ineffective as long term instruments or intolerably
overreaching in relation to the legislative branch.
The Code is intended not only to fill the void demonstrated in Kidd, but
also to provide through Draft Section 969.90 a realistic role for injunc-
tive relief as the best means yet available for successful enforcement of
Code provisions. Since work on the revision project terminated before
the completion of the Custody Chapter, this Section has not been drafted
yet. However, examining the catalogue of errors into which the exclusion-
ary rule has fallen, we may identify the features any new rule or court
proceeding must satisfy:
1. It must systematically aid in the devel-
opment of the law of arrest, search
and in-custody investigation, with such
detail as to be a comprehensive ref-
-,0 The complaint also requested that the master be directed to hold public hearings
at which the public could *'present plans for the rehabilitation of the Police
Department, tinder the supervision of this Court."
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erence for law enforcement officers.
As a code remedy, it must be partic-
ularly adapted to elaboration and en-
forcement of code provisions.
2. If it is to be a court process, decisions
must be made under circumstances
other than individual adversary pro-
ceedings brought to the court's atten-
tion on a random basis. Presentation
of the facts surrounding the police
conduct must be adequate to determine
whether the actions complained of are
isolated instances of an errant officer
or a pervasive policy of the depart-
ment. If the complaint involves de-
partment policy, there must be room
for inquiry into the considerations
involved in such conduct and the
context in which it took place.
3. Decisions must be systematically com-
municated to the policy-making ma-
chinery of law enforcement agencies.
4. Means must be provided a) to secure
voluntary compliance, b) to require
compliance where it is not forthcoming
voluntarily and c) to maintain juris-
diction so as to monitor compliance
and to modify findings and directions
as needed. The proceedings should be
unconcerned with discipline or punish-
ment of individual officers except where
such is necessary to require conformity
to court orders.
With these points in mind the general outlines of Draft Section 969.90
may be suggested. Any person or organization should be able to bring
an action to seek enforcement of the Code29 1 and the regulations or guide-
lines issued pursuant thereto,2 92 or to seek the issuance of additional
291 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 82 (1968).
-9-' If the prosecutor may be called on later to defend the police against non-observance
of regulations he drafts, query, will he not, as would any good lawyer, prepare
them with this in mind? Of course he will and should. But his counsel and
protection of the police, as with any lawyer, is bound by the law and by the
litigious qualities of the adversary. Moreover, it is hoped at least that the
forced working together of the police, prosecutor, courts and complainants will
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regulations. 29 3 Suit should be allowed without any special showing of
injury or clean hands on the part of the complainant; the Section is con-
cerned with the enforcement of the Code provision and any person who
brings such an action in alleging non-enforcement is rendering a public
service. He must stand on his allegations rather than on the purity of his
motive or on evidence of personal injury. Costs and attorney fees should
be available to the good faith litigant for the same reason, regardless of
final outcome of the suit.
Elaborate discovery proceedings, during which police officials testify as
to policy and procedure surrounding the actions complained of, should be
encouraged. Means to ease this task for both the police and the com-
plainant should be developed. Matters relating to police conformity to
statutes and supplementary regulations are by their nature a public con-
cern: police attempts to maintain their operations as a state secret are
inconsistent with the concept of the police as an administrative agency,
although occasionally there may be specific information which a court
finds is not in the public interest to disclose. 2 94 One result of the raising
of the blue curtain exposing the mechanics of police policy formation
should be increased police interest in the way those decisions are arrived
at. Moreover, it should be noted that none of the suits filed have been
concerned with internal police management except as it impinged on
complainants. State courts have been generous in their understanding of
police problems and there is no reason to think that this provision will
make them any less receptive to reasonable police arguments.
The provision should encourage voluntary compliance by use of the
pre-trial conference, where the court may often act as a mediating force.
With increasing expertise, the court may be able to provide an overview
which focuses on the common thread of public concern which runs
through the adversary interests of the police, the prosecutor and the
complainants. 295 Once a decree is entered the court should have full
result in a more long-range view of the police function on the part of all
participants.
293 See note 288 supra.
294 See note 251 supra.
295 The court noted one of the by-products of such a suit in Lankford v. Schmidt,
240 F. Supp. 550, 556 n. 4 (D. Md. 1965):
The evidence does show what has been com-
mon knowledge in Baltimore-that the rela-
tions between the Negro community and the
police have deteriorated seriously. The court is
grateful to the amici curiae, who with the
approval and cooperation of counsel for both
sides were instrumental in the organization of
a bi-racial committee which has begun its efforts
to establish better communications between the
Negro community and the police, and thereby
to improve the relations between them.
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equity powers for its extension, modification or continuation. 29 6 Return-
ing to the question asked at the beginning of this section by Professor
Packer, "If the police break the rules, what should the consequences be?,"
we now have an answer: the suggested court review, together with the
exclusionary rule which will remain, 29 7 offers a means of measuring the
seriousness of the breach and of repairing it.
VI. Conclusions
What has been suggested here is a goal-oriented code revision: the
objectives are the minimization of the number of minor offenders taken
into custody; the replacement of confusing terms and concepts with words
that describe actions to be taken; and the incorporation of controls on those
called upon to carry out code directives. Such notions are neither radical
nor impractical; nor do they go beyond the demands of current decisions
of the Wisconsin or the United States Supreme Courts. With more reason
the Code could be attacked as being too conservative, too overcautious,
too unimaginative and inadequate to deal with many of the substantial
social and legal problems which fall within the ambit of such a code.
In drafting a new code, one is restricted. Past law actually constitutes
the least of these, for the very assumption on which the revision is based
is that such law was deficient. Neither are the institutions themselves in-
herently impenetrable: that the police and the courts in many cases are
ready to undergo relatively substantial changes has been demonstrated
amply through the various Vera Institute projects described above.2 98
What then are the real sources of this resistance?
The resistance comes from the people who must agree on goals. The
people who draft codes today come from law schools, important law firms,
district attorney offices and judges' chambers. In one way or another
most of these men are administrators, businessmen of the law concerned
with the proper running of a system - their system. The system works
if it works for them; it does not work if cases are often overturned,
or if new procedures are constantly imposed from above, or if there is too
much work to be done. Law revision is provoked by such administrative
2 96 See Note, 78 HARv. L. REV. 973, 1086-1092 (1965). In Lance v. Plummer, 353
F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 929 (1966), a prior injunction
enjoined various organizations and defendants "and any other persons to whom
notice or knowledge of this order may come" from interfering with the right of
Negroes to seek housing accommodations. Shortly after its issuance, appellant
engaged in activities contrary to the injunction. The district court ordered him
to resign his position but the court of appeals modified the order permitting the
deputy to continue in the position if he could satisfy the district court of his
future compliance. See Note, 65 MICH. L. REV. 556 (1967).
297 The Code provisions might follow those set forth in the MODEL PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
CODE, supra note 261.
298 These illustrations of the possibility of change seem to me to be a more valuable
lesson than even the sum of these largely successful projects.
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squeakings. If consideration of the lowly defendant enters into this pic-
ture, it is because he has "constitutional rights"; that is, he has some-
thing which, if not paid appropriate attention, may result in convictions
overturned, new procedures imposed, and so on. These are corporate
goals, shared by the administrators of welfare systems, urban renewal pro-
grams, criminal correction houses, educational institutions. These goals
seem to be characteristic of systems where the persons who are "served"
have no standing to participate in the way they are served.
Lawyers are concerned with what the actors in the system can or must
do, not what they should do.299 Their goals consciously or unconsciously
tend to become oriented to the past and to "discovered" rights and
responsibilities. By their tradition, by their class, by their associates,
lawyers act as instruments of the past and as the mechanics, carpenters
and plumbers of the system, rather than as the architects. Codes prepared
by the lawyers in our legislatures, in our bar associations, and even in our
law schools are frightening in their lack of imaginative attempts to grapple
with social problems in social terms and to tell us how the proposal con-
tributes to the solution. People do best what they are trained to do. There-
fore, it is not surprising that legislators "solve" social problems by pass-
ing laws against them; nor that they sometimes react in the opposite way
by avoiding the formulation of laws when the lawyers feel politically un-
comfortable in acting or ill-equipped to do so. This is particularly true
where the legislators believe that another group in whom they have con-
fidence, such as the police, can do the job better. The Wisconsin experi-
ence is an example of this phenomenon.
The Code chapter on custody and disposition, largely as it is described
here, was presented as the work of a reporter. This Code is directed to
that committee of people who ultimately must make all the political
decisions and compromises in preparation of a code to be presented to the
legislature. In Wisconsin this Code was rejected by that committee as an
attempt to write a police manual. Revision continues, however, as a
committee of lawyers are now adapting the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure to Wisconsin's needs. 30 0
Lawyers are thus writing rules for lawyers -a perfectly sensible pro-
cedure. The revision committee was acting only with fitting modesty in
rejecting the Code and restricting its goals. But such action only em-
phasizes the seriousness and breadth of the problem of revision itself. We
must begin asking basic questions: What should be the goals of penal law
and criminal procedure revision? Is it feasible to bring "social reality to
the criminal law?" 301 What can and should be done by criminal sanction;
what alternatives are available? What is the interplay between substantive
299 See Goldstein, supra note 95.
300 See Hough, Report of the Judicial Council, 41 Wis. B. BULL. 33 (August 1968).
301 Morris, Politics and Pragmatism in Crime Control, 32 FED. PROB. 9, 15 (June
1968).
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and procedural law as it affects unlawful police activity? What role will
local communities play, or be forced to play, in the making of law and its
enforcement? What is the role of the lawyer where we deal largely in
terms of behavioral prediction? Perhaps the final question is which of these
are really questions for the law revisor and which are "non-questions"
that provide no leads for revision even when answered. 3 0 2 Only by pur-
suing such inquiries can we provide future revision efforts with meaning-
ful goals for effective and rational code revision.
Appendix
969.07 CIRCUMSTANCES IMPLYING CUSTODY. (1) IMPLIED RESTRIC-
TION ON LIBERTY. (2) REQUESTS TO APPEAR AT POLICE
STATION.
COMMENT: This Section concerns the ambig-
uous circumstances in which the officer does
not have enough evidence to act under Section
969.01 but he nevertheless wishes (1) to stop
the suspect in order to question him or (2) to
ask him to come to or stay in a certain place.
There is no code draft included under this Sec-
tion because Terry v. Ohio raises questions
about the adequacy of the original draft.
The purpose of this Section is to require the
officer to inform the person to be stopped of
the nature of the "detention" - that is, that
he is "free to go." If the officer fails to so in-
form the person, that person thereafter has all
the rights of one in custody including the right
to be warned of his right to silence and to
counsel. Failure to so warn the person of his
right to go would lead to exclusion of any
incriminating statements he might make while
subject to the policeman's authority.
The standard and the language used by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court to determine when
an officer must give a warning to the suspect
and the warnings to be given follow closely the
American Law Institute Model Code of Pre-
Arraignment Procedure, section 3.05.
969.20 PROCEDURES ON ORDERING A PERSON TO STOP: WARNING.
A law enforcement officer acting without a warrant who stops a person to determine
whether to issue a notice to appear or to take the person into custody shall
(1) Identify himself as such unless his identity is otherwise apparent; and
(2) As promptly as is reasonable under the circumstances, inform the person of the
reason he has been stopped, unless the reason appears to be evident.
969.22 PROCEDURES ON TAKING A PERSON INTO CUSTODY: WARNING.
Upon taking a person into custody, as promptly as is reasonable under the circum-
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stances, and in any event before engaging in any questioning about the crime, a law
enforcement officer shall
(1) Identify himself as such unless his identity is otherwise apparent;
(2) Inform the person that he is being taken to the police station;
(3) Inform the person of the reason he was stopped, unless the reason appears to be
evident;
(4) warn such person that he is not required to say anything or to answer any
questions, that anything that he may say may be used in evidence against him in a
court of law, that upon arrival at a police station he will be permitted to com-
municate by telephone with counsel, relatives, or friends and that if necessary, funds
will be provided to enable him to do so; and
(5) Inform such person that he has a right to the presence of an attorney at the
police station to advise him and to be present during any interrogation; that if he
cannot afford an attorney one will be provided for him, if he desires, prior to any
questioning about the crime.
Ref. ALI (1966) s. 3.08: Study Draft No. 1 (1968) s. A4.01(2).
COMMENT: Section 969.20 concerns the warn-
ing to be given to a person stopped by a law
enforcement officer because he is reasonably
believed to have committed a crime under
Section 969.01 but before the officer determines
whether the person must be taken into custody.
The officer must identify himself as a law en-
forcement officer and inform the person of the
reason he has been stopped as promptly as is
reasonable under the circumstances unless the
reason appears to be evident.
Once the officer has decided to take a person
into custody (969.22), he must inform the per-
son that he is being taken to the police station
or other place of detention and give him the
Miranda3 0 3 warnings. The person must be ad-
303 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966):
By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or other-
wise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.
But cf., Meyers v. United States, 388 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1968); People v.
Rodney, 21 N.Y.2d 1, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225, 233 N.E.2d 255 (1968), street ques-
tioning not, under circumstances, "custodial interrogation"; contra, Common-
wealth v. Jefferson, 423 Pa. 541, 226 A.2d 765 (1967).
In State v. Shoffner, 31 Wis.2d 412, 432-33, 143 N.W.2d 458, 468 (1966),
an officer arrested a person fleeing after his automobile struck a safety island.
In telephoning for assistance, he learned that there had been a robbery of a
nearby restaurant. He asked the suspect: "Do you know what else you are under
arrest for?" The incriminating reply was excluded for failure to warn. See also
State v. LaFernier, 37 Wis.2d 365, 155 N.W.2d 93(1967), where the suspect
agreed to a polygraph test the day before and "spontaneously" confessed orally
when he appeared to take it.
the main problem is . . . whether "custodial
interrogation" had begun - thus necessitating
the warnings - at the time the oral confession
was made .... the defendant was "interviewed"
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vised that at the place of detention he will be
permitted access to counsel, relatives and
friends, and that if he is indigent, he may tele-
phone at police expense.
Although Section 969.20 does not require a
warning because the purpose of the detention
is primarily to determine if custody is necessary,
the possibility of a disclosure of incriminating
information suggests that police should warn
at this point.
969.60 CONDITIONS OF INVESTIGATION OF A PERSON IN CUSTODY.
(1) WARNING AT THE OUTSET OF INTERROGATION. Immediately before
a person is questioned about a crime or an ordinance violation the person shall be
informed of the matters listed in s. 969.30(2)(c) - (g), unless this is made unnecessary
because arrangements already have been made to obtain for him the services of a
lawyer.
(2) DECEPTION AS TO COOPERATION. No law enforcement officer shall attempt
to induce a person in custody to make a statement or otherwise cooperate by indi-
cating that the person is legally obligated to do so, if no such legal obligation exists.
Ref. Study Draft (1968) A5.02.
(3) DECEPTION AS TO FACTS OR CONDITIONS. No law enforcement officer
shall knowingly make untrue statements to a person in custody with the intent to
induce that person to confess to a crime.
COMMENT: While these Sections are obvi-
ously important to the Code, this Article em-
phasizes the means for reducing the time a
person must be retained in custody. Moreover,
a considerable amount of space in publications
has already been devoted to in-custody investi-
gation and access to counsel (969.70, infra).
Section 969.60(1) requires substantially the
same warnings as given in 969.30(2) "before
a person is questioned ......
Section 969.30(3) precludes a law enforce-
ment officer from attempting to secure a con-
fession by knowingly making untrue statements
to a person in custody. This may be required
by Miranda which requires a waiver "knowingly
and intelligently" given. This may only be done
if the suspect acts on truthful representations.
969.70 ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND CONSULTATION RIGHTS.
(1) ACCESS TO COUNSEL - INDIGENTS. A person in custody who states that
he wants a lawyer, and who is financially unable to employ counsel, shall be pro-
the day before he confessed and was asked if
he wanted to take a lie detector test. We think
this is sufficient custodial interrogation to re-
quire the warnings to be given at that time.
155 N.W.2d at 99.
Wisconsin attorney general's special memorandum No. 37, In-Custody Interro-
gation: When Miranda Warnings are Not Required, 4 (Nov. 1, 1966), advised:
"If the officer is in doubt, the warnings should be given if the suspect's state-
ments are to be preserved for use at trial."
December 1968]
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vided with counsel pursuant to s ....... in any case where the station officer has
reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime in which the
maximum sentence exceeds six months' imprisonment, or the police wish to inter-
rogate the person about a crime, or where such is required by the United States or
Wisconsin constitutions.
(2) ACCESS TO COUNSEL -NON-INDIGENTS. A person in custody who states
that he wants a lawyer, and who is financially able to employ counsel but does not
know of one, shall be permitted immediately to telephone the lawyer or person or
agency designated by the county by the circuit court pursuant to s .......
(3) ACCESS OF COUNSEL TO CLIENT. (a) Counsel for the person in custody,
whether designated pursuant to subs. (1) or (2) or otherwise retained by or for the
suspect, shall be permitted to interview his client in person or by telephone in private
at the place of detention for a reasonable period of time at any hour of the day
or night. Counsel shall be allowed access to the person in custody whenever the
person in custody requests his presence. If no counsel for the person is present,
similar visitation privileges must be accorded to a relative or friend of the person
subject to the restriction of s. 969.30(5).
(b) A person in custody shall be given reasonable opportunity from time to time
during his detention to consult in private with counsel or any relative or friend
presen: in lieu of counsel, and, upon request, to use the telephone, subject to the
restriction of s. 969.30(5).
COMMENT: Subsection (1) is a compromise
between providing counsel to all persons in
custody who may desire a lawyer but may be
unable to afford one and the present situation
in which there is no provision for offering
counsel before the first court appearance. It
gives state-provided counsel to all persons who
are being investigated for a charge carrying a
penalty of imprisonment in excess of six
months. This criterion is related to Section
969.32(1) which requires that persons who are
charged with offenses where the statutory pen-
alty does not exceed six months' imprisonment
must be released within a two-hour period on
notice to appear or their promise to appear.
Neither the penalty likely to be incurred nor the
time of detention seems sufficient to cause sub-
stantial prejudice to the person who fails to have
an attorney during this short period. In the case
of those to be charged with more serious crimes,
even though they would be released within the
same time limit, the seriousness of the charge
and the desire for an attorney recommends that
the state provide counsel. This need not mean
that the lawyer must come to the stationhouse.
No Section has been drafted specifying the sys-
tem selected, but it world leave a certain dis-
cretion to each circuit court to select from
among several choices.
The Subsection also requires that counsel be
provided whenever "the police wish to interro-
gate the person about a crime." This is to
prevent the anomalous situation in which the
police have to warn the suspect that he is
entitled to a lawyer before answering any ques-
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tions but are unable to produce one if requested
in response to the offer.
Subsection (2) concerns the person who is
financially able to pay for an attorney but who
does not know one. It has been the custom
for the police to hand the suspect a telephone
book from which he may select an attorney
of his "choice." Such a "system" is a self-
administered insult to the legal profession be-
cause it is the profession which has permitted
the condition to develop.

